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Abstract

This research argues that the information security governance objectives should be
grounded in the values of organizational members. Research literature in decision sciences
suggest that individual values play an important role in developing decision objectives.
Information security governance objectives, based on values of the stakeholders, are
essential for a comprehensive security control program. The study uses Value Theory as a
theoretical basis and value focused thinking as a methodology to develop 23 objectives for
information security governance. A case study was conducted to reexamine and interpret
the significance of the proposed objectives in an organizational context. The results
suggest three emergent dimensions of information security governance for effective control
structure in organizations: resource allocation, user involvement and process integrity. The
synthesis of data suggests eight principles of information security governance which
guides organizations in achieving a comprehensive security environment. We also present
a means-end model of ISG which proposes the interrelationships of the developed
objectives.

Contributions

are

noted

and

xii

future

research

directions

suggested.

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction
This research is about designing internal control objectives for maximizing
Information Security Governance (ISG) in organizations. Adequate internal controls are an
essential part of the governance structure in an organization. The creation and
implementation of these controls are essential in order to streamline organizational
processes.
Security controls in the context of information security governance are primarily aimed at
achieving three things: managing the business process integrity, ensuring business
continuity and aligning organizational objectives with those of the security program
(COSO, 2004). A poorly designed control structure is incapable of communicating top
management‘s objectives and philosophy to the employees. Information security
governance objectives convey the management‘s goals for the security program and its
expectations from the organizational members for the achievement of these objectives.
Lack of proper security governance objectives can lead to faulty design of controls, which
result in information security problems. Hence, an understanding of the process of
designing internal control objectives is imperative.
There is evidence in extant literature which points to a lack of understanding about the
process of designing internal control objectives. Most of the prevalent internal control
models are atheoretical and do not provide insight into the design process of such
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objectives. This research also makes a contribution towards the design of internal control
objectives for information security governance from a value-focused perspective.
The overall aim of this research is to develop information security governance objectives
for organizations which are theoretically grounded and based on the values of the
stakeholders. In pursuance of this aim, this study elicits individual values for internal
controls in information security governance context, creates a means-end framework of
fundamental objectives of internal control objectives, examines the theoretical framework
through an in-depth case study and proposes ISG principles for implementation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the nature of the
research and section 1.3 establishes the importance of the research problem. Section 1.4
presents the scope of the research and section 1.5 presents the structure and description of
the whole dissertation.
1.2 Nature of the research
There is a surfeit of reported security breaches which have resulted in huge losses
to organizations resulting from inadequate security controls. According to the Global
Security Survey by Deloitte (2006), many financial institutions still have not felt the need
to measure the effectiveness of their information security controls, leading to serious
organizational vulnerability. Cases of serious insider breaches suggest two things:
First, the internal control objectives are incapable of checking and preventing such
incidents proactively. Second, the control objectives are either inadequately conveyed to
the organizational members or the objectives fail to motivate the members to align their
personal objectives with security control objectives. The ―tone at the top‖ is ineffective in
2

conveying the right message to the employees. When the individuals are unable to identify
with the control objectives and the lack of alignment between individual and corporate
goals is palpable, then this lacuna becomes evident through internal breaches.
This research argues that information security governance objectives of an organization
should be grounded in the individual values of organizational members to provide a better
control structure. Designing and implementing internal controls is an important part of
effective information security programs. This study focuses on eliciting individual values
for designing internal controls for information security governance. Studying the value
propositions of employees for information security governance would identify the deepseated values of people within organizations. This would facilitate a ―bottoms up‖
approach for designing of control objectives and governance.
The basic research question that guides this research is ―What are the information security
governance objectives to be followed to keep organizations secure?‖ In pursuit of a
comprehensive addressal of this question, the sub questions that need to be answered are:
1. What should be the nature and scope of ISG objectives for defining and
developing internal controls such that information security can be maintained?
2.

What are the principles to be adhered to in order to ensure good information
security governance in an organization?

3. How can organizations improve their information security governance
practices?
1.3 Importance of the research problem

3

Organizations face a major problem in the rampant lack of proper information
security governance. Due to inadequate information security governance, security incidents
are on the rise, making managers nervous about their ability to minimize risks and
vulnerabilities in information systems. The concerns about security breaches in
organizations are steadily increasing and can mainly be divided into four types (Parker,
2006):
 Increasing security incidents: The number of security threats is increasing, as
evidenced by numerous surveys and research. According to CERT sources, security
incidents have risen 2099 % from 1998- 2002- an average annual growth rate of
116 % (CERT, 2006).
 Sophisticated nature of security breaches: It is no longer a secret that most security
breaches are caused by insiders. The new threats are becoming increasingly
complex and sophisticated in nature. Currently rampaging viruses have the
capability of shutting down the entire IT network in the organization.
 Increasing regulatory pressure: Many governmental regulations have acknowledged
the importance of information security in the knowledge economy. Regulations
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) and
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide a lot of
institutional pressure for better security preparedness. There are strict requirements
in the form of internal control management processes, which are pushing up the
strategic importance of security in organizations.
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 Dynamic security needs: Reactive and ad hoc security measures can only provide
temporary relief from particular kinds of security threats. Security management has
to be proactive to enable flexibility on the part of management to combat unseen
threats. This needs to be inbuilt in the system and adaptive modular approaches
need to be installed.
So how do organizations deal with the situation? Global security surveys conducted by
four major consulting firms (Deloitte, KPMG, PWC and E&Y, 2006) to understand
organizational responses to security problems show: more awareness of security as a
strategic issue in organizations, more investments in security programs, increased
acceptance of the reality of internal threats and more security issues in boardrooms, as
compared to any other year. Even though there is an increase in security awareness of
organizations, the numbers of security attacks and resulting breaches have recorded a
corresponding rise to reach an unprecedented level. It is an indicator of the fact that
organizations are unable to generate fundamental and effective responses to security issues
in general.
The lack of effective information security governance in organizations is a result of
security governance objectives being inadequately defined and implemented. If the
objectives are not in place, it naturally follows that there cannot be adequate controls to
achieve them. This is made evident by the fact that most security breaches are not technical
but socio-organizational in nature. A study on security breaches in finance industry
reported that most security incidents were not technically sophisticated. These incidents
typically involved exploitation of vulnerabilities such as business rules or organizational
5

policies (CERT 2004). The lack of proper information security governance objectives in
organizations are manifested in two ways: inadequate internal control structure and
increased insider threats. Most of the recent security failures can be traced to either of these
two consequences of inadequate ISG.
There is a plethora of reported security breaches resulting in huge losses to organizations,
which are a direct result of inadequate controls. The recent 2008 episode at Societe
Generale where more than 4 billion Euro were wiped out of the banks assets by an insider
is a pertinent example. The organization has blamed employee Jerome Kerviel for the
colossal loss. He has been charged with hacking into the bank‘s computers, falsifying
documents and breach of trust (Forte and Power, 2008). Kerviel circumvented obsolete
procedures about reporting transactions in the bank and exposed it to exceptionally high
risks in the futures trading market. The banks losses were in the region of $7 billion and it
is speculated that this breakdown fueled the U.S. Federal Reserve‘s emergency 0.75% rate
cut in interests. The bank also confirmed that it has instituted "additional control
procedures" to prevent a reoccurrence of similar rogue trading in the future (Forte and
Power, 2008).
Some of the most glaring examples of security failures of catastrophic proportions can be
attributed to inadequate control structures in organizations. Fiascos such as the demise of
the Barings Bank, Kidder Peabody and the above mentioned Societe Generale case reflect
on the inability to institute adequate internal controls and Enron‘s failure to ensure
integrity of business processes clearly point to the increasing need for effective control
structures.
6

Cases of lack of integrity leading to lapses in information security governance abound.
Recently the office of Ohio Secretary of State posted SSNs, date of births and personal
information of citizens on a state website as part of Standard Security Practices (Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse 2006). The Department of Social Services in Los Angeles reported
boxes of files containing personal identifiable information such as W-2, medical
information and SSN being left unattended and unshredded, which exposed more than
2,000,000 individuals to security risks (Rutgers Identity Theft Center, 2006). These
breaches are a glaring example of the lack of adequate internal controls and poor
implementation of controls that do exist. It is not surprising that the argument to ―make
information security a boardroom issue‖ (Coviello and Swindle 2006) is being repeated
and is gaining validity. Cyber Security Industry Alliance, in its National Agenda for
Information Security for 2006 has urged the Federal Government to encourage private
sector to apply information security governance to business operations (p.6). There is
clearly a gap between management‘s objectives for information security governance and
employees‘ understanding of the same. There remains a palpable lack of proper written
security policies in organizations, especially in industries which are not extensively IT
dependent such as financial sector, education and government (Leyden, 2004). Many well
known episodes of business infidelity are an example of the vulnerability of state of the art
information security governance to break-ins and exploitation of the existing
vulnerabilities in the business process (Forte and Power, 2008).
Information security governance encompasses various aspects of organizational functions.
The design and development of applications to support the infrastructure for business
7

process and mechanisms for deploying these applications are under the purview of security
management. Also, policy development and implementation, internal control design and
implementation, management of technology and people; all of these constitute part and
parcel of the information security governance in an organization.
Another indicator of the lack of adequate ISG objectives, which is the internal threat from
employees, has always been acknowledged as a major source of security breaches in
organizations. 96% of the respondents in global security survey conducted by Deloitte
indicate that they are concerned about employee misconduct involving their information
systems (Deloitte, 2006). The survey identifies the majority of threats as being due to
errors and omissions (human error: 42%; operational error: 37%), rather than malicious
intent. It is important to note that, of those institutions that experienced a successful
internal breach, 28% were the result of experienced and intentional fraud and 18% were
due to the intentional leaking of customer data (Deloitte, 2006).
The numerous cases of serious insider breaches suggest two things as already mentioned:
First, the ISG objectives are incapable of checking and preventing such incidents
proactively. Second, the control objectives are either inadequately conveyed to the
organizational members or are not aligned with their personal objectives in an effective
way. The ―powers that be‖ are ineffective in conveying the right message to the
employees, resulting in the employee‘s isolation and alienation from the control objectives.
The apparent lack of alignment between individual and corporate goals is manifested in
internal breaches.
This leads to a significant question: What are the businesses doing about this situation?
8

It is not clear how organizations plan to combat these issues in security governance. The
global security survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coppers (PWC) shows that most
executives with security responsibilities in organizations worldwide have made little
progress in implementing strategic security measures that could have acted as a
fundamental inhibitor for various security incidents (PWC, 2006). Since, security
governance objectives are not being developed at the corporate level and are not being
integrated in the business processes, the risks in form of increased insider threats and
failure of controls still remain. Also, the lack of planning in governance objectives
obviously results in more reactive than proactive measures for dealing with security
threats.
Security is still perceived as a cost driver and not a value creator. Majority of the
organizations reported that their security is not in compliance with major regulations, such
as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), Sarbanes Oxley Act or
non-U.S laws such as European Union Data Privacy Directive, which have been around for
years (PWC, 2006). Thus mandating internal control assessment through regulations is
obviously not serving the purpose.
Information security governance practices depend on strong internal control management
techniques and a supportive control environment in an organization. Organizations that
reported their security polices and spending are more aligned with their business processes
experienced fewer financial losses and less network downtime than those that did not
(PWC, 2006). This is an indicator of the dire need for effective information security
governance programs in organizations. Correct information security governance objectives
9

are required to assure proactive and encompassing security measures which protect
organizations from threats. It is crucial to develop the right controls objectives and the
requisite controls to compliment these objectives along with their periodic assessment. The
overall security status of the organization is determined through an adequate assessment of
the controls (NIST special publication 800-53A, 2006). The selection and implementation
of security controls have major implications on the operations and assets of an
organization. Security controls are the safeguards that maintain the integrity of the
organizational information systems. The effectiveness of security controls must be
assessed to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, their
operation as per intention and requirement, and their effectiveness in producing the desired
outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system (NIST special
publication 800-53A, 2006).
1.4 Scope of the research
Three categories of definitions are required for anchoring the basic concepts in this
research. This section explicitly defines what we mean by information security, internal
controls, information security governance and individual values in this research. A cogent
definition of the basic constructs that guide this research will help the reader gauge the
conceptual foundation of this work.
Information security: Information security means protecting all information assets from
misuse, harm or any other unintended result. This includes securing information in
computers, maintaining integrity of business processes, retaining skilled knowledge
workers with their implicit knowledge and also encouraging employees to claim ownership
10

of their share of information assets (Dhillon 2006). Information is a shared asset, which
has to be protected from all possible distortions by everyone sharing it. This definition
adopts a holistic view of information systems security where information is secured
through technical, organizational and normative means.
Internal controls: Internal controls are a means to provide reasonable assurance that an
organization will achieve its business objectives while avoiding undesired risks (ISACA,
2004). Internal controls are policies, procedures, practices, and organizational structures
put in place to reduce risks. These also attempt to rationalize the organizational processes.
They operate at all levels in an organization and help in reducing risks involved at various
stages of the operation, thus helping the organization reach its business objectives (Dhillon
and Mishra, 2006).
Information security governance: ISG can be defined as ―a way of establishing and
maintaining a control environment to manage risks that relate to confidentiality, integrity
and availability of information and its supporting processes and systems (Moultan and
Cole, 2003)‖. This conceptualization suggests a technical orientation for security. Certified
Information Systems Auditor (CISA) Review Manual (2004) defines information security
governance as a ―focused activity with specific value drivers: integrity of information,
continuity of services and protection of information assets (pp.385)‖. This definition
suggests that due to global integration of organizations via networks, security has become
a significant governance issue and the end product of information security governance
process is the safety and security of data.
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Values: Value refers to the preferred or what is conceived as preferable to human mind
(Catton, 1954). An individual‘s preferential behavior shows certain regularities and this
pattern can be attributed to some standard or code, which persists through time providing a
basis by which people order their intensities of desiring various desiderata (something
desirable). Keeney (1992) conceptualizes value as ―what we care about and should be the
driving force for our decision making (pp. 3)‖. Values are more fundamental to a decision
context than the available alternatives. But in common practice, decision-making usually
focuses on the choice among existing alternatives.
Information systems security research has witnessed limited theory-developing efforts
(Weber, 2006). Specifically in the area of internal controls design and implementation for
security, there have been limited attempts to create or use existing theories. In this
research, a theory building exercise is performed. By analyzing individual values about
internal controls in organizations, we create a framework of means and fundamental
objectives. The conceptual framework thus developed provides a set of high-level
principles for internal controls design and implementation in the context of information
security. The interrelations between various objectives also provide an insight into
complex relationships and multipurpose roles that such objectives play.
This study is conducted using value theory as the theoretical basis and value focused
assessment as a methodology. Catton (1954) proposed value theory, which states that the
choices made by individuals over a period of time, shows a definite pattern and is guided
by the values internal to such people. The values, deep rooted in people‘s minds, are
manifested by the choices people make in complex situations. This theory provides an
12

appropriate basis for understanding the reasons for behavior of individuals in groups.
Keeney (1992) suggests a methodology to create decision objectives by studying
individual values in a decision context. This methodology- namely value focused thinking,
provides a way to elicit individual values and creates decision objectives about a problem.
A means-end framework can be created through this methodology, which provides highlevel guidance in decision-making.
The framework developed is used to explain ISG conceptualizations and practices through
an in-depth case study. This case study was conducted in the information technology
department of a state agency in Virginia, USA. The results from the interviews and
secondary data from the organization were used to reexamine the preliminary theoretical
model.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
Chapter two presents a review of the extant research literature. In this research, we
have primarily looked at three streams of research: information security research,
management controls or organizational design research literature and internal controls
research in information systems discipline.
Chapter three describes the theoretical basis and research methodology that this particular
research adopts. A discussion about value theory as a theoretical basis and value focused
thinking as a methodology is provided to conceptually ground the work.
Chapter four describes the creation of a means-end framework through the process of
interviewing information security professionals across industries. Using Keeney‘s value
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focused approach, a theoretical framework with means and fundamental objectives about
internal controls for information systems security is created from the interview data.
Chapter five describes a case study that was conducted to create an initial conceptual
framework about means and fundamental objectives regarding internal controls. In this
theory building exercise, this chapter also presents a validation of the theoretical model.
Chapter six describes data analysis results and their implications for information security
governance research in particular and information security research in general. The
synthesis of the results is presented and an answer to the ―so what‖ question of this
research is provided.
Chapter seven presents a mapping of our initial research questions to our findings. The
research contributions and limitations are suggested. Future research directions stemming
from this work are also suggested.
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CHAPTER 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The focus of this research is to develop internal control objectives for information
security governance. There is little research in the area of information security governance
(McFadzean et al., 2006; von Solms, 2006) and the available models have different
conceptualizations about the topic. For this research, as described in the previous chapter,
Information security governance is defining, implementing and monitoring security
controls (ITGI, 2004). Since it is a subset of information systems security research, it is
natural that research perspectives and trends in information systems security would
influence this research. Therefore, to gain an insight into the research in information
systems security governance, it is important to understand the prevalent research issues in
information systems security domain. Information systems security places more emphasis
on technical aspects of security than on its non-technical aspects in an organization
(Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon, 2001; Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001). Information systems
security research has traditionally been mechanistic in approach with a narrow focus on
ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data in the computer systems
(Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Baskerville and Sipponen, 2002). The narrow technical
approach overlooks other major organizational security vulnerabilities to information
systems in the form of lack of segregation of roles, disgruntled employees and inadequate
security policies (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that a review of
information systems security governance research shows similar trends and biases to be
inherited from the superset i.e. information security.
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Two broad orientations dominate the literature in information systems security governance
area: These are technical and socio-organizational orientation. Technically oriented
security governance research places a greater emphasis on using technical controls (such as
access controls and security architecture) to manage enterprise security. Socioorganizationally oriented security governance literature revolves more around formal and
informal controls (such as responsibility and accountability and control culture) to ensure
comprehensive security programs. A critical review of information systems security
governance models from research and industry standards for governance is presented. The
two perspectives described above are used to traverse the extant literature in information
systems security governance.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, the
first section discusses the technically oriented information systems security governance
literature. The second section discusses socio-organizationally oriented information
systems security governance literature. The third section discusses the current state of
extant literature in information systems security governance and analyzes its implications.
This discussion also presents the gaps in the literature as identified in the review. Finally,
the concluding section presents the assertions as these related to ISG practices.
2.2 Information Systems Security Governance: A Technical Orientation
As conceptualized by Moulton and Coles (2003), information systems security
governance from a technical perspective can be defined as ―a way of establishing and
maintaining a control environment to manage risks that relate to confidentiality, integrity
and availability of information and its supporting processes and systems.‖ Along similar
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lines, Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) Review Manual (2004) defines
information security governance as a ―focused activity with specific value drivers: integrity
of information, continuity of services and protection of information assets (pp.385)‖. This
definition suggests that due to global integration of organizations via networks, security
has emerged as a significant governance issue and the end product of information security
governance process is the surety of safe and secure data.
As mentioned above, research from this perspective is premised on the belief that security
governance is about managing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in
information systems. The emphasis is greater on data management than systems
management. With a technical scope, control objectives developed and controls deployed
focus on securing critical information in computer systems. The motivation being that
technical safeguards are the most important component of a security program and if
technical controls are in place, the organization is automatically more secure. Not only
some research models but also some of the prevalent security governance standards have
had technical focus.
ISO 17799, renamed as ISO/IEC 27002, is a prominent information security governance
framework with a technical orientation to security management. International Standards
Organization joined hands with International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) for
developing a series of standards for Information Security Management (ISM). These
standards are the best practices for security management and are also known as ISO/IEC
27000 (ISO27K) series of standards. As per the new release on security management,
ISO27k ―provides the means to implement effective information security management in
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compliance with organizational objectives and business requirements‖. Although
preliminarily released in 2006, ISO27k is far from complete. Currently only three
standards have been officially published (27001, 27002, and 27006) covering
implementation and maintenance of an ISM system, guidelines for conducting ISM in an
organization, and guidance for bodies that provide audit and certification of ISM systems.
There is a future expectation about many more such security standards.
ISO/IEC 27002 is a widely used information security management framework in North
America and Europe. The framework provides guidance about security in 11 different
areas (see table 2.1). ISO/IEC 27002 is exclusive to information security, and only
addresses that issue. It is divided into 10 sections, with 36 objectives. Each objective is
again divided into sub-objectives (ISO, 2005)
The framework provides the range of controls needed for securing information systems. It
is based on security risks assessment and provides the basis for cost justification and
improved productivity of security staff.
The major benefit of using ISO/IEC 27002 for information security governance is that it is
detailed and is targeted at people responsible for technical information security. The
framework provides much more guidance on precisely ‗how‘ things must be done (von
Solms, 2005). For example it gives guidance on what an information security policy should
look like in terms of structure and content. ISO/IEC 27002 is, in many cases, the
framework of choice of IT and information security managers because of its technical
superiority (von Solms, 2005).
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Table 2.1. Control Objectives from ISO/ IEC 27002
Control objectives from ISO 17799
1.

Business continuity planning

2.

Systems access control

3.

System development and maintenance

4.

Physical and environmental security

5.

Compliance

6.

Personnel security

7.

Security organization

8.

Computer and Network management

9.

Asset classification and control

10.

Security policy

11.

Incident management

There are some shortcomings of using this framework. It provides ‗stand alone‘ guidance
with a narrow focus on security management and cannot be integrated easily into a wider
framework for information technology governance (von Solms, 2005; Brown and Nasuti,
2005). The framework does have a list of proposed controls but fails to suggest how these
controls can be synchronized to achieve the maximum benefit (Eloff and Eloff, 2005). A
marked emphasis on just the technical aspects of security management makes it incomplete
as a framework for security governance area. With similar orientation, Information
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a widely used framework for referencing
security management principles. The framework was developed in UK by the Office of
Commerce. It identifies a broad range of processes that are considered as best practices for
information technology service management (see table 2.2).
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ITIL provides security from the service provider perspective, identifying the relationship
between security management and IT security officer (ITIL, 2007). It describes the role of
best practices for IT services. There are several guidelines in ITIL libraries about the
technical management of security. Targeted at people responsible for IT service
management, ITIL is a collection of books referred as best practices for IT service
management (Heschl, 2004).
The key to the growing success of ITIL is its flexibility. ITIL, unlike other process-focused
strategies for business improvement is not a methodology per se. ITIL consists of several
libraries of advice and guidance on how to deliver and support IT services. However, there
are many challenges which emerge while implementing ITIL in organizations.
Implementing ITIL brings about sweeping changes in an organization in the form of
changed processes and culture (Lange, 2007). It is difficult to assess the ―value‖ that is
added by implementing these changes. Also, ITIL is perceived as difficult to implement
considering the huge volume of advice that it offers. The framework currently offers a
library of 10 books on various IT service management topics. Organizations find it hard to
fully comprehend the meaning of the framework (Lange, 2007). In summary, ITIL is high
level, nonspecific and concentrates mainly on service of IT.
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Table 2.2. Service processes as identified by ITIL
Service processes from ITIL
1. Incident management
2. Change management
3. Problem management
4. Configuration management
5. Release management
6. Service level management
7. Continuity management
8. Capacity management
9. Financial management
10. Availability management
11. Security management
12. Help desk management

Managing security risks from the Internet is a challenge from the information systems
security governance perspective. Occurrence of business risks is becoming more imminent
as the corporate network, processes and critical business data are vulnerable to attacks
from the Internet (Segev et al., 1998). Denial of service attack is one of the big threats to
organizational security. Abouzakhar and Manson (2002) suggest innovative ways to
address different types of distributed denial of service attacks which have the ability to
respond quickly. The authors acknowledge the attacks on networks as a significant security
breach and in their suggestions to deal with these attacks they propose a model, with
intelligent fuzzy agents, which allocate resources dynamically to ensure availability of the
network for legitimate users without blocking useful protocols. This model is useful for
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managing security from specialized external threats, although it does not provide any
inputs for managing network breakdown threats from inside the organization.
Acknowledging the importance of managing Internet security threats, Qiang and Hua-ying
(2007) argue that Internet security governance is an iterative and continuously evolving
process. The authors propose a systematic model for the Internet security governance
based on the complexity theory and systems dynamics. The authors analyze the topology
characters of host objects and message spreading rules in the model. According to the
model, Internet security governance has four stages; Nodes identification (identify the
nodes which can carry viruses or messages that disrupt the system), topology structure
analysis (typology affects the spreading trends of the diseases or viruses depending on the
content on the web page), disease spreading analysis (describes the spreading speed of the
disease, its coverage, duration and so on) and security governance (suggests measures to
control the spreading of the disease in the network and verifies the measures through
systems simulations and case studies). The above model treats the Internet as a technical
system and does not acknowledge the importance of social and behavioral factors in
managing risks. The model forwards too simplistic a representation of the real threats to
the organizational networks on the Internet.
Along similar lines, with emphasis on technical supremacy to deal with information
security problems, Finne (1996) proposes an information security chain model for security
management in an organization. The model comprises twelve modules and eighty sub
modules, each emphasizing an area of security management. The model has a heavy
technical emphasis with modules such as computer security, distributed systems, operation
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security, protection against theft, protection against fire and water, electricity distribution,
internal and external threats, communication, external contact, contingency planning,
personnel security, contract employees and visitors, attitude towards security issues,
security questions and the environment. The model is comprehensive and touches upon the
various sources and aspects of a security breach. But a model of this nature is too broad in
scope and does not take into account the contextual security governance challenges that an
organization faces.
In technically oriented security governance research, information security architecture is
considered a crucial aspect of governance. From this perspective, researchers use security
objectives as overarching access control and authentication rules for a computer system
(e.g. Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). Sherwood (1996) argues that enterprise security
architecture is extremely important to adequately comprehend and manage the security
needs of the organization. Sherwood (1996) proposes a security governance model namely
Sherwood Associates Limited Security Architecture (SALSA). In this multi-layered model,
the top layer is the business requirements definition stage and at each subsequent lower
layer, a new level of abstraction is developed. The lower layers define major security
strategies, security services and security mechanisms. The last layer suggests ways of
selecting technologies and products. This process approach to security management
encourages everyone to participate in the security development program. The model helps
in developing a participative security architecture which provides technical capabilities to
meet the business requirements. For this reason, the model is more anecdotal and
conceptual in nature rather than being driven by a theory or rigorous research. The
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inconsistent implementation of security management controls is considered a major risk in
today‘s networked environments. This is a significant security issue as there is no benefit
in installing sophisticated access controls on one system to create a ―trusted environment‖
when those controls can be simply bypassed by an unauthorized user gaining access to that
―trusted environment‖ through a gateway connected system which has inadequate controls
installed (Ward and Smith, 2002). Lack of proper controls results in exposing
organizations to new vulnerabilities and compromising the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information systems. Development of access control policies to protect all
systems is essential while implementing effective internal control processes consistently
across all systems (Stoupa and Vakali, 2007).
Ward and Smith (2002) articulate the need for access control policies for information
systems. The authors argue that is important to have governance guidelines and risk
management strategies to protect information assets of an organization. Access control
policies help the management in mitigating risks within the organization and allow
effective segregation of roles for overall enterprise security. The paper proposes a high
level approach to implementing security governance objectives through information
security responsibilities, management accountability policy, and other access control
security policies in individual and distributed systems. The proposed model adequately
emphasizes the importance of access controls for networked environment. The model is
limited in its application at an enterprise level as there is asymmetrical emphasis on access
control policies compared to other technical requirements for governance. The proposed
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model has not been tested in real organizational setting, thus its applicability is
questionable.
Booker (2006) emphasizes the importance of maintaining a database of critical network
and information assets for effective information systems security governance. It is a
challenge to proactively manage security programs and minimize costs of the security
initiatives. To overcome the above problem, a security management model is suggested.
The model consists of five components (see table 2.3):
Table 2.3: Security management model (Booker, 2006)
Stages
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Objectives
Understanding disruptive forces
Implementing a holistic approach
Measuring and communicating value
Aligning key security initiatives with business strategy
Managing the program globally while allowing regional control

In understanding disruptive forces component, the author emphasizes the importance of
governance and compliance, mobile workforce, business justification requirement and
reactivity of businesses and suggests measures to deal with these issues. Implementing a
holistic approach suggests that it is important to map security requirements into a simple
taxonomy that provides a comprehensive security framework. For measuring and
communicating value, it is suggested that calculation of Total Economic Impact (TEI) is
used as it provides a better foundation for communicating the investment profile required
for information security. Under aligning key security initiatives with business strategy, the
author suggests that network security, communications security, identity management and
operational risk management are necessary. And finally under managing the program
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globally while allowing regional control component, alignment of global practices based
on proven and acknowledged security standards, such as ISO17799, is recommended. This
helps the business to document its security practices both internally and to the customers
and trading partners. The model suggests that professional security operations must deliver
security for the IT environment with appropriate value, service levels and accountability to
the top management of the enterprise. This model is technically oriented and undermines
the importance of social and behavioral influences on security management. The proposed
model is generalized and lacks focus on ―how‖ to operationalize the above ideas.

The research in information systems security governance area with a technical focus can be
summarized as follows:
Security governance is viewed as managing confidentiality, integrity and availability of
data. Hence emphasis on technological infrastructure is more in order to prevent the
presence of technical loop holes in the systems.
1. Information systems security governance models are primarily focused on
information systems security architecture, authentication, access control, Internet
security and network management.
2. Security control objectives are derived from the technical requirements of the
organization. It is assumed that if security is managed on the technical front, it
would automatically make the overall organization secure.
3. Strong technical solutions to ensure security are adequately understood,
implemented and used by the end users as intended by the management.
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4.

It is believed that for a governance model to be successful, organizations require
coordinated incident response as well as a comprehensive knowledge framework of
network, applications and business requirements.

Use of such technically oriented models is more popular as businesses are eager to grasp
the idea of implementing complex technological controls to protect the information held in
their computer systems (Dhillon, 2006). The governance models reviewed in this section
encourage competent technical capabilities to support the entire security portfolio.
2.3 Information Systems Security Governance: A Socio-Organizational Orientation
Socio-organizationally grounded research in information systems security
governance is premised upon the belief that management of formal and informal
environment in an organization is more important than the management of the technical
requirements. The research in this area emphasizes the importance of formalized
procedures and individual inputs in the governance process. Researchers in this domain
highlight the management‘s role in security governance. The management requires control
objectives to define the goal of implementing policies, procedures, organizational
structures and responsibilities to ensure that business objectives are met and undesirable
events prevented. There are several existing frameworks for information systems security
governance, in research and in practice, that advocate the socio-organizational approach to
security management.
Grounded in socio-organizational perspective, Control Objectives for Information and
Related Technology (CobiT) provides guidance on management‘s role in security
management. It is the most widely used information technology (IT) governance standard
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in United States. The framework provides ―good practices‖ across a domain and a process
framework that presents activities in a manageable and logical structure (ITGI, 2007).
CobiT helps an organization align its business goals with IT goals. It emphasizes the
importance of business needs that are satisfied by each of its objectives (Ridley et al,
2004).
CobiT provides seven criteria that generally define what business requires of IT (see figure
2.1). CobiT requires IT to deliver the information that an organization needs to meet its
objectives. The framework divides IT processes into 34 types and categorizes these into
four domains: Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Delivery and Support, and
Monitor and Evaluate. These domains contain 34 high level control objectives and 215 sub
control objectives. These objectives are implemented through the use of control practices.

Figure 2.1. Interrelationships of COBIT components (source: COBIT 4.1, ITGI 2007, pp. 8)
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CobiT is continuously kept up to date and harmonized with other standards and guidelines.
There are several benefits of using CobiT as a governance framework for IT. Some of
these are: better alignment with business, a simplistic view of IT‘s role in the organization,
process orientation allowing ownership and responsibilities and CobiT popularity with
third parties and regulators. CobiT is designed to provide more focus on aligning IT
control objectives with the business processes of an organization and allows management
to benchmark its control environment to standards of policy and good practices
implemented worldwide (Ward and Smith, 2002).
Use of CobiT for information systems governance is not without criticisms. The
framework represents the consensus of experts on good practices but it is not theory driven
or empirically validated in research. The model is strongly focused on control and less on
execution. The control objectives are very high level and generic and are not specifically
tailored for security purposes. There is only one control objective that talks about security
in any detail. DS5 is a high level control objective which says ―Ensure System Security‖
and has 21 sub objectives to it. But these are not the only objectives relevant for
information security governance (von Solms, 2005).
Along similar lines, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) framework also describes a unified approach for evaluation of the internal control
system that a management designs with the objective of achieving reasonable assurance of
the fundamental business objectives. COSO was developed to provide consistent platform
for developing and measuring effective internal controls across industries. The COSO
framework suggests five control components (see table 2.4). These are:
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Table 2.4. COSO components

1. Control Environment
2. Risk Assessment
3. Control Activities
4. Information and Communication
5. Monitoring

The control environment defines the tone of an organization and the way it operates,
providing both discipline and structure. Organizations with effective control environments
set a positive example from ―top management‖ and try to create integrity and control
consciousness. This objective primarily provides the ethics, direction and philosophy to
the organization (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006). Ramos (2004) argues that control
environment is the foundation for all other components of internal controls. The risk
assessment component suggests a process through which the management identifies the
potential threats that can prevent the organization from meeting its business objectives.
The controls activities include the operationalization of policies and procedures that are
created and established to show management‘s intention of securing its assets. There could
be several controls such as access control, physical controls, verifications and segregation
of duties. The nature of the activities creates awareness and responsibility among the
people who undertake the tasks. The information and communication component
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emphasizes on reports containing operational information. Organizations need tools to
capture and communicate relevant information to ensure the integrity of controls.
Information thus obtained is critical to the processes of conducting, managing and
controlling the operations of the organization. The monitoring component ensures that
systems that are performing as intended controls are delivering the desired results.
Monitoring can be accomplished by continuous checks and balances that occur during
normal operations or also through separate evaluations by management, with the assistance
of the internal auditors. The extent of ongoing monitoring usually determines the need for
separate evaluations. The latest version of the COSO consists of eight components as three
more controls have been added to the existing five controls. These are: objective setting,
event identification and risk response.
The popular model COSO is not without its criticism. The set of objectives suggested in
this model are all from the management perspective and the importance of maintaining a
technical infrastructure is not emphasized. Risk assessment component suffers from a
myopic view of security threats and is more concerned with data security than formal or
informal level of organizational vulnerabilities. Measuring the effectiveness of internal
controls is a difficult and an ongoing process (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006) and COSO does
not provide any feedback mechanism for the improvement of the control objectives.
A review of the research literature in information systems security governance from socioorganizational perspective suggests four emergent themes which are influencing the
majority of research initiatives. These themes are a) security policy approach b) life-cycle
development approach c) unified approach d) and end user participation approach. Each of
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the themes with examples of research being conducted in the particular area are discussed
below.
Development and use of security polices for effective governance is heavily researched
from socio-organizational perspective of information systems security governance. There
have been several calls in information systems security research literature to aid
information security policy formulation (Von Solms, 1996; Straub and Nance, 1990).
Straub and Nance (1990) use general deterrence theory to facilitate security policy
formulation. The objectives of the theory hinge on maximizing prevention and minimizing
undetected and unpunished abuse (Straub and Welke, 1998). Moultan and Cole (2003)
emphasize the importance of sound security policies as being vital for a security program
and provide guidelines for development of internal controls (Cockcroft, 2002, Straub and
Welke, 1998). The authors categorize security governance on the following dimensions
(see table 2.5): responsibilities in practices, strategies and objectives, management,
resource management, regulatory compliance, policies and procedures and external
communication. The authors present a comprehensive set of governance principles which
have been emphasized in the literature emerging from various quarters over the years.
Table 2.5. Governance objectives (source: Moultan and Cole, 2003)
Dimensions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Objectives
Responsibility in practices
Strategies
Management‘s role
Resources
Regulatory compliance
Policies and procedures
External communications
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The objectives suggested in Moultan and Cole (2003) model are socio organizationally
grounded and provide good reference point for developing a governance framework.
Inversely, the authors underplay the role of technical expertise required for security
governance. Also, the suggested objectives are based on the conceptual understanding of
the authors and have no empirical support.
Along the same lines, Eloff and Eloff (2005) suggest a comprehensive approach towards
information systems security governance with well managed controls to minimize risk and
ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The authors propose a framework called PROTECT,
an acronym for the seven components in the model. The components are: Policy includes
security policies, procedures and standards. It also includes well documented guidelines for
implementation. Risk component suggests the use of methodologies such as CRAM and
Octave for identifying vulnerabilities in the system. Objective refers to the main objective
of the framework, which is the intention to minimize risk exposure by maximizing security
through implementation and review of set of controls. Technology refers to the systems
component (hardware, software) of the IT infrastructure. Execute component refers to
proper infrastructure of security controls from maintenance and management. Compliance
component refers to both internal as well as external compliance with polices and
regulations. It comprises codes of practice, legal requirement and international standards.
Team component refers to the employees‘ responsibility towards security and aims at
creating a work culture with improved security. The model presents both technical and
people‘s ―perspective‖. This model is very high level. The drawback of the model is that
there is obvious lack of guidance on how and when to use these objectives.
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Security policies, standards and procedures are also highlighted in Information Security
Architecture (ISA) model proposed by Tudor (2000). The author defines information
security architecture as the process of developing risk awareness through assessment of
current controls. ISA also includes the alignment of existing controls to meet the
organization‘s information security requirements.

Figure 2.2 Information security architecture model (source: Tudor 2000)

ISA has been conceived as a management process intertwined with day to day operations.
In this approach, five key principles are highlighted (see figure 2.2): Security organization
and infrastructure, Security policies, standards and procedures, Security program, Security
culture awareness and training and Monitoring compliance. The model proposes that all
individuals should know their responsibilities with regard to protecting the organization‘s
resources. The architecture is based on a holistic mix of organizational and technical
aspects of security governance. The biggest drawback of the model is that it is very high
34

level, basic, non-iterative and difficult to apply for developing specific measurable security
controls.
McCarthy and Campbell (2001) also emphasize the role of security policies in their
proposed Capability Maturity Model approach for security governance. The model
provides a set of security controls which can be used to protect information assets against
harm. The model encompasses seven main control levels (see table 2.6):
Table 2.6. Capability Maturity Model (source: McCarthy and Campbell, 2001)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Control Levels
Security Leadership
Security Program
Security Policies
Security Management
User Management
Information Asset Security
Technology Protection and Continuity

In the model, Security leadership stresses the importance of executive level security
representatives within an information security strategy. In the next level, Security program
provide defined roles and responsibilities for security tasks. Security policies which
comprise the third level emphasize the use of security standards, policies, and guidelines
for technical, procedural and human aspects of information systems security. Security
management component deals with monitoring people and technology in daily operations.
User management deals with managing user profiles and ensuring that users are made
aware that they are being watched. Information asset security encompasses the technology
aspects of security i.e. maintain firewall, network and database. Technology protection and
continuity component maintains the IT environment and its continuity including disaster
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recovery aspects. The objective of the Capability Maturity Model approach is to start at a
strategic level and work down to the technology level, guided by the direction provided at
the top level. The uniqueness of this model lies in its assessment of the current information
security capabilities to architect an appropriate security solution. The main criticism lies in
the anecdotal nature of the model and lack of theory or empirical validation to lend it
credibility.
Security polices are an important component of the information security governance model
proposed by Da Veiga and Eloff (2007). The authors propose an integrated information
security governance framework which is a result of triangulation of components of many
of the above mentioned models. The framework is partitioned into 4 levels namely A, B, C
and D. Level A comprises strategic, managerial and technical protection components.
Level B consists of six main categories that are grouped according to three levels A
categories. Level C is a comprehensive list of information security components categorized
under level B components. All the main categories are influenced by change depicted at
Level D.
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Figure 2.3. Information security governance framework (source: Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007)

The six main categories of this model are (see figure 2.3): Leadership and Governance,
Security management and organization, Security policies, Security program management,
User security management, Technology protection and Operations. The framework can be
deployed as a single point of reference for governing information security. The control
objectives listed in the framework provide a wide range of options to protect the
organization. The information security management system proposed is based on a
common security standard namely BS 17799. The model aims to ensure that best practices

37

of an organization are documented, reinforced and improved over time. The main benefit
of the model is that it could also be used as an information security culture assessment tool
to measure the acceptable level of controls consciousness. Action plans can then be
employed for areas of development. The model‘s criticism is that it is based on personal
intellectual understanding of the researchers and a thorough review of the literature. There
is no empirical work to support or dismiss the importance of the above framework.
The main problem of governance models with a policy focus is the little or no emphasis
placed on feedback and modification with changing business requirements. Security
polices should be aligned with the security governance objectives. These in turn should be
reviewed with changing technological developments (Lindup, 1996).
Rees et al (2003) have criticized current approaches to policy development and propose the
use of Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in E-Business Security (PFIRES) model.
Initially developed for e-commerce activities, the PFIRES model addresses the needs of
security polices for any organization with IT and Internet operations. The framework
consists of four stages: assess, plan, deliver and operate. The assess stage includes policy
and risk assessment whereas plan stage involves requirement definition and development
of security policy in alignment with business objectives. In delivery stage, controls are
defined and implemented where as in operate stage all control processes are monitored and
reviewed. This model emphasizes the importance of feedback in all stages. The main
drawback of the model is that it is entirely focused on security policies as a governance
mechanism. Security policies are a required but not a self sufficient condition for good
information systems security governance.
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In the life-cycle approach, the underlying assumption is that information systems security
governance is an ongoing process and needs to be viewed from a business process
perspective. The models suggested in this stream of research are process based and the
stages defined are similar to those of software life-cycle development. The security
governance models with requirement analysis, design, implementation and testing have a
solid foundation in the systems approach underlying many IS development and
management approaches. Some of the examples of process models are presented below:
Kolokotronis et al (2002) propose a multi-dimensional model with following objectives:
business needs or requirement analysis; risk and cost assessment; security strategy
implementation and monitoring. The authors suggest that security should be managed at a
corporate level and not at the local level to solve specific technical problems. Moultan and
Cole (2003) present a similar argument in support of treating security governance as an
enterprise issue to establish an adequate control environment. It is important to identify
risks so that management can assign responsibility to the right people to develop and
implement appropriate controls to mitigate the risk.
Table 2.7 Information security governance objectives (source: Kolokotronis et al, 2002)
Number of
dimensions
1.
2.
3.
4.

Objectives
Requirements analysis
Risk and cost assessment
Security strategy
Monitoring

Using a similar approach, Straub and Welke (1998) present a security risk planning model
that comprises four stages: security problem definition, risk analysis, alternative
generation, and planning decision. The authors argue that very little is available in
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literature of the present to describe an overall approach to security planning and evaluation
process (Straub and Welke, 1998). Both the models discussed above (Kolokotronis et al,
2002; Straub and Welke, 1998) have a process orientation to security governance. The
models provide high level objectives for defining specific security objectives. The
objectives are vague, difficult to implement and not helpful in developing specific
information systems security governance objectives and their related controls. The main
limitation of the studies is a lack of scientific evidence concerning the practical usability of
the results.
In the unified approach of information systems security research, the central premise is that
both organizational and technical aspects of security governance should be combined for
increasing overall security. The base assumption here is that managerial focus for security
governance is required for the technological solutions to work efficiently. Dutta and
McCrohan (2002) argue that sophisticated security technologies can be rendered
ineffective by the failure to differentiate among critical information assets, poorly designed
operating procedures or lax attitudes towards security within the organization.
Poole (2006) argues for an information security framework established by combining the
best of ISO 17799 and COBIT into an information security benchmarking model. This
model meets the corporate governance requirements by focusing on both the control and
accountability framework. The author argues that these benchmarking models are being
successfully deployed in UK and across Europe. Dutta and McCrohan (2002) present a
security governance model which comprises three dimensions: organization, critical
infrastructure and technology. The role of management in this model is to assess the
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criticality of data sources and develop controls for the organization. The authors argue that
holistic security management requires interplay of technological, organizational and
critical infrastructure elements. Hence, awareness and commitment of the senior
management is required to develop a control environment that balances the costs and
benefits of security controls, keeping in mind the level of risk faced by the organization
(Dutta and McCrohan (2002). The model proposed is comprehensive and deals with both
technological as well as socio-organizational elements. The drawback of this model is that
is based purely on authors‘ conceptualization. The model is subjective at best and lacks
empirical validation.
Along the same lines, Lindup (1996) also argues that the management in the organization
does not operate in isolation. The effectiveness of the security governance is dependent on
many factors (see figure 2.4) that include: business processes, application systems,
technical security, procedures and human factors.

Figure 2.4 information security management model: Lindup (1996)
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The emphasis again is on socio-organizational as well as technical issues in governance
and on challenges that arise in managing the human capital. The author argues that
technology can impact organizational security in unexpected ways. Technology can make
existing controls in the higher layers ineffective or make new control mechanisms possible.
It can impact security and control in three different ways: creating new security
vulnerabilities, changing the way business is done and changing the way the workplace is
organized (Lindup, 1996). The pervasive presence of technology in businesses makes it
difficult to isolate the technical aspects from managerial aspects of governance. More than
the technology, it is ―the way a technology is used‖ that has the greatest impact on the
security of the information systems (Lindup, 1996). However, this model too is based on
conceptual understanding of the author and not on a solid theoretical platform.
From end user participation perspective of information systems security governance
research, control objectives should convey the value and beliefs of the employees actually
implementing the controls. The central assumption is that a ―bottom-up‖ approach to
development of security governance objectives increases the alignment between individual
objectives and organizational security objectives, resulting in organizations which are more
secure. The researchers in this domain of security governance research encourage
employee participation in governance.
The advocates of this school of thought argue that very few organizations involve end
users in development of information security strategy and policy making (Warman, 1992).
This might result in making the security objectives too complex and weak controls which
would lead to a break down in security (Angell, 1996). Also ignorance or incorrect
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procedures can lead to potential disasters (Warman, 1992). In a study in 2002 advocating
use of meta policy for security in emergent organizations, Baskerville and Siponen argue
that changed security measures should not spark conflict between management and the
employees in an organization. When the values of the employees do not match the values
embedded in the security measures, there are chances of discrepancies in implementation
of such measures (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). Values are a key determinant of how
people come to evaluate other people and organizations (Jones and George, 1998). Schein
(1996) claims that organizations do not learn from its experience but tend to repeat the
same mistakes made in the past due to a continued lack of alignment between various
occupational communities within themselves. This might result in operational and midlevel managers having different shared assumptions and objectives. These will be far
removed from the objectives preached and practiced by senior managers. The alignment of
personal and organizational objectives for information systems security governance is
important for the success of the controls. Technology used is influenced by the values and
goals imposed by the executive culture in the organization (Schein, 1996). Taylor (2006)
argues that it is management‘s mistaken perception of risk causing behavior which leads to
an implementation of a technology based approach that ignores human factors.
De Haes and Grembergen (2008) argue that IT governance can be deployed using a
mixture of various structures, processes and relational mechanisms. Anderson (2001)
argues that within IT governance, information security governance becomes a much
focused activity, with specific value drivers including integrity of information, continuity
of services and protection of information assets. Thus the relational mechanism which
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ensures the active participation and collaboration of the IT managers and business
managers is equally important for information systems security governance too. The
authors argue that relational mechanisms are crucial in the governance framework and
paramount for attaining and sustaining business/IT alignment, even when the appropriate
structures and processes are in place. Research in management controls has historically
emphasized the role of senior management in the success of internal control programs.
This trend is now changing. Controls research has shown an increase in interest in
employee empowerment (Simons, 1995). It is becoming common for lower level
employees to be actively involved not only in day-to-day processes but also in activities of
strategic significance.
In conclusion, research in information systems security governance area with a socioorganizational focus can be summarized as follows:
1. Security governance is viewed as an all encompassing process which involves
managing formalized structures and informal environment. Hence emphasis is
placed on formal as well as informal controls.
2. Security governance models are primarily focused on factors like policy
development, management and end user participation, user values and beliefs, lifecycle or process orientation and complimentary nature of various controls or the
unified approach.
3. Security controls are based on ‗formal administrative‘ management requirements
and ‗informal peoples‘ management requirement. It is assumed that management,
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formal procedures and informal people management mechanisms would ensure the
overall security of the organization.
4. It is assumed that management understands the need for appropriate socioorganizational controls and that implementing these controls would enhance the
security environment.
5. Information systems security governance models that emphasize on the
management‘s role in creating and developing security governance objectives
embedded in the contextual factors of the organization are successful in protecting
the organization from any harm.
Since most of the IS security breaches occur because someone within the organization
subverts the controls (Dhillon and Silva 2001), researchers in this domain argue that it is
prudent to focus on the socio-organizational aspect (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006) of
security to provide overall better governance.
2.4 Discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly review the extant literature in
information security governance research. The research in information security governance
can basically be classified as per two dimensions: technically oriented research and socioorganizationally oriented research. It is to be noted that this classification does not convey
that proponents of either streams of research are not sympathetic to each other‘s premises.
Researchers do acknowledge the need for both these dimensions. The classification is
based on implicit assumptions of the research and the dominance of one orientation over
the other.
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The fundamental difference between these two streams of research (see table 2.8) lies in
the nature of assumptions, nature of controls developed, end user role and the results of
using the particular approach for the organization.
Technically oriented security governance research perceives security as managing data in
computers. Hence the nature of controls implemented is technical in nature which includes
passwords, access control, sniffers etc. The end-users are expected to have the technical
expertise to implement the artifact in a way that delivers the intended benefit from the
technology used. The final goal of implementing such controls is to build a strong IT
infrastructure that protects the network from outsiders. The efficiency also improves as
technology related failures are minimized.
Table 2.8. Research in information systems security governance
Technical Vs. Socio-organizational
Dimensions
Assumptions

Nature of controls
End- user role

Result

Technical orientation
Security governance is ―managing
confidentiality, integrity and
availability of data‖
Technical
Technical solutions are well understood
Implementation would give intended
benefit
Strong IT infrastructure
Better protection from outsiders
Reduced technology related incidents

Socio-organizational orientation
Security governance is managing formal
structures and the informal environment.
Formal and informal
Need to understand and participate in
control development process
Understand responsibility and control
culture
Strong management and people
interaction
Better protection from insiders
Greater acceptability of controls

Research in socio-organizational orientation conceptualizes governance as a process of
involving all stakeholders and assigning responsibilities in a way which makes information
systems secure at the formal and informal levels of the organization. The nature of controls
suggested are both formal and informal. End-users in the organization are required to
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participate in the control development process and understand both their responsibility and
the control culture of the organization. The ultimate goal of such measures is to make
controls more acceptable, improve management and end-user interaction and protect the
information systems from insiders.
A review of research from both the perspectives reveals various facets of using these
approaches. A summary of the findings from the review of both perspectives is presented
in table 2.9. Before each body of work is discussed separately, an overall critique of
industry wide standards or best practices utilization is presented. As we have seen in the
discussions above, COBIT, COSO, ISO 17799 and ITIL are some of the common
standards used extensively in the industry and supported by different groups of researchers.
Standards provide a set of best practices across industries and are helpful in getting the
work done efficiently in real organizations. But these standards are not without drawbacks.
Several issues arise when the general standards are used ―as it is‖ by the organization.
First, security standards are generic in nature and do not reflect the unique security
requirements of an organization (Baskerville, 1993). Second, standards do not take into
account the social nature of governance problems (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Third,
the standards are not adaptive in nature and do not suggest courses of actions in the event
of changing business requirements of an organization initiating ad hoc managerial
decision-making and judgment (Ferris, 1994). Standards are not based on any theoretical
platform or developed using rigorous research standards. These standards do not add to the
body of knowledge in research.
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In technically oriented information systems security governance research, bulk of the
research has been done in systems dominated requirements such as information security
architecture, access controls, Internet usage, network protection and database controls.
Majority of work in this domain (Abouzakhar and Manson, 2002; Qiang and Hua-ying,
2007; Finne, 1996; Booker, 2006) argues for a solid technical foundation for security of
information systems by developing capabilities for strong IT infrastructures. These will
facilitate the management of technical controls as a centralized function. The drawbacks of
research from this perspective are based on the fact that it does not adequately address
vulnerabilities from the ―inside‖ i.e. formal and informal issues with security management.
Also, security management frameworks with technical emphasis are ―standalone‖ in nature
and cannot be easily combined with other frameworks for enterprise wide governance of
security.
Technically orientated information systems security governance models are unable to fully
comprehend several behavioral complexities that may need to be resolved to enact security
solutions. Research in information systems security area is predominantly technically
oriented (Dhillon, 2001). It is not surprising that many of the security governance models
too are rooted in technical foundations. But having a predominant technical orientation
does not lend itself well to incorporation of in-depth feelings, emotions, attitudes and
perceptions toward security. A sympathetic understanding of the contextual formal and
informal issues is required for an overall successful governance program. Information
security is not just a technical problem but has several other facets to it just like leadership,
culture and structure (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Similarly
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information systems security governance objectives can not be just technically oriented to
provide a comprehensive security program. In socio-organizationally oriented information
systems security governance research, majority of the work is confined to the area of
development of policies, end-user participation, iterative process orientation and unified
approach combining formal and informal with technical controls. Research in this domain
(Ward and Smith, 2003; Moultan and Cole, 2003; Eloff and Eloff, 2005; Tudor, 2000;
McCarthy and Campbell, 2001; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; Rees et al., 2003) argues for
aligning individual and organizational security goals and combining formal and informal
controls with technical controls for a comprehensive security program. There are several
benefits of using governance models rooted in this perspective. Vulnerabilities from
―inside‖ are addressed and the organizational environment becomes more conducive to
security practices. Incorporating values from end-users or using a ―bottom up‖ approach to
governance suggests better implementation and success of these controls. There are some
drawbacks as well of using these models. Most of the frameworks suggested are
―anecdotal‖ in nature i.e. based on practices, experience and understanding of the
researchers. There is hardly any model with security governance objectives which has been
empirically tested for its applicability and usability in real organizations. Also different
proposals and examples of security governance objectives do not provide guidance with
respect to the process of objective development.
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Table 2.9. Summary from literature in information systems security governance
Perspective

Exemplar work

Implications for security
governance

Pros & Cons

Technically oriented
research

-ISO 17799
(2007)
-ITIL (2007)
-Abouzakhar and
Manson (2002)
-Qiang and Huaying (2007)
-Finne (1996)
-Booker (2006)

- develop infrastructure to ensure
confidentiality, integrity and
availability of data
-establish information systems
security architecture
-develop stringent access
control models
-establish means to protect
networks
- emphasize Internet security
- emphasize database security
-ensure identity management
-ensure incident management

Socioorganizationally
oriented research

-COBIT (2007)
-COSO (2007)
-Ward and Smith
(2003)
-Moultan and
Cole (2003)
-Eloff and Eloff
(2005)
-Tudor (2000)
-McCarthy and
Campbell (2001)
- Da Veiga and
Eloff (2007)
Rees et al. (2003)
- Kolokotronis et
al (2002)
- Dutta and
McCrohan
(2002)
- Lindup (1996)
-Anderson
(2001)

- formal controls at management
level and informal controls for
people management are more
important than technical controls
for security governance
-develop sound security policies
-perceive security governance as
a process of system development
and develop iterative approach to
improve it
- develop a unified approach to
governance combining technical
as well as socio-organizational
controls
-incorporate individual‘s values
and encourage end user
participation for security
governance

- solid technical
foundation for securing
information
- develops capabilities to
maintain efficient IT
infrastructure
-integrates enterprise wide
technical security controls
into a superior centralized
function
- ―standalone‖ in nature,
not easily integrated in
governance framework
-develops vulnerability in
organization‘s formal
procedures and informal
people management aspect
-vulnerabilities in form of
management lapses and
people management issues
can be avoided
-continuous feedback to
improve control objectives
improves governance
results
- incorporating technical
and non-technical controls
in governance models
improves overall security
-better alignment of
individual and
organizational goals
-high level, generic
objectives are difficult to
implement
-―anecdotal‖ models based
on conceptual
understanding. Lack
empirical support

Socio-organizationally oriented information systems security governance research
emphasizes the importance of formal procedures and informal aspects of the organizational
environment. Interactions between stakeholders have also been discussed at the level of
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information security governance. Security governance models in this domain emphasize
the management‘s role in creating and developing security governance objectives
embedded in the contextual factors of the organization. As Dhillon and Torkzedeh (2006,
p. 17) observe:
Part of the problem related to our inability to manage and ensure IS security has been our
over-reliance on the confidentiality, integrity and availability issues, thereby ignoring the
more organizationally based measures. Even most of the risk management approaches take
for granted that confidentiality, integrity and availability are the cornerstones of IS security
and hence develop complete methodologies around these concepts. When organizations
begin to over rely on risk analysis as a means to ensure IS security, they tend to ignore all
the other organizationally grounded IS security vulnerabilities and problems.
Managing security is also problematic because employees are unaware of the appropriate
security policies and standards (Ward and Smith, 2002). Understanding perceptions of an
organization‘s board members and other stakeholders with regard to risks and market
expectations is crucial to improving Information Security Governance (Ezingeard et al,
2003). Since most of the IS security breaches occur because someone within the
organization subverts the controls (Dhillon and Silva 2001), it is prudent to focus on the
socio-organizational aspect (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006) to manage security in a better
way.
A review of information systems security governance research shows many apparent gaps
in the literature. First, research from technical perspective provides good technical basis for
managing security but is not sufficient by itself to provide comprehensive security.
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Second, research from socio-organizational perspective undermines technical perspective
and most of the models suggested have not been empirically validated in real settings.
Third, participative approach of governance which proposes involving the values of endusers in governance is discussed in the research but there is hardly any work done in this
area. There is a dearth of models that incorporates end-user inputs into governance
objectives. Fourth, there is hardly any research that suggests how to develop the security
governance objectives i.e. what process to use or what methodology to follow. Fifth, there
is very little work based on theoretical foundations. Most of the models are based on
conceptual understanding and experience of researchers. More research is required to
address the gaps identified in information systems security governance research. This
research addresses some of these gaps by developing organizationally grounded value
driven information systems security governance objectives that are theoretically sound and
empirically validated.
2.5 Conclusion
Technical and organizational perspectives of information systems security
governance offer different prescriptions for implementing security controls. The
technically oriented models emphasize specific problem selection, tool selection and
knowledge acquisition about the tool to solve any problem. A review of the research shows
over-dependency of the organizations on the availability of technical tools to manage
security problems. The socio-organizationally oriented models, on the other hand,
emphasize the need for managing formal security policies development processes,
management of individuals and creating an environment to facilitate the security
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management. Both organizational and technical orientation is required for overall security
of the organization. The challenge lies in prioritizing the objectives and allocating adequate
resources for the fulfillment of both types of objectives.
The goal of this chapter was to present an in-depth review of various information systems
security governance approaches in literature. In the beginning of the chapter, the research
literature was divided into two distinct streams: technically oriented governance models
and socio-organizationally oriented governance models. The assumptions and differences
between the two approaches have been established. Having identified the potential benefits
and drawbacks of using governance models from both the perspectives, this chapter
discussed various noticeable gaps in the research of information systems security
governance. The discussion section suggested a gap in the research in the area of
developing theoretically grounded value based information systems security governance
objectives. This gap will be addressed in this research. The following chapter outlines a
theoretical basis that helps in developing value based governance objectives for
information systems security. The assumptions of the theory will be explained followed by
a brief review of use of values in information systems research and information systems
security research. The methodology to develop the objectives would be discussed and
substantiated.
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CHAPTER 3 Theory and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the theoretical and methodological foundations of this
research. The theoretical and methodological position of a study must be consistent from a
philosophical perspective. The ontology, epistemology, methodology and the methods
used in a study should be consistent to qualify as a valid research design. Since this study
uses individual values to develop ISG objectives, an introduction about research in
individual values is warranted. Rest of this chapter is organized as follows:
The following section presents a synopsis of the existing research in individual values in IS
and the pertinent lessons which have emerged for studying values in ISG. After
establishing the importance of values for ISG, the following section presents a discussion
on ‗Value Theory as a theoretical platform‘ with reference to this research. The
methodological position of the study is explained in section three of the chapter. Section
four outlines the research design for the study. The last section presents the conclusions.
3.2 Study of values in research
This section presents a discussion on the use of ―values‖ in information systems
research. The discussion is presented in three parts. First part presents a holistic preview of
how values have been studied in information systems security research. Second part
presents a discussion on how values have been used in research in the management
discipline. Third part presents the lessons derived from using values in information
security governance research.
Concept of values in IS Security Research
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Research in information systems security recognizes the importance of individual values in
successful security programs. Solms (2001) specifically mentions the fact that information
systems security policies and controls in general do not have human considerations.
Successful implementation of the controls and polices is facilitated when individuals are
able to align their value system with that of the management. Researchers argue that if
there is a misalignment between individual and organizational goals, there will be greater
security threats to information systems from the insiders in the organization (Loch and
Conger, 1996; Solms, 2001; Magklaras and Furnell, 2005; Stanton, 2005). Dhillon and
Torkzadeh (2006) study the significance of values of employees for information systems
security in organizations. The employees should be treated as owners of information assets
(Adams and Sasse, 1999) to ensure that responsibility and accountability, on the
employee‘s part is enhanced.
Concept of values in organizational research
Organizational research has long emphasized the importance of studying personal and
group values in organizational settings. Davis (1958) calls management philosophy as the
philosophy of individualism and claims, ―Management philosophy emphasizes the
concepts of delegation, decentralization, individual initiative and individual accountability
(p. 39)‘. In a study to understand the impact of personal values on organizational decisions,
Senger (1971) measured personal value orientations by using a value scale. The values
provided the structure for the scale and a semantic differential technique was used as a
scaling device. Senger‘s study suggests that ―Personal value structures and systems of
preference ordering used by decision-makers could lead to more useful decision models
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which are better able to predict choice behavior (p. 422).‖ Research in authority of
management in organizations also studies value systems of individuals. Authority depends
on its acceptance by those it intends to direct. Hence any emerging pattern of authority
must be consistent with the values of individuals it is directed at and address the emerging
ideals, purposes and values of these individuals (Albanese, 1973). A manager‘s
effectiveness is determined by his ability to synchronize the values of his associates and
the pattern of authority he attempt to implement (Albanese, 1973).
Lessons for studying ISG
Information systems security research fully acknowledges the importance of individual
values in security posture of organizations. Individual beliefs of employees shape the
interpretation and hence the success of all security measures in an organization (Magklaras
and Furnell, 2005; McHugh and Deek, 2005). Importance of normative controls in an
organization has been emphasized in information systems security literature. The informal
controls help in effectively reaching out to people and conveying management‘s ideas
(Adams and Sasse, 1999; Schultz, 2002). Assessment of individual values, beliefs and
attitudes could be used for predicting employee‘s attitude and behavior (Stanton and Stam,
2005). Employee‘s behavior, especially for security issues, is critical for an organization.
User sophistication, social engineering and end user behavior are well-researched
constructs in security literature (Loch and Conger, 1996) and the findings emphasize the
importance of individual belief systems in security management.
A thorough review of research in the previous chapter suggests that the designing of ISG
lacks appropriate theoretical basis and there is a need for more investigation of issues in
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this area. Weber (1997) argues for more theory building efforts in information systems is
needed to increase legitimacy of research in the discipline. Taking phenomenon that are
purportedly forwarded and accounted for by theories from other disciplines and building
novel theories on their basis to explain information systems issues helps the information
systems discipline (Weber 1997). Value theory, borrowed from sociology, provides an
appropriate theoretical basis to incorporate individual values into the designing of internal
controls for security. Studying individual values in the context of information security
governance, helps in creating more effective security programs for organizations. Internal
controls depend on the information security objectives of an organization (Haara and von
Solms 2003) and should be designed keeping in mind the specific security needs of a
particular organization. Internal values of employees can be elicited to establish the
security objectives of an organization. Employee‘s security behavior depends on his
personal values and standards of conduct (Leach 2003). Information security governance
objectives, which are rooted in personal values of employees, would lead to more robust
and proactive design of internal controls. This would bring the security behavior of the
employees in accordance with management‘s expectation, conveyed through internal
controls. Employees can relate to the controls (being a reflection of their own core values)
and information systems security program can be better governed and implemented.
The benefit of using individual values to develop control objectives is twofold: First, there
will be a better alignment between individual and organizational goals if the control
objectives are created in a ―bottom up‖ manner. This way of communication can reduce
the gap between management expectations and employee interpretations about the
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controls. Second, it will facilitate the creation of an environment of shared goals amongst
employees, which has beneficial long-term implications for an organization‘s information
systems security. In this chapter we posit that value theory and value focused approach
provide an appropriate theoretical and methodological basis to design internal control
objectives for information systems security in organizations.
3.3 Theoretical basis: Value Theory
Catton (1952) proposed a theory of value which essentially suggests that the core values of
individuals guide their decision making process. According to Catton (1952), an
individual‘s preferential behaviour shows certain regularities and this pattern can be
attributed to some standard or code, which persists through time. Values provide a basis by
which people can control their intensities of desiring various desiderata (something
desirable). Based on available choices, people make preferences or choices which are
grounded in their values. In the organizational context, knowledge of such preferences of
individuals provides a context for managerial decision-making.
Value is not a property of an object but is a quality of relationship (Catton, 1952, pp. 108).
A person‘s desire for something under a given situation depends upon the ―selective
perception‖ of that person. Selective perception directs valuation by interspersing final
goals with other intermediary goals i.e. a goal may be pursued in order to attain some
higher ultimate goal. Thus the nature of the major goals accepted by individuals is
complimented by their notions of ways in which these goals might be affected by future
events. These in turn are the determinants of values of people. Value Theory provides a
theoretical platform to affirm that values are important for decision making and
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incorporating values in developing decision objectives significantly helps individuals
accept the results of such decisions.
Catton adopts a field concept of values for understanding and predicting human behavior
from studying of values. In this approach, the concept of value is perceived as somatic (in
brain) which surround the value object (Catton, 1952). It is assumed to have a
correspondence to some postulated external field. The nature of this value field is multidimensional. Psychologists have studied values extensively but more in terms of
―motivations‖ (Catton, 1952). However, there is an intrinsic difference in what sociologists
call ―values‖ and the psychologists call ―motivations‖. The idea behind studying
motivations in management, both internal as well as external, has been the same as in the
field of sociology i.e. predicting the human behavior from the study of these concepts.
Psychologists argue that human nature does not allow the valuation of anything that is
readily available and indispensable to their survival (Catton, 1952). Maslow (1943 in
Catton 1952) shares similar views and argues that a readily satisfied need can never
motivate human behavior.
Catton conceptualizes valuing as field of forces. He argues that when we observe a person
valuing something, certain things become apparent from the behavior of that person. This
is true even for various persons at different times in relation to various objects. Based on
extant literature, Catton created a comprehensive list of various dimensions of values. The
seventeen dimensions of values as studied by Catton (1952) are descriptive of the vast field
of valuation: Intensity, Duration, Probability, Permanence, Continuity, Proximity (spatial,
temporal, social), Conduciveness to survival, Inclusiveness (of persons, of other values),
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Irrevocability, Congruency with other values, Cognitive completeness, Free selectibility,
Infinitude and Subsidization.
A multiplicative combination of these measures or some function of each one of these
would help in specifying the ―worth‖ of its desideratum to the subject (Catton, 1952).
Catton hypothesized the relationship of these dimensions, which impact the values of
individuals and empirically studied the hypotheses. According to this theory, the value of a
particular object to a particular person, under particular conditions of time and place is
specified by the product of the above-mentioned seventeen dimensions raised to some
power. Catton (1952) defines behavior valuing as ―willingness to give or do something in
order to get or keep something else (p. 172)‖.
The importance of societal conditioning in shaping one‘s value-attitudes has been amply
researched in the field of sociology. Hobson (in Catton, 1952) suggests that ―man is made
and sustained by association and the process of civilization is nothing else than the
progress of the arts of association. In any estimate of human welfare it is, therefore
necessary to take our stand firmly on the principle of the social determination of values (In
Catton, 1952)‖. Catton (1952) suggests that any study of a theory of value is meant to
persuade people that certain norms or? code of conducts are more acceptable than the
others. Values are merely products of some code of behavior, which the advocate of the
code wants to propagate. Theories about values enunciate some broader values to which
other values might be subordinated. Cooley (in Catton, 1952) defines values as ―a special
attribute awarded to those objects and ideals capable of serving purposes arising out of
needs…that is to say, value is instrumentality (p. 98)‖. The social nature of the
60

determinants of value is studied by psychoanalysts as well. Morton observes that time is an
important determinant of values and immediacy of interests clouds the judgment of
humans in many instances. Extending this time perspective about values, Frank (in Catton,
1952) suggests that individuals, as they mature with time in a social setting, tend to get
socialized and start understanding the values of the particular setting. Values are arranged
according to different rank orders for different people and this differentiation impacts the
sociological analysis of inter-group relations (Catton, 1952). In management science, this
concept of values guiding the decision making process was taken forward by Keeney
(1992) who argues that values are guiding principles to evaluate the desirability of a
particular consequence. ―Values are what we care about and they should be the driving
force for our decision making (Keeney, 1992, pp. 3)‖. Values are principles of evaluation,
which we use to evaluate the actual or potential consequences of action and inaction of
decisions (Keeney, 1992). Focus on values guiding the decision situation makes the search
for alternatives a creative process and produces unique alternatives. It expands the horizon
of options available to a decision maker by basically answering the question ―what is
important to me‖ rather than the constrained thinking of ―what can be done‖ under given
constraints. This research uses Value Theory as a platform to guide the study of values in
the context of information security governance.
3.4 Methodology
This is a two phased study. Phase 1 of the study uses value focused assessment as the
methodology. The second phase of the research uses interpretive case study as the basis for
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the research study as the basis for the research. This section provides a discussion on both
the methodologies.
3.4.1 Value focused thinking
Research in decision sciences essentially suggests two broad approaches to decision
making (Keeney, 1992): Alternative Focused Thinking (AFT) and Value Focused
Thinking (VFT). Values are more fundamental to a decision context than the available
alternatives. But in common practice, decision-making usually focuses on the choice most
desirable among existing alternatives. The relative desirability of the consequences can be
best understood if the values of the decision maker are reflected in the decision. Ideally,
values should be fundamental to a decision problem, and not the alternatives. Alternatives
should be used as a means to achieve the fundamental values. Value focused thinking
approaches a decision problem by looking for the best possible solution and working
towards making it a reality. Alternative focused thinking considers what is readily
available and takes the best alternative from available options (Keeney, 1992).
Keeney (1992) suggests that VFT is a preferable way of taking decisions especially if there
are lots of subjective interpretations involved. Alterative focus thinking, even though very
popular for decision making in day-to-day life, has several shortcomings (Keeney, 1992).
AFT has a narrower focus than VFT. The former aims to solve decision problems whereas
the latter is concerned with the identification of decision opportunities, which is more of
problem finding (Keeney, 1992). Alternative focused thinking is more reactive in nature.
Value focused approach leads to best possible consequence that helps in identification of
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decision opportunities. It is proactive in nature, affirmative and helps in developing
decision objectives for the problem context.
An objective is a statement of something that one desires and is characterized by three
features (Keeney, 1992): a decision context, an object and a direction of preference. To be
more specific, if the decision context is the development of information security
governance objectives, the object would be effective information security governance and
the directional preference would be positive i.e. more information security governance is
preferred over information systems security.
Fundamental objectives are useful for the purpose of creating and evaluating alternatives,
identifying decision opportunities and guiding the decision making process (Keeney,
1992). Desired properties of fundamental objectives include (Keeney, 1992):
Essential: The objectives should be able to indicate consequences in accordance
with the basic reasons for interest in the decision situation. Depending on how
essential the objectives are, decision context is influenced greatly by these
objectives.
Controllable: The objectives should be able to adequately address the
consequences that are influenced only by the choice of alternatives in the decision
context and not by other confound variables beyond the decision context. It
requires a balancing act to reach the right degree of essential and controllable mix
in the objectives chosen.
Complete: The objectives should include all possible aspects of the consequences
of the decision alternatives. The knowledge of the possible consequences with
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respect to each alternative provides a list of all the implications of interest when a
particular alternative is selected.
Measurable: The objectives should be defined in such a precise way that even the
degree to which an objective can be achieved could be measured.
Operational: The objectives should be operationlizable for an analysis in
conjunction with the time and effort available. It should fully address whether it is
possible to obtain the relevant information useful for thinking and analyzing the
consequences.
Decomposable: The objectives should be such that a separate treatment of each of
the objectives should be possible. Aspects of consequences relating to one attribute
can be treated independently from aspects of consequences of other attributes.
Non-redundant: The objectives should reflect unique alternatives for different
possible consequences. Double counting can occur in two ways: possible impacts
of the alternatives and values of those impacts.
Concise: The number of objectives should not be too many. This can help in crating
a parsimonious model. This requires omitting any objective that is not deemed
useful. An objective should be omitted from the list if various alternatives can be
differentiated in terms of that objective. If including the objective has no impact on
the relative desirability of the alternatives, it should not be included.
Understandable: The objectives should be able to facilitate generation and
communication of insights for guiding decision-making process. It should be
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adequately understood by individuals who are in positions to make or influence
decisions.
The decision context and fundamental objectives together provide the decision frame
(Keeney, 1992). The decision context defines a set of alternatives necessary for a specific
decision situation. The fundamental objectives explicitly identify the core values of a
decision context and define the consequences which are of concern. It also identifies the
essential reason for interest in decision situation. Thus fundamental objectives are the end
objectives and the means objectives help in achieving these fundamental objectives. Means
objectives have implications and aid in achieving the fundamental objectives. It is
important that decision context and fundamental objectives are compatible as they are
interdependent (Keeney, 1992). In the figure 3.1, these concepts are shown.
VFT provides a method to elicit the individual values necessary for creating a common
denominator of a multi criteria decision-making context. Keeney (1992) proposes semi
structured interviews as one appropriate method of collecting data in this methodology.
According to the value focused approach, the best way to understand underlying values
about any issue is to ask people what is important to them in a particular context and the
reasons why they deem it important (Keeney, 1999). For a particular research problem,
personal values of people regarding the research question are elicited. Keeney suggests a
three-step process for using value-focused approach in an inquiry. These steps are:
Elicit and create a comprehensive list of personal values underlying the problem: The aim
of the researcher at this stage is to elicit the underlying values of respondents through
probing. The process of identifying the values begins with interviewing people. An
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explanatory definition is provided about the research context, scenarios are projected and
interviewees are asked to provide examples to demonstrate their choices. Direct questions
about values might not be useful as values are difficult to bring to surface and are more
difficult to express explicitly. The personal values which are projected during the
interview session are listed.
Obtain a common denominator or common objectives: a list of objectives corresponding to
the values of respondents is generated at this stage. The data collected (transcripts of the
interviews) are converted into a common form at this stage. These common denominators
give rise to values. The values thus generated need a verb to generate the objectives. The
values that are listed are objects and ways to achieve this object becomes the objective.
The verb form of the values thus created could be termed as the objective of that object.
Classify the objectives as fundamental for decision context or as means objectives: this is
the final step in value-focused approach which leads to the end result of a network of
means and fundamental objectives. Classification of all the objectives formed is done and
the objectives clusters are divided into two categories, ―means‖ or ―fundamental‖.
Depending on the role of a category in a decision context, a category can be relegated as
―means‖ to the decision or an ―end‖ to the decision objective for the particular problem
context. An objective that leads to another objective being considered in decision-making
is a means objective whereas an objective which is fundamental and important in its own
right in a decision making process is called fundamental objective. Differentiation between
means and fundamental objectives is primarily done through performing a Why Is This
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Important (WITI) test for each of the objectives (Keeney, 1992). The entire process
depicting the development of control objectives from the values is shown in figure 3.1:

Figure 3.1 An overview of using VFT to generate decision objectives

3.4.2 Case study
This research adopts an in-depth case study approach. This qualitative in-depth case study
is performed to interpret the meanings of the objectives in an organizational context.
The choice of case study as a methodology in the second phase of the study is based on the
reasons suggested by Benbasat et al (1987). The authors argue that a field case study helps
in presenting a rich picture of the phenomenon under study without disturbing the natural
state of entities. The relevance of the developed objectives needs to be studied in a real
organizational setting to bring out their meaning fully. In a natural setting, events unfold in
relation to the focus on contemporary issues and this makes a realistic picture of the
relevance of the constructs under study emerge.
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For establishing the rigor criteria, this study uses the seven principles of Klein and Myers.
Klein and Myers (1999) propose seven principles for conducting interpretive field work.
The interpretive field studies in information systems research have repeatedly referred to
these guidelines for conducting the research. The first principle, the fundamental principle
of the hermeneutic circle suggests that human understanding is developed by iterating
between the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole they form. This process of
constituting the whole picture from constituent parts is fundamental to all the principles
proposed. An illustration of the principle is evident in Lee‘s (1994) study of information
richness in email communications. Lee constructed the global context of the email
exchanged in the organization and interpreted the meanings of the fragments of the
messages exchanged through email. The principle of contextualization needs incorporation
of the critical reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting. This
helps in presenting a coherent picture about how the current situation under investigation
emerged. The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects requires a
clear projection so as to bring out how the research materials were socially constructed
through the interaction between the researchers and the participants. For example, Trauth
(1997) explains how her understanding improved as she became self-aware and started to
question her own assumptions.
The fourth principle is of abstraction and generalization. This principle is about relating
the idiographic details revealed by the data interpretation through the application of
hermeneutic circle and contextualization of the data, to theoretical concepts that describe
the nature of human understanding and social action. The principle of dialogical reasoning
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needs openness towards possible contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions and
actual findings at the case site to be adopted. This reasoning process leads to subsequent
cycles of revision and a modified interpretation emerges. The principle of multiple
interpretations is about the possibility of differences in interpretation of the participants
responses as expressed in multiple narratives or stories of the same sequence of events
under the study. The seventh principle is about suspicion that requires sensitivity to
possible biases or other distortions in the narratives taken from the respondents.
In literature, choice of case studies for empirical research is criticized for lack of statistical
generalizability. This criticism is unfair. There have been several responses in literature to
counter argue this perception. The choice of methodology should be based on the
ontological and epistemological stance of the research. If one views the social world
objectively, then the methodological choice should be quantitative techniques. But in this
research, social world is viewed as a subjective reality. Hence a qualitative and interpretive
approach to research is advocated and in-depth case study is an optimal choice here. As
Walsham (1993) argues:
From interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an individual case
of cases depends not on representativeness of such cases in statistical senses,
but on plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing the
results from the cases, and in drawing conclusions from them (p.15).
There is a common misconception that qualitative case studies‘ results lack usefulness due
to the results being statistically generalized from a sample to a population. The argument
is that since the sample size is very small in case studies (in a single case study it is one)
hence no meaningful statistical technique can be applied to the data. But this criticism
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seems unwarranted given the nature the case studies. According to Yin (2003), cases are
not sampling units and should not be chosen for this reason. If they are not sampling units,
then they should not be analyzed or generalized in a statistical manner.
Lee and Baskerville (2003) argue against statistical generalizability, claiming that it is
actually a form of inductive logic. The authors argue that to establish statistical
generalizability, we need to follow an additional premise. This is the ‗uniformity of nature‘
assumption which forwards the view that the future would be like the past. Since the
principle of uniformity of nature cannot be satisfactorily established, the relevance of
statistical generalizability is questionable. One would have to continually regress through
the circular logic of the Uniformity of Nature in a vain attempt to validate inductive logic
(Lee and Baskerville, 2003). This problem of induction is credited to an 18th century
philosopher Hume, and is sometimes called Hume’s Truism.
Yin (2003) argues that generalization of results, from either single or multiple designs, is
made in reference to theory and not to populations. He contends that multiple cases do
strengthen the results of the research by replicating the pattern matching. Replication can
increase the confidence in the robustness of the theory but by no means does it increase the
generalization of the results to entire populations. There are examples of cases studies
which go beyond the statistical results and explain the situation from the perspective of
human actors involved. These case study evaluations cover both process and outcomes as
this methodology can include both quantitative as well as qualitative data.
There are several examples of the use of case methodology in the literature. Yin (2003) has
listed several examples of case studies along with the appropriate research design in each
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case. Yin (2003) suggests three types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and
descriptive case studies. According to Yin, each of those three approaches can be either
single or multiple-case study, where multiple-case studies are replicatory in nature and not
sampled cases. In exploratory case studies, fieldwork, and data collection may be
undertaken prior to definition of the research questions and hypotheses. This type of study
has been considered as a prelude to social research on a particular topic. This type of case
study requires that the framework of the study must be created ahead of time. Results from
pilot studies can be useful in determining the final research design. Selecting cases is a
difficult process, but the literature provides guidance in this area (Yin, 1989). Stake (1995)
suggests that selection should be based on opportunity to learn about the problem, and
subjects should be willing. A selected case generally represents a typical environment
conducive for the problem. Explanatory cases are suitable for doing causal studies. In very
complex and multivariate cases, the analysis can make use of pattern-matching techniques.
Descriptive cases require that the investigator begin with a descriptive theory, the findings
for which are in the form of in-depth description of the phenomenon from the researcher‘s
perspective. Each research strategy has advantages and disadvantages. Yin (2003) suggests
three conditions on the basis of which a research strategy could be designed. These are:
nature of research question, the control a researcher has over actual behavioral events and
the focus of the researcher on contemporary vis a vis historical events.
In this study, the field case study took place from October 2007 - April 2008 in the
Department of Information Technology for the City, a major south eastern city of USA.
The data collection and analysis methods are discussed in the next section. The specific
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data collection methods will be discussed in the following section. The entire staff of the
IT department (with particular attention being focused on the IS Security policy group)
was interviewed. The IT department totals approximately 100 employees. Daily
observations and intensive document review will accompany these interviews.
3.5 Research design
3.5.1 Data Collection
This research was conducted in two phases. Phase one used value focused thinking and
phase two used in-depth case study as a methodology. In data collection for phase one,
which used VFT, 52 interviews was conducted with a diverse group of people representing
a good mix of people from the various functional areas of different organizations. From the
security side, we have representation from Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief
Information Officers (CIO), information technology directors, security managers, security
officers, system administrators, systems auditors and helpdesk IT specialist. We also
interviewed people with non IT job specialization for a fresh perspective about security
controls. These respondents were manager and line staff from functionalities other than IT
such as accounts, finance and human resources. The interviews were conducted over a
period from July to November 2007. The average duration for the interview was 45
minutes. The interviews were mainly semi-structured but a question template was
developed to guide the discussions. The template is attached in appendix 1. The
conversations were tape recorded and transcribed personally by the investigators.
Participants in this study represent nine industries and provide a wide perspective on
security governance issues. The industries included in this study are: Insurance,
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healthcare, credit card services, Banks, financial investment, energy, telecommunications,
Internet service providers and real estate development, both in private as well as
government sector. The respondents had at least 5 years of professional work experience
and have significant experience of using IT and all are under the purview of security
governance practices. Some of the respondents do not directly work in information security
governance domain but were nonetheless included in the study. We feel that the pervasive
nature of security controls impacts everyone across the board in an organization and it is
useful to get the values of even those people who were not directly responsible for
developing and implementing these controls.
For data collection purposes in phase two of the study, which was an in-depth case study, a
number of sources of data were used. Primary source of data was the semi structured
interviews. Secondary sources include the policy and procedure manual, the audit manual
at CCIT, the policy guidelines provided by the state agency which is responsible for the
security policies of the state for the case study, primary source of data was the interviews
with organizational members. Key stakeholders were identified at the case study site with
the help of our point of contact at the organization. The key stakeholders were able to
provide adequate insight into organization‘s internal control structure in the context of
information systems security. The target organization has 4 main divisions: IT
development, IT infrastructure, Security and Project management. Each division head and
the manager from the particular department were interviewed. The CIO of the organization
and the chief audit officer were interviewed increasing the total number of interviews to
10. The overall representation of the respondents (top management, middle management
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and operational level) provided good insights into the applicability of the developed
objectives in the particular organizational context. See appendix 2 and 3 for the topic
guide used in the interviews and list of the respondents. Notes were taken during the
interviews and were recorded in the master response document as soon as possible after the
meetings.
3.5.2 Data analysis
For data analysis of phase one, we used Kenney‘s three step methodology to develop the
decision objectives (explained elsewhere). For the data analysis of the case study in phase
two, several methods were used. Huberman and Miles (1994) suggest three ways of data
analysis for qualitative interview data: data reduction, data display and conclusion
drawing. In data reduction process, the researchers identify portions of the data which is
relevant for the theoretical construct under study. With the useful data, the researchers
categorize and structure the data in a manner to facilitate the drawing of meaningful
interpretations. This is done through writing summaries, synopsis or making networked
diagrams that permit conclusions to be drawn. Finally conclusion drawing is the
interpretive process through which the researcher analyses themes and patterns and then
compares and contrasts these to triangulate the data. Walsham (2006) suggests that even
though the researcher is the agent of the interpretation, a theoretical framework should be
used to guide and bind the researcher. Else, the result would be more anecdotal than
empirical in nature. In this case, each of the above three steps were performed iteratively
several times before actual results emerged. When the initial set of results did not seem to
provide insightful conclusions; the entire process was repeated. Various issues were
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identified during the data analysis from the primary and secondary sources. Several
iterations took place before the objectives were put into clusters. These clusters were
revisited with the second phase data and many of the sub objectives were condensed in the
light of new data from the case study. Identifying an informant and the key stakeholders in
the case study setting helped in applying triangulation technique. Final interpretations were
done in accordance with the theoretical basis of the research. This provided meaningful
principles that have applicability in other settings too. An overview of the research design
is provided below in table 3.1.
Table 3.1 An overview of the research design

Research Design
Types of Research Questions

Description
Phase 1: Questions about values regarding
information security governance
Phase 2: Questions regarding the usefulness of the
proposed objectives from the previous phase.

Strategy

Two phase study: Value focused assessment
through interviews and Case study

Data Collection method

Semi-structured interviews, case study,
observations, secondary support documents in form
of manuals and policies

Data Analysis

Phase 1: Value focused assessment steps as
suggested by Keeney (1992)
Phase 2: Data reduction, data display, triangulation

Theory Used

Value Theory

Major References

Keeney (1999), Catton (1954, 1959), Dhillon and
Torkzadeh (2006)

Respondents

IT managers, IT Auditors, security professionals

Expected Results

Framework of means and fundamental objectives
for maximizing ISG, principles of ISG

Validation Criteria

Klein and Myers‘ seven principles for interpretive
field studies
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3.5.3 Evaluation Criteria
The set of principles for evaluating interpretive research proposed by Klein and Myers‘ has
been used to evaluate this study. The principles include the hermeneutic circle,
contextualization, interaction between subjects and researcher, abstraction and
generalization, dialogical reasoning, multiple interpretations, and suspicion. The
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle refers to the idea of developing the
complex whole from the meanings and the parts and their relationships. This signifies
developing a complete picture about the context, the phenomenon and the complexities of
the construct under study. The principle of contextualization requires reflection on the
social and historical background to integrate the emergent situation in the field.
The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects shows the need for
critical reflection on how the research data was socially constructed through the interaction
between the subjects and the researcher. The principle of generalization deals with details
that are revealed by the data interpretation through the application of principles one and
two.
The last three principles point to the requirement of a degree of sensitivity on the part of
the researcher to minute details of their data and findings. The principle of dialogical
reasoning means that the researcher should be open to the idea that theoretical
preconceptions might not be able to explain the case situations in the field. The principle of
multiple interpretations alludes to the researcher showing sensitivity to the differences in
interpretations of the participants to the same event. Lastly, the principle of suspicion
refers to the sensitivity towards possible biases and distortions by the participants. These
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principles were used to establish the validity of this study and a discussion on their usage is
presented in chapter 7 of this dissertation.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter established the importance of using individual values for development of ISG
objectives. An outline of the philosophy, theory, methodology and the research design that
is being followed in this study is provided. A discussion on generalizability of the results
is presented. Based on the discussions in this chapter, an empirical investigation of ISG
development and validation was conducted. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of these
investigations.
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CHAPTER 4 Means and Fundamental Objectives for Information Systems Security
Governance

4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the means and fundamental objectives for
information systems security governance. The objectives have been derived from the
interview data gathered across 9 industries over a six month period. The chapter begins by
providing a brief description of the profile of the respondents who were interviewed. This
chapter then presents the list of means and fundamental objectives which emerged from the
data. The discussion section presents the relevance of the proposed objectives in the light
of research literature and establishes the contributions there of. The key lessons for
practitioners of Information systems security governance are also listed. The concluding
section discusses the results and establishes the need for the case study, which is
subsequently presented in the following chapter.
4.2 Developing means and fundamental objectives
In the first phase of the study, a value focused approach is used to develop the means and
fundamental objectives for information systems security governance. As discussed earlier,
Keeney suggests a 3 step process to develop decision objectives from the values of the
stakeholders in the decision context. Objectives in a multi objectives decision analysis
model are generated in hierarchical fashion. The overall objective is defined first, followed
by a definition of the fundamental objectives. These are the objectives that we actually
wish to achieve in a decision context, as opposed to means objectives which merely
provide a means to attaining our fundamental objectives (Kirkwood, 1997). A value
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hierarchy helps in ensuring that fundamental objectives are appropriately related to the
overall objective (Kirkwood, 1997).
In the context of this study, maximizing information security governance is the overall
objective for the organizations in order to ensure an effective security program. The
achievement of this strategic objective is affected by the various decisions that the people
in the organization take. We seek to understand the fundamental objectives that apply to
these decisions for multiple decision contexts within an organization.
4.2.1 Respondent profile
In an attempt to understand the values that affect ISG objectives in organizations, 52
interviews were conducted with a diverse group of individuals representing a broad cross
section of industries and functionalities. The roles which the respondents were discharging
included: Chief Executive Officers (CEO), Chief Information Officer (CIO), Information
Technology Directors, Security Managers, Systems Administrators, Systems Auditors and
helpdesk IT specialists. We also interviewed people with non IT job specializations for a
generic and non-technical perspective about security controls. These respondents included
managers and line staff workers from functionalities other than IT such as accounts,
finance and human resources. The interview questionnaire template is attached in
Appendix 1.
Participants in this study represent nine industries and represent a wide perspective on
security governance issues. The industries included in this study are: Insurance,
healthcare, credit card services, Banks, financial investment, energy, telecommunications,
Internet service providers and real estate development, both in the private and government
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sector. All the respondents had at least 5 years of professional work experience and
significant experience of using IT. They are also under the purview of security governance
practices. Some of the respondents do not directly work in information security
governance domain but were included in the study nonetheless. We feel that the pervasive
nature of security controls impacts everyone across the board in an organization and it is
useful to get the values of even those people who were not directly responsible for
developing and implementing these controls.
4.2.2 Keeney’s three step methodology
Keeney‘s 3 step methodology is explained in this section to demonstrate how the steps
were incorporated in the conduct of the first phase of the research. As Keeney (1999)
suggests, the best way to understand the underlying values of people about an issue is to
directly ask them. To understand the individual values, this study uses a three-step
procedure as proposed by Keeney (1992).
Step 1: Listing Values
In the first step, Keeney suggests the development of a comprehensive list of personal
values which might underlie the problem being explored. The process of identifying these
values begins with interviews, which can be done individually or in groups. It is important
to clarify the decision context of the study to the interviewees. Thus before the interview
process, a guiding definition of information security governance was provided. We defined
ISG as:
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Information Security Governance is defined as organizational structures,
procedures and practices put in place to help in ensuring the integrity of the
information flows and business continuity. Information Security Governance helps
in protecting the information assets of the organization through the use of proper
internal controls.
This definition provided clear boundaries for the scope of this research. The governance
practices internal to the organization that affect the working of employees on a daily basis
have been studied in this research. This research does not concern itself with the external
practices such as relations with vendors or outsourced services.
We applied the process of listing the values which emerged during interview sessions with
domain experts and other stakeholders in order to develop the objectives. The aim of the
interview was to develop objectives for maximizing information security governance in an
organization. The interviews continued with questions which sought to generate typical
values and bring them forth for observation (Keeney, 1992) such as (1) probing for a wish
list of the perfect characteristics for the ideal situation; (2) discussing the shortcomings of
the proposed characteristics in real life cases; (3) considering actual work examples from
the interviewee‘s experience; (4) discussing the consequences of bad decisions made; (5)
asking the interviewee‘s about how others in the organization will be impacted by
decisions and (6) generating scenarios to actually understand and cross check values being
communicated.
People express their values in a variety of ways. In order to facilitate better understanding
of what they meant, each respondent was interviewed individually and asked to explain
their responses with examples. Probing further proved to be useful as the researchers
developed a clearer perspective of exactly what a respondent meant. Thus, presenting
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scenarios, interpreting consequences, understanding the constraints and goals of a decision
context helped bring the values to the surface in a lucid manner. We extracted 260 values
from the interview data and converted them into common forms (see Appendix b). After
40 interviews, we felt that the data had a lot of repetitions, which clearly pointed reaching a
theoretical saturation in the process. Nonetheless, we conducted 12 more interviews to be
exhaustive of all possible values about the decision context and reach a well informed
theoretical saturation.
Step 2: Categorizing Values
All statements or the raw values for the problem context were changed into a common
form. These common forms are subsequently converted into objectives. An objective has
three features: a decision context, an object and a direction of preference (Keeney 1992).
Decision context in this case is ―What should the information security governance
characteristics be in an organization?‖ Hence, each of the values that are listed by
respondents is an object and the way to achieve this object becomes the objective. Thus the
verb form of the object could be termed as the objective of that object. For example, data
from the interview suggests a raw value such as ‗‗Problems one comes across are usually
lack of awareness about controls‘‘. The value explicated above can be changed into a
common form ―Lack of awareness about controls is a problem‖, which in turn can be
converted into an objective ―Create awareness about control in employees‖. The decision
context is related to controls, the object is awareness and the direction of preference is to
have more awareness about controls. It is possible to derive more than one objective from a
specific value statement, e.g. The maximization of education and training for security
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governance is another objective that can be derived from the above value statement. As
Keeney suggests, better alternatives for a decision problem can be generated once
objectives have been established. This is opposite to alternative focused thinking where
alternatives are first identified and then the objectives are specified. After striking down
the repetitions in the data, we developed a list of 190 objectives (see appendix c).
Step 3: Relating Objectives
The list of objectives thus generated was arranged into clusters according to the underlying
idea being conveyed by the objectives. After clustering, these objectives were rearranged
through means-ends relationships (Keeney 1992). This basically involved classifying all
the categories thus formed into either a ―means‖ to the decision or an ―end‖ to the decision
objective for the problem context. Thus an objective that leads to another objective being
considered in decision-making is a means objective whereas an objective which is
fundamental and important in its own right, in the decision making process is called
fundamental objective. This is primarily done through performing a Why Is This Important
(WITI) test for each of the objectives (Keeney 1992). For example- ‗ensure audit efficacy‖
objective does not directly impact information systems security governance in an
organization. In its own context, the audit functionality gives an assessment of current state
of controls and their strengths and weaknesses. It does so in a way that controls are
developed and implemented in a better way, hence it is a means objective.
However, the objective ―ensure continuous improvements in controls‖ directly impacts
information security governance practices because if a security control is not implemented
well, it creates vulnerability, thus weakening the governance process. Therefore ―ensure
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continuous improvements in controls‖ is a fundamental objective. Using similar logic, all
the objectives are classified into either the means or fundamental category. Both
fundamental and means objectives are important for the decision context. The set of
fundamental objectives specify the core values which the decision should incorporate. The
list of means objectives suggests areas of improvement for decisions based on the
fundamental values. Our data suggests six fundamental and seventeen means objectives
that are essential for information security governance in organizations. The next section
presents a discussion on each objective and its relevance in achieving overall effective ISG
in organizations.
4.3 Establishing the objectives in information security governance research
The fundamental and means objectives developed in this research need to be reviewed in
the light of the existing information systems security governance literature. It is important
to ground the developed objectives in extant literature to understand the implications of the
objectives for research in this domain. Also, the grounding helps in interpreting the extent
to which these objectives would be useful in establishing the information systems security
governance agenda for organizations. The discussions about the fundamental and means
objectives are presented in the two subsections below.
4.3.1 Fundamental Objectives
Establish Corporate Control Strategy (F1)
Our data suggests that developing a corporate wide control strategy is a fundamental
objective for maximizing information security governance in organizations. It is important
to define a strategic control plan that establishes the business requirements of information
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systems security in order to make the organization achieve its business objectives. A
control strategy maps the information security governance objectives to the business
objectives and aligns the two. The strategic control plans should be then translated into
operational controls that in turn set clear short term goals. As suggested by our data, it is
crucial to develop a corporate security control strategy and ensure that security is a nonnegotiable budget line item for the management. This involves developing a risks
management strategy, understanding organizational power structures in developing
controls and viewing security controls as cost of doing business. As observed by a senior
IT manager in the electronics goods industry:
Security control is a non–functional requirement and there is no place for non
functional requirements in the system design. User groups do not talk about
security, the so called non-functional technical requirement. How do you manage
it? It becomes an issue of internal policies, and then it has to be related to IT
architecture.
A control strategy ensures that security governance is an antecedent to complete security
and process integrity. A control strategy requires developing guidelines using consensus
and flexibility in tools for control. As mentioned by one of our respondents:
―Security is addressed during normal strategic and operational planning cycles.
Security has achievable, measurable objectives that directly align with our
enterprise objectives. Determining how much security is enough is directly
proportionate to how much risk and exposure an organization can tolerate‖.
Gregor et al. (2004) suggests a relationship between strategic planning practices and the
value derived from IT. Business and IT management jointly create IT strategy, using the
business strategy and objectives as the key reference (Peppard, 2001). Research in IT
strategy stresses the need for top management to be closely involved in the IT strategy
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process (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Peppard and Ward, 1999), so that the IT
strategy, upon implementation, results in IT systems that support the business strategy
(Premkumar and King 1994). Consequently it is important to have a control strategy which
ensures information security and thus helps in developing the IT strategy. Control strategy
involves planning for the success of the security program. Having a centralized control
strategy provides the departments with control plans that are required for successful
implementation of security controls. IT strategy is a ―macro competency‖ necessary for the
success of IT (Peppard and Ward, 2004) and control strategy is important for the security
of IT assets.
The use of inadequate control tools and inefficient internal practices for security has a
negative effect on the management process and also compromises strategic objectives
(Alves et al, 2006). Information security governance requires strategic direction and
impetus. It requires commitment, resources and assignment of responsibility for
information security management. It also requires a means for the board to determine that
the intent has been met (Information Technology Governance Institute, 2006). Information
systems control strategy is required to address information threats by conducting risk
assessments aimed at identifying mitigation strategies and required controls (Da Veiga and
Eloff, 2007). The control strategy should be an inherent part of an organization‘s IT
strategy and overall business strategy in order to ensure that organizational objectives for
both the short and long term are comprehensively met.
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Encourage a Controls Conscious Culture (F2)
Culture creates and sustains connections among policies, processes, people, and
performance (Julia and Westby, 2007). Our data suggests ―establish control culture‖ as an
important objective for information systems security governance. Developing control and
risk consciousness in employees creates a ―prevention mentality‖ that helps in minimizing
intergroup rivalry over security initiatives. A control conscious culture interwoven into the
fabric of the organization holds together all the technical, formalized and informal controls
of the governance program. An environment where individuals ―watch out‖ for each other
strengthens the actual controls, leading to the achievement of the desired results. Also,
with changing security needs, which in turn impact the controls, changes in the corporate
culture too have to be formally taken care of. As a senior systems auditor from the
healthcare industry commented:
Changes being made in the corporate culture have to be managed in a better way.
For instance, if the Internal Audit suddenly has to play a bigger role or a separate IS
security department is required…all these things require a corresponding change in
corporate culture. Why am I doing this? This needs to be explained better to people
in MIS. If suddenly people are reviewing everything that you do…this kind of a
change just has to be managed properly.
Management should establish ethical standards of conduct, which are essentially the rules
to be followed by employees (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Ethical considerations, such as
maintaining employee‘s privacy, must be included by the management as a part of security
governance program. The control consciousness is the general atmosphere in the
organization, in which people perform their activities and carry out their control
responsibilities. Controls must be implemented to protect the privacy of both the
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employees and the customers. This enhances trust within the organization and with
customers outside the organization (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Communicating these
measures is part of control awareness in an organization. All organizations have a set of
unwritten norms and values to which their members subscribe. This cultural dimension is a
powerful force in enhancing or compromising security (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002).
Maximize Clarity in Policies and Procedures (F3)
Security policies, procedures and guidelines are paramount in the implementation of
information security governance as they provide direction and support (ISO 17799, 2005).
Our data suggests that management should have clarity in security policies and procedures
to make the implementation of the controls more effective and get the intended results
from the governance process. Clarity in policies and procedures is essential to ensure the
proper use of applications and technological solutions instituted in an organization.
Controls should be reflected in the policy document and seen to be implemented through
the procedures. As shared by the chief architect at a leading computer services
organization:
I think internal security controls are in the policy. In order to impose the policy,
controls are developed, so controls in a way are policy. It helps you to ensure
your policy.
Clarity in policies can be achieved through a structured approach to the development of
user and operations procedure manuals, service requirements and training materials.
Policies should be made easily accessible and reflect truly the control requirement in the
policies. The high visibility of fair policies ensures that everyone follows the policy. Our
data suggests that it is important to make the policies readily available for reference. It is
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also vital to develop controls that follow procedures and are convenient to use. As
mentioned by a senior auditor from a financial services industry:
At the start, I just tell the auditee- if you just follow your security policies and try
to implement the controls, you will be able to answer most of the questions, and
there will be no problem.
There is a heavy emphasis on developing clear policies in information systems security
governance (von Solms, 1996; Straub and Nance, 1990). Ward and Smith (2002) argue
that the IT security policies also provide the basis for displaying the executive
management‘s commitment to IT security. Moultan and Cole (2003) suggest that policies
should be developed in a way that should facilitate the development of the relevant
controls for security. In their proposed security governance framework, Moultan and Cole
(2003) have identified ―policies and procedures‖ as an objective. In their security
governance framework, Eloff and Eloff (2005) place policies as a first priority for an
effective governance program. In their proposed model, McCarthy and Campbell (2001)
identify policies, procedures, documented guidelines and standards as crucial components
for proper implementation of security controls. However, the policies should reflect the
human, technical and procedural aspects of security management holistically.
Maximize Regulatory Compliance (F4)
Information systems security governance entails preparations for fulfilling the mandatory
requirements of complying with relevant regulations. The governance structure should
ensure compliance with external requirements as it is important for the organization to
meet legal, regulatory and contractual obligations. Security governance practices are able
to meet the regulatory requirements by identifying and analyzing external requirements for
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their security impact and taking appropriate measures towards complying with these. Our
data suggests that ensuring regulatory compliance is a fundamental objective to maximize
information systems security governance. Regulations do not improve the governance
measures efforts per se. To a certain extent, the regulations force an organization to rethink
its security preparations and take actions which it should have taken anyways. As one of
the respondents, internal auditor in credit card services industry, explained
Five years ago our CEO did not know about controls, so we had to sit down and
explain them to him. Over some time he was still in the process of getting it, but
now he knows all about controls. It [SOX] helped a lot in increasing the popularity
of controls. People are scared of SOX…we can just not fail and say I will do it next
year. You have to keep testing till you pass. You have to be compliant.
Regulatory compliance has been a big driver in recent years to develop and shape security
governance initiatives. As one of the respondents, Chief Executive Officer in a state
agency commented:
Regulatory compliance drives a lot of what we do. It also has an impact on your
stock price. Control conciseness has come about in a big way because of this.
Compliance with regulation as a security governance objective has been extensively
supported by literature (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; Tudor, 2000; Eloff and Eloff, 2005; von
Solms, 2006; Moultan and Cole, 2003). Both internal as well as external compliance with
policies and regulations requires preparedness and understanding of codes of practice, legal
requirements and international standards. Dhillon and Torkzedeh (2006) classify
compliance as a fundamental requirement for security initiatives.
Ensure Continuous Improvements in Controls (F5)
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‗Proper implementation of controls‘ has been identified as a fundamental objective for
information systems security governance. Our data suggests that continuous and iterative
control assessment helps in implementing the right controls in the correct fashion.
Implementing controls requires caution to ensure minimum likelihood of disruption and
errors in the functioning of the systems. Understanding the organizational context of
particular controls helps in the implementation and adoption of controls. Our data suggests
that to develop effective controls, implementation practices of an organization should use a
―clean slate‖ approach i.e. start afresh and not superimpose old methods which will make
existing biases impede the process.
Implementation of controls is not a one time phenomenon but an evolutionary exercise. It
includes adapting the controls as per changing business needs. Managing the changes is
crucial too, especially in a production environment. This requires analysis, implementation
and follow-up of all changes requested and consequently made to the existing IT
infrastructure. It is crucial that the changed roles reflect changed controls in the
organization. As observed by a respondent, internal auditor in financial services industry:
For example you make a great access control upfront and don‘t come back and
look at it again. So we could point out some of those issues. We try to make
sure that you develop something, to take care of those processes where it has
holes. So if somebody changes roles, changes jobs or the organization restructures,
what controls do you have in place which ensure that you change your procedure
accordingly? Or then you have to consider- do the procedures need to be changed?
So there is a lot you have to think about.
In his security management model, Booker (2006) identifies ―implementing a holistic
approach‖ as one of the objectives for good security governance. The author suggests that
all the security requirements of the organization should be exactly mapped to the controls
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and implemented precisely to provide a holistic security governance approach. Realizing
the importance of the control implementation process, ITGI has a domain of activities and
objectives dedicated to successful implementation of controls in its governance framework,
COBIT (2007). In the Acquire and implement domain of COBIT, seven objectives are
identified. All these objectives suggest a meticulous implementation process. COBIT even
emphasizes the importance of managing changes [objective AI6 (Manage Changes) of
COBIT] for successful ongoing implementation, which is similar to what our data
suggests. COSO framework, in its control activities component describes the impact of
well implemented relevant controls on security environment of the organization. Eloff and
Eloff (2005) argue for proper execution of security controls to develop a secure IT
infrastructure and to maintain the control environment. Rees et al. (2003) identify the
importance of proper controls implementation in their security governance model.
Enable Responsibility and Accountability in Roles (F6)
Our data suggests that responsibility and accountability in structures is essential for good
information systems security governance. Clarity in roles and ownership of decisions in the
organization helps in aligning security governance goals with business goals. Some of the
sub-objectives associated with this objective are ‗discourage sudden changes in
responsibility structures‘, ‗define and document roles and privileges properly‘ and
‗encourage transparency about accountability for actions‘. The groups of sub-objectives
argue for a stable, well-defined and clearly communicated responsibility structure to
provide right direction to the security practices. Clear role differentiation encourages
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accountability of the managers and results in better alignment of personal motivations of
the individuals with organizational expectations. As one of our respondents commented:
Roles and responsibilities have to be very clear upfront. Nobody should be
surprised at their work by having to do something which they were not doing
yesterday. Making sure that people understand the priority, roles, responsibility is
important. If you can demonstrate this, then you can get the level of service
required.
In a global survey of IT managers regarding ‗what activities should be a part of
information systems security governance‘, about 94% of the respondents emphasized
alignment of roles and responsibilities and accountability as a crucial activity (Deloitte,
2006). Thus it is important to encourage ownership of data sources and assign appropriate
roles and privileges to managers in order to carry out the governance objectives effectively.
It is also true that organizations can allocate roles and authority but responsibility can only
exist once it is accepted (Drummond, 2003). Accountability, thus results when the
responsibility is accepted by all parties to ensure that all the resources are used for
authorized uses and such actions can be traced back to the responsible person (GISP
security principles). Hence it is absolutely essential to communicate the importance of the
roles to the managers.
To summarize, the list of six fundamental objectives for information security governance is
presented in the table 4.1 below. Under each objective, the corresponding sub objectives
are shown.
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Table 4.1 Fundamental objectives for information security governance

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

Objective
Sub-objectives
Name
Ensure corporate Develop corporate security control strategy
controls strategy Establish a risk management strategy
Ensure that security governance is a non-negotiable budget line item
Understand organizational power structures while developing controls
View security governance as a cost of doing business
Ensure that security governance is an antecedent to security and process integrity
Develop guidelines using consensus
Develop measurable security control objectives
Ensure departments have control plans
Develop flexibility in tools for controls
Encourage a
Establish a control- consciousness culture
controlsDevelop risk consciousness in the employees
conscious culture Establish a security conscious culture
Create prevention mentality
Encourage appreciation for security governance culture
Establish a culture where individuals watch out for each other
Encourage an environment of conformity
Instill the desire into the employees to meet expectations about controls
Maximize Clarity
in Policies and
Procedures

Enhance visibility about fairness of policies and procedures
Create controls which logically follow the procedures
Create convenient policy
Define control policies for access to information resources
Ensure compliance with policy document
Ensure policies are readily available
Reflect control requirements in security policies
Encourage discussion on internal controls as identified in the policies
Maximize
Define controls for compliance with regulations
Regulatory
Encourage regulatory compliance through internal controls
Compliance
Encourage respect for laws of the society
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and sustained improvement in business
processes
Establish a compliance culture
Explain the importance and need for compliance to technical people
Follow regulations in entirety
Formalize process of compliance in the organization
Understand the impact of regulations on controls
Use regulations as a catalyst for implementing better practices
Avoid turning compliance into ―check the box exercises‖
Ensure continuous Ensure continuously iterative control assessment and implementation
improvements in
Maintain and integrate the controls properly in changing business needs
controls
Change controls with process changes
Effectively test the controls
Manage changes efficiently
Manage changes in production systems
Manage controls from the source of problems i.e. employees
Understand the organizational context of controls implementation
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F6

Enable
responsibility
and
accountability in
roles

Use clean slate approach for controls implementation
Develop effective change management practices
Create organizational responsibilities for compliance
Define responsibility and accountability of controls for security governance
Discourage sudden changes in responsibility structures
Encourage a sense of responsibility
Encourage individual responsibility for ensuring proper access to data resources
Encourage responsibility sharing
Ensure accountability
Assign responsibility for protecting information
Define and document roles and privileges properly
Encourage transparency and accountability for actions
Encourage individual responsibility for ensuring proper access to data resources
Ensure responsibility and accountability sharing in protecting information
Ensure job design around IS needs

4.3.2 Means Objectives
Ensure Efficacy of Audit Processes (M1)
Efficacy of auditing, on the part of both the internal and external auditors, is essential for
assessing the progress of the organization on various security governance fronts and the
efficiency of the efforts in this direction. In this research, ―ensure efficacy of audit
processes‖ has emerged as an important means objective which essentially inserts checks
and balances into the governance program. Audit practices are essential for ensuring that
the management is incorporating adequate consideration towards the changing context of
governance tasks. Our data suggests that internal auditors can be treated as consultants to
ensure effectiveness of the controls. Talking about the role of auditors in internal control
assessment, the chief audit officer of a fortune 500 organization in credit card services
industry mentioned:
We do not create controls, we only test them. We consult about them and we tell
them [auditee] here is the type of control you will need to have and you will
have to create it because that‘s your job. If you need help in creating those controls,
we can provide some guide lines and come back and see how well you have done
it.
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It is important to provide adequate access to the auditors across the organization and
establish a cross checking mechanism for the audit function. Auditing helps in integrating
the information rules into daily management practices. Periodic internal audits with well
defined objectives and scope can help in enhancing the security governance mechanisms in
an organization.
Auditing is an important functionality which provides assurance for risk management,
controls and governance structures (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2006). Organizations
may regard strategy, people, assets and finance as pivotal but equally so are routine day-today aspects of an organization including the mechanics of the IT system. Thus auditing
becomes crucial to provide a reasonable assessment of risks of day-to day jobs in IT and
suggest improvements for better security of information systems. It is vital for
management to consult experts proactively and to advise on IT security (Trcek, 2003).
Auditing ensures segregation of duties and points out anomalies in normal business
transactions. Lack of segregation of roles and auditing of the suspense account were the
major cause of the failure of Barings Bank (Drummond, 2003). This is ssentially an
example of security governance loopholes. Internal auditors are responsible for pointing
out management deficiencies negatively impacting the strength of an organization‘s
internal control (Banks, 2004). The greatest benefit of audit function is its unbiased
assessment of management adequacy. A strong, independent audit committee can be
critically useful in ensuring high quality of reporting and controls and the proper
identification and management of risk (Wagner, 2000).
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Maximize Clarity in Business Processes (M2)
Our data suggests that it is absolutely essential to maintain the integrity of business
processes for proper security management. To maintain the integrity, it is essential that
there be clarity in how these processes work, so that proper controls can be instituted in the
right places. Business processes need to be clearly understood and awareness of normal
business activities should be increased. As explained by an internal auditor from the
financial sector:
The application should not be a black box. We should understand the business
processes. What is it that it is doing? How does it convert the input into output?
Whether the whole processing it is doing is correct or not, should be clear.
If the implemented controls make it difficult for the people to perform their day-to-day job
efficiently, there is a greater possibility of these controls being circumvented. As observed
by one of our respondents:
The practices do not take into consideration the impact on the user‘s performance.
The introduction of new requirements in an existing process necessitates additional
effort on the part of the user. This effort is often perceived negatively because it can
be intrusive, complicated, unclear, or draining.
Business processes can be described as ―a set of ordered activities, controlled by central
vision which consume resources and use information‖. Adequate information security
governance has clearly defined business processes (Alves et al, 2006). Efficiently designed
processes reach maturity faster, hence can be protected better. It is important to recognize
that security requires an end-to-end view of business processes (Dutta and McCrohan,
2002). A clear and holistic view of business processes can lead to a comprehensive
security governance program. Moulton and Coles (2003) argue that implementing and
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ensuring effectiveness of governance requires business process information risk
management (BPRIM) approach. This approach recommends that business process owner
must appreciate that risks arise due to faulty business processes and the information that
they use. It is imperative that the management inserts and enforces controls related to the
risks throughout the business process. Along similar lines, Banks (2004) argues that
organizations should not change job descriptions, employees or business practices without
first examining the impact of these changes on controls. A sudden change in business
process can create vulnerability from the security management perspective and should be
avoided.
Ensure Communication about Controls (M3)
Our data emphasizes the significance of sound communication about the controls. It is
important to clearly communicate the various consequences of non compliance with
controls, the nature and scope of the controls themselves and consequences of possible
control breaches that can occur.. Our data also suggests that organizations should
encourage communication about control issues amongst employees. It would be helpful to
have a communication policy that results in frequent internal debates about controls in the
organization. Employees would be better prepared to follow the controls if they are aware
about the rationale, purpose, risks and values of the controls and the reasons governing
organizational actions. Communications acts as the backbone for a successful security
governance program. As one of the respondents shared about his organization:
Communication, discussion, and debate on controls topics are encouraged. Such
exchanges are conducted in visible, open, participative forums, both formal and
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informal, as appropriate. The security actions and their contribution to mitigation of
enterprise risk are well known throughout the organization.
The failure to regularly and effectively communicate information security policy,
standards, baselines, procedures, guidelines, responsibilities, related enforcement
measures, and the consequences of failing to comply to all relevant parties can cause
unintentional breach of policy by parties to whom the policy has not been effectively
communicated (GISP, 2006). Such failure can also result in the intentional breach of policy
by parties to whom the adverse consequences of such a breach have not been effectively
communicated. COBIT 4.1 (2007) emphasizes the importance of constructive
communication between IT and other functions within and outside the business for security
governance. COBIT identifies, communicate management aim and direction (PO6), as an
important objective that stresses the importance of ongoing communications policy to
articulate the vision and the objectives of security governance program. In COSO
framework, information and communications, the capture and communication of relevant
information for integrity of controls is proposed as an objective. Leach (2003) observes
that it is important to gather input from staff on the precise points where the body of
available information is being undermined by confusing messages in the company‘s
pronouncements or contradictory practices in its systems. Open communications help
employees‘ form a clear picture of the intent and scope of the controls.
Ensure Alignment of Individual and Organizational Values (M4)
Our data suggests that it is very important for the individuals in an organization to be able
to identify with the organizational goals. ―Ensure alignment with individual and
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organizational goals‖ has emerged as a fundamental objective in this research. It is
important for the management not to contradict the values being imposed on employees by
setting conflicting managerial and security goals (Ruighaver et al, 2007). There is a
significant cost to be paid for not understanding individual values about security
governance and not attempting to reconcile these values with those of the organization at
large. For the proper alignment between individual and management security goals, values
of people about security governance should be reflected in the objectives developed by the
management. As observed by the chief security officer of a state agency:
Information security should flow from bottom-up; people with their hands in the
actual work should influence information security governance policies with
guidance from the top.
This objective articulates the need for understanding an individual‘s attitudes and beliefs
about security and how their behavior is influenced by peers. It is important to promote
certain values in individuals for better security governance. Some of these values, as
suggested by the interviews, are: respect for others, privacy, integrity, self-pride in job and
honesty. As observed by one of our respondents, a compliance officer in insurance
industry:
Personal integrity influences information security governance practices a lot. No
matter what laws are in place, if your own values are not upright, there is little that
would stop you from behaving unethically.
The importance of individual values for better security governance is also established in
the literature. Leach (2003) argues that an individual‘s personal values and standards of
conduct is a major determinant of the willingness of that person to stay with the
organization and conform to the established norms. Most people ascribe a high importance
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to shared values and sensible rules. Such employees are also expected to imbibe and apply
the organization‘s value system and standards of work to their own preconceived and
individually accepted set of rules. If there is a conflict between an individual‘s values and
organizational values, tension arises and most people are unable to sustain in such an
environment for long (Leach, 2003). As one of our respondents, an HR manager at a state
agency mentioned:
It is important to acertain whether one‘s personal values/norms are the same as the
company‘s or not. If they are not, then most likely his behavior would negatively
affect the security governance.

Values provide keys to reach an understanding on how people evaluate the organization
and its measures for governance (Jones and George, 1998). If the values embedded in the
security measures do not match individual‘s values, chances of the failure of such
measures increase drastically (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002; Warman, 1992; Angell,
1996). It is important to involve end-users in control development process so that too
complex and stringent controls do not result.
Ensure Data Criticality (M5)
Information systems security governance measures must protect the integrity of critical
business data. This requires acquiring and maintaining technology infrastructure that
satisfies the business requirement of providing the appropriate platforms for supporting
business applications. It is important to maintain the integrity of the electronic data for the
accuracy of business decisions and for meeting regulatory compliance criteria. An IT
governance manager from a state agency in California suggests:
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Security governance safeguards information against unauthorized use, disclosure
or modification, damage or loss by implementing logical access controls. These
controls ensure that access to systems, data and programs is restricted to authorized
users.
Some of measures to establish criticality of the data, which our data suggests, are through
assessment and classification of data. The various parameters governing this are
sensitivity, identification of data owners, assigning of responsibilities according to
information criticality and linkages of data with authorizations. Articulating the need for
protected data, one of our respondents says:
With data resource, you have to specify data ownership. Some body needs to own it
and resources should be classified, according to their sensitivity, whether it is
proprietary information or not. Access to those data resources should be restricted
except by authorization which should come only from the data owner. It should be
granted on roles. Access should be given to roles rather than individuals.
It is imperative to ensure that data remains complete, accurate and valid during its input,
updation and storage. It is also important to establish data integrity for compliance
purposes. Data integrity and auditibility of data resources is a big part of compliance
efforts (Volino, 2004). Establishing data criticality through confidentiality, integrity and
availability has been enthusiastically supported by security governance researchers (Finne,
1996; Sherwood, 1996; Ward and Smith, 2002). ISO/IEC 27002 identifies asset
classification and control as governance objective for information systems security.
Access control and authentication rules (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994) have been considered
very significant for proper governance structure. Booker (2006) argues for maintenance of
a database critical network and information assets for better security governance. A secure
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and reliable IT infrastructure can only be created though the institution of proper protection
mechanisms for critical data in an organization.
Ensure Punitive Structures (M6)
It is important to establish deterrence criteria to communicate the consequences of non
compliance with controls and policies. Our data suggests that it is of paramount
importance to ensure disciplinary action in case of unethical behavior or against law
breakers. Establishing clear consequences for not complying with controls and explaining
the disciplinary actions signifies the seriousness and commitment of the management in
instituting the controls. It is also important to explain the meanings of criminal actions to
the employees. A respondent said:
You have to make the consequences of the action very clear. Most of the times,
companies do not make it clear. They warn them saying ―if you do that, criminal
action will be taken‖. But what is the criminal action? People are held responsible
for breaches, but it‘s not clear that if breaches happens, what action would be
taken?
Deterrence criteria help in creating the fear of punishment amongst employees which in
turn cultivates conformity with rules and regulations. Developing countermeasures to deal
with destructive actions is required in order to ensure quick and effective responses in case
of security breaches. One of our respondents added:
Some of the governance practices may not work because the people involved have
personal agendas such as wanting to meet deadlines even if it means not adhering
to company policy. People will continue to put the company in financial and
operational risks until they experience the consequences for doing so.
Deterrence criteria for security have been emphasized in information systems security
research. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) argue for developing deterrence criteria for better
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security. Straub (1990) and Straub and Nance (1990) have used the general deterrence
theory from criminology, which suggests sanctions to prevent people from committing
crimes. The theory suggests that it is prudent to maximize prevention and deterrence and
thus minimize abuse. There has not been much work about deterrence criteria in security
governance research. Most of the leading standards for security governance such as
COBIT or ISO 27000 do not mention deterrence as an objective. Research models in
security governance also do not emphasize deterrence activities as an important objective
for governance. However, our data suggests that deterrence is an important objective when
controls are used as a governance mechanism.
Ensure Clarity in Control Development Process (M7)
Our data suggests that establishing clear control development process creates transparency
in governance efforts and creates a favorable perception of the controls in the organization.
It is important to create systemization in control development process and define
achievable objectives. Critical data or business processes should be protected by multiple
layers of controls, so that in the event of one set of controls failing, there would be other
sets of controls to fall back upon. The chief architect of one of the leading IT services firm
in the USA observed:
For example, we made sure there no single point if failure, by providing layers of
protection through logins. Unfortunately you have to remember more than one
password for this. Particularly vexing is that anything different from your daily
desktop login, and you have lot of problems remembering it. But everything can
not be convenient, and people are getting used to it as there is no other option.
Change initiatives also require development of fresh set of controls at all levels. Controls
should be simple, flexible, timely and easy to use. Security controls could be developed by
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structuring information needs and performing risk assessment to understand the scope of
their impact. There has to be a balance between stringent and usable controls for the
security governance environment to prosper. The Chief Information Officer of a leading
insurance firm commented:
Yes, we want to create environment of innovation and creativity. People are free
to do what they want to do but I would say within the framework. So we define
the framework within which people can freely move but retain enough controls
so that people do what they have to do
COBIT (2007) touches upon the development of application level controls and emphasizes
clarity in the process. NIST, in its special publication (800-53 revision 2, 2006) provides
guidelines for selecting and specifying controls, specifically for information systems
supporting the agencies with federal government. The guidelines suggest creating a
foundation for the development and assessment of security controls determining the
governance efficiency. COSO, in its controls activities phase, touches upon the process of
defining security objectives. It calls for transparency in the process for better fits with the
organization. There is a lack of discourse in research literature about the process of
development of security governance objectives and the actual controls which follow from
this process. Definitely, there has not been much guidance on how to develop effective
controls. This research suggests establishment of clear control development processes.
Ensure Formal Control Assessment Functionality (M8)
Establishing ―formal controls assessment‖ functionality has emerged as a ―business
requirement‖ for successfully governing information systems security. Our data suggests
that the controls assessment functionality enables continual assessment and improvement
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of controls. A formal entity for control assessment ensures that appropriate controls are
designed around information systems needs, where company‘s assets are protected,
bureaucratic delays are avoided and stakeholder viewpoints are reflected in the governance
process. As suggested by a database administrator in a state agency:
It is very difficult to take into account how each employee conducts their job
responsibilities and design IS around that, but ideally each employee job function
and needs should be looked at and incorporated in the IS design
It is important to differentiate between lines of business and industries before applying
popular controls which are being used by others. A periodic cost benefit analysis and IT
architecture review for the appropriateness of a particular design for the security controls
should be performed by such an entity. The Chief Information Officer from a state agency
explained:
In controls assessment for internal system, we perform what we call security
architecture review. Anything that goes into the production is part of overarching
set of policies. Look at our governance model, one dimension is change control.
Part of our change management process is security architecture review for
application developers, purchasing officials, to check if this meets security
guidelines.
Instituting formal control assessment functionality also discourages implementing controls
as an ―afterthought‖. It is important to understand how and why controls work and what
can be done to make them more effective. This can be the chief responsibility of such a
business unit. As mentioned by a senior auditor at a state agency:
You go though it [control] and make sure it is ok and put it in production. This is
what I had done to improve it, so we try to check a lot of those or test the
procedures. We try to make sure, do you have it? Or the segregation of duties?
Which is the set of developers who approve the actual production? We take a lot of
their input because it‘s crucial for the controls, so they know exactly how it has
been done.
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Establishing controls assessment as functionality helps in managing the IT investment for
security. Control assessment as a functionality meets the need of the business requirement
for funding and controlling disbursement of financial resources. Security governance
would be more effective if there are regular investments made in this area and an
operational security budget is established and approved by the organization. Our data
suggests that a formal entity for control assessment could help in achieving several sub
objectives for security governance. Some of these are: explaining prioritization of tasks
and actions for organizational members, establishing the relation between controls and IT
architecture, ensuring good IT architecture, developing dynamic controls structure and
balancing centralization vs. decentralization and effectiveness vs. usability.
The existing frameworks of information systems security governance do not have a clearly
articulated objective of this kind. But there have been discussions on the various functions
that the control functionality would perform. For example, security investment, a sub
objective for control assessment functionality, has been researched arduously over the
years. It is difficult to make security investment decisions as it requires calculation of net
benefits expected from the investment (Ryana and Ryanb, 2006). Calculation of net
benefits from security is difficult but required nonetheless. As Dhillon and Moores (2001)
suggest, key to controls implementation is to identify the exact level of resources
allocation needed. The amount spent should be proportional to how critical the data is, the
cost of controls and probability of the occurrence of the event. Ryana and Ryanb (2006)
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argue that investment in security initiatives results in greater freedom from successful
attacks and the system survives longer before actually succumbing to such an attack.
The role of IT architecture in managing security is also acknowledged by research
literature. Dynamic business environment and sophisticated security needs call for newly
formulated IT architecture demands and revised assumptions about design and deployment
of information systems (Melling, 1994). Such architectural shifts have strategic
implications for the organization. Amer and Hamilton (2008) claim that it is important to
have a security architecture which governs and ensures that various security related tasks
are deployed correctly. Appropriate controls need to be designed along the way inherently
in the business process as the IT infrastructure of an organisation evolves. Organization
make important business decisions on real time information but there are hardly any
assurance methods associated with data of this kind (Flowerday and von Solms, 2005).
Current auditing practices provide assurance months later which might be too late.
Appropriate and timely controls to mitigate such risks are required and the oversight from
a formal body are playing increasingly important roles in the integrity of such data. It
should be capable of arranging for continuous auditing on demand (Flowerday and von
Solms, 2005). Hence we infer that some of the points that we have emphasized under this
objective, have been touched upon in literature but there is no direct call for establishing
controls assessment as a separate functionality. Our data suggests that this is something
which needs to be done.
Maximize Monitoring and Feedback Channels (M9)
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Our data suggests that security governance requires effective and established channels for
monitoring the controls and incorporating feedback for further enhancements. Monitoring
the controls helps in achieving the performance standards set for IT processes. Establishing
monitoring and feedback channels as a security governance objective requires commitment
to continuous reviewing, getting feedback from people and assuring that ―what is being
claimed‖ is done. As shared by the Chief Information Officer at a state agency in Virginia:
Nothing can derail a security initiative and change management quicker than
agitating employees. Whether it is a VP or a CFO, if people feel you are not being
responsible and are taking control away from people or trying to impose it, it
makes people jump through hoops.
Periodic review from external auditors helps in providing a fresh perspective about the
controls. Review and feedback about the controls should be encouraged on a daily basis.
Our data suggests that it is important to review the controls with respect to the
organizational objectives and analyze the existing gaps. As explained by chief architect at a
software service provider organization:
There are certain controls which are not liked by people…more pertinently, people
hate them! How you go about making sure that controls are effective? Well!
We do have some feedback processes wherein people register their concerns. After
all internal control is the most important part of security.
Monitoring of employee behavior includes monitoring the installation of unauthorized
software, use of string passwords and keeping records of internet sites visited (Da Veiga
and Eloff, 2007). Technology monitoring could include installation of sniffers for
incoming and outgoing data packets, capacity and network monitoring. In COBIT (2007),
there are four domains for managing information technology and monitoring and
evaluating one of the domain in this model. In this domain, all IT processes need to be
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regularly assessed over time to check their compliance with controls (ITGI, 2007). This
domain prepares the management to ask difficult questions such as; ‗How well is the
organization prepared to assess the effectiveness of security controls?‘ ‗Can IT
performance be linked to business goals?‘ (ITGI, 2007). COSO (2006) too emphasizes on
monitoring to ensure that controls give the intended results. Internal auditing can help in
the monitoring process as well. Monitoring the effectiveness of controls is a difficult and
ongoing process (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006). There is no mention of feedback channel in
COSO though. Tudor (2000) defines ―monitoring compliance‖ as a security governance
objective which is critical for protecting IT infrastructure. Rees et al. (2003) emphasize
that all control processes should be monitored and reviewed. In their proposed model,
feedback is considered critical to a successful governance program. Every stage of the
model suggested is followed by a feedback channel so that there is continuous
improvement in the process of governing security. Kolokotronis et al (2002), in a proposed
multidimensional multilayered security governance model, suggest monitoring as a crucial
objective for managing security controls. The authors also argue that monitoring of the
controls should be done at a corporate level
Ensure Visible Executive Leadership (M10)
Visible leadership for security governance entails a philosophy and style which promotes
security controls throughout the organization. Our data suggests that establishing executive
leadership in visible roles fundamentally helps in improving the perception of security
governance in an organization. As suggested by our respondents, executive leadership
should be able to ―walk the talk‖ and should lead by example. Such behavior generates
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respect for the security leaders and encourages key individuals to enforce rules and
remedial solutions effectively. As one of our respondents collaborated;
There has to be strong leadership, reinforcement of a tie between what‘s being
done and its value and risks. Also practice what you preach. It helps to have
IT personnel in visible positions with good commitment being shown from top
executives.
For a strong foundation for information systems security governance program, it is
important for the leadership to nurture relationships with the employees. As our data
suggests, in order to promote the security governance initiatives, it is important to put
committed IT personnel in visible positions and encourage a control conscious attitude on
the part of the supervisors. Having an enthusiastic manager to lead the security governance
initiatives goes a long way in shaping the perception of the people about security. As one
of our respondents, a manager in accounting department of the insurance industry
explained:
Leaders should understand their accountability and responsibility with respect to
security for the organization, for their stakeholders, and for the communities they
serve, including the Internet community and the protection of critical national
infrastructures.
Research literature in information systems security governance argues for a strong
leadership for the success of security governance program. Committed leadership is
required to manage resources for the security program. It is necessary that senior leaders
should be seen to be visibly engaged in the management of enterprise security program and
champion the security cause (Julia and Westby, 2007). Also, senior executives should
accept the responsibility of the success of their security programs. Security leadership
should be responsible the sponsorship, strategy and return on investments metrics
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(McCarthy and Campbell, 2001). Tudor (2000) emphasizes the importance of executive
sponsorship in developing security infrastructure for better governance. Leadership in
terms of guidance and executive level presentations is a key objective for security
governance (Eloff and Eloff, 2005; ISO 17799, 2005). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) propose
leadership and governance as a primary objective for a comprehensive security
management program both at strategic and operational levels.
Maximize Group Cohesiveness (M11)
Group cohesiveness, as a security governance objective, informally creates a favorable
environment for the actual use of the security controls. As the data suggests, group
behavior can greatly influence and shape individual perception about security controls.
Norms of security behavior influences cohesive groups better and more profoundly than
groups with disagreements. As mentioned by a help desk staff at a state agency:
I think the biggest influence to individual and group behavior towards IS
governance is peer pressure. On always look around to see if everyone else is
following or not following the controls.
Also, with cohesive groups, an individual gets few opportunities of feeling left out and be
disgruntled. Our data suggests that it is important to have cohesive groups which perceive
security governance initiatives positively. Enhancing group cohesiveness can be achieved
through acquiring and maintaining a motivated and competent workforce, thus maximizing
personnel contributions to security. Acknowledging the impact of peer pressure in group
behavior, security governance should comprise of active measures to enhance team spirit
through sound personnel management practices.
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Managers should pro actively initiate measures to enhance group cohesiveness. As our data
suggests, some of these measures could be: encouraging the tendency to share the work
and credit for good work, respecting personal integrity and values, restricting personal
competition within the group, discouraging favoritism and self interest in groups and
understanding when the group‘s behavior changes due to peer pressure. Even though an
objective such as ―enhance group cohesiveness‖ does not give tangible benefits in the short
run, it is nonetheless essential for the well being of the security governance measures in the
long term. Director of Integrated Systems Security department at a state agency observed:
A person‘s ability to give credit where credit is due; appreciation to others for
their work, not taking undue individual credit for group work is important for the
group to work together.
In information systems research, the importance of group solidarity has not been
emphasized specifically for security or governance related works. Eloff and Eloff (2005),
in their security governance model, describe ―developing teams‖ as an objective for
governance. This component describes employee‘s responsibilities towards security and
aims at creating an improved control culture. But organizational behavior and social
psychology research have long argued for encouraging the formation of cohesive groups
within organizations (Lepine and Dyne, 2001) for meeting business objectives. It is
important to have teams and groups that can carry out governance responsibilities to meet
security objectives. Well planned security initiatives need even better planned execution by
responsible members. Much of the work in organization is completed through teams.
Success of a team is a function of team member‘s talents and available resources, but also
depends on how such team members interact to get the work done (Marks et al., 2001).
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People derive part of their identity and sense of self from the work groups to which they
belong (Hogg and Terry, 2000). This is significant in terms of security management, as
even minor deviations from the expected role could be catastrophic. From security
governance perspective, it is important to understand how group membership based self
definition produces behavior which is in sync with the group (Hogg and Terry, 2000).
Such strongly motivated security groups can shape security perception and behavior and
influence the culture of the organization positively for better security management. After
all, organizations rely on employee initiatives in order to perform effectively (Hogg and
Terry, 2000) and security governance is no exception.
Maximize Management Commitment (M12)
Our data suggests that ―maximize management commitment‖ objective for security
governance initiatives can actually decide the fate of the controls instituted. Management
needs to actively participate in the entire control development-implementation-monitoring
process from end to end in order to establish effective controls as a ―top priority‖. As
mentioned by a senior auditor from the health insurance sector;
Security governance needs to be driven from the very top of the organization to
down. Unless it‘s starts at the top, it is difficult to enforce it at a lower level.
They [management] set the tone for the entire organization. If the people know that
the executives are continually violating the policies, they will think that policy is
not important. Executives should be self aware in the compliance era, since they are
the driving force behind the security initiatives.
Managing security governance efforts requires setting of priorities for resources invested in
controls. Also, management needs to reward conformity with controls, develop an
environment that facilitates control adoption, provide recognition for good control

114

behavior, instill good values about controls and ensure that it is accessible at all times. As
observed by information security manager in an educational institute:
There should be positive reinforcement for doing the right thing and doing things
right; and there should be negative consequences for failure to do so.
It is wise to assess the damage to the organization and to individuals from lack of the
controls. Management should proactively encourage values such as dedication,
determination, open mindedness and truthfulness for a secure environment. Providing
appropriate attention to all stakeholders in the organization and instilling the desire to meet
the expectations from the controls is important for long term success of the governance
program. As a respondent from internal audit division at a Bank said:
With respect to oversight, planning, and performance, security is treated in the
same fashion as any other business requirement. Security is considered a cost of
doing business, not a discretionary or negotiable budget-line item that needs to
be regularly defended. Business units and staff don‘t get to decide unilaterally how
much security they want. Adequate and sustained funding and allocation of security
resources are required as part of the operational projects and processes they
support.
Research literature in information systems security governance calls for greater
management participation for the success of security initiatives. Moultan and Cole (2003),
in their security governance model, identify ―management‘s role‖ objective as an important
dimension for the success of the security program. Management should foster a control
environment that encourages high level of integrity and professional standards. The
involvement of the senior management with security agenda is a key to achieving good
security governance (Ezingeard, McFadzean and Birchall, 2005; ISO 17799, 2000).
Information security can only be established if senior managers give it their complete
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support and commitment (Von Solms, 2001). It is the management‘s responsibility to
convey it‘s seriousness about governing security matters and emphasize the strategic
benefit of the controls implemented. It is difficult to implement the appropriate plans for
security strategy with the support of the top management (Kankanhalli et al, 2003).
McCarthy and Campbell (2001) emphasize the importance of security and user
management for better security governance and propose a crucial role for the management
to ensure success.
Maximize Resource Allocation for Controls (M13)
In this research, ―maximize resource allocation for controls‖ has emerged as a means
objective to maximize information systems security governance. Management needs to do
a lot of groundwork before developing the actual controls for security. This objective
suggests that organizations should take some proactive initiatives in order to develop
conducive environments for effective control development, implementation and
monitoring. Our data suggests initiatives such as allocation of resources, coordination of
multidisciplinary functions, enhancement of measures like trust, development of an
environment for free and politics-free environment, as being a precursor in resources
allocation. These control initiatives act as an antecedent to creating a control friendly
environment and aligning the business strategy with the security strategy of the
organization.
Security is often treated as the job of IT people and controls as part of accounting
department domain. Resultantly, there could be potential conflict or lack of responsibility
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between the two departments resulting in compromised systems. These tensions need to be
resolved. As suggested by a senior auditor, retail industry:
Plug the gap. MIS and Accounting have to play in the same sandbox. Both
departments have to understand that they are trying to resolve the same issues of
securing information.
An environment of politics and fear can undermine the seriousness of security controls. It
is therefore important to create fear-free conditions where individuals can voice opinions
about use and relevance of controls. One of our respondents adds:
Secrecy creates fear, which ultimately leads to someone making a mistake by
letting information out. Caution would be a better value to push because it allows
for openness, but not fear to occur.
Research literature on information systems security governance does acknowledge the
importance of some of the proactive initiatives as suggested by our data, but does not
accord the same importance to all. According to von Solms (2000), trust is the most
important issue in establishing information security governance in an IT environment. The
fundamental question that needs to be asked is: ‗Can I trust the entities I depend
upon?‘(DeMaio, 2002). Management and employees should have mutual trust for each
other for implementation of controls and procedures and also to guide employees through
changes in security behavior. Often good security plans fail due to lack of proper resources
and guidance. It is critical for the management to ensure that adequate resources are
allocated to support the overall enterprise information security strategy (Information
Technology Governance Institute, 2006). For getting enough resources, the security
department needs to make a good business case for security. As observed by a project
manager, electronics industry:
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Security is a non–functional requirement. There is no place for non functional
requirements in system design. User groups do not talk about security, as this a so
called non-functional technical requirement. How do you manage it then? It
becomes an issue of internal policies.
One of the obstacles in engaging senior executives to address information security is the
difficulty of connecting security expenditures to profitability (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002).
It is imperative that the business value of security expenditure be justified to the
management. Our research indicates that expenditures in security are intricately linked to
business continuity and hence the very existence of an enterprise. In the review of
literature, we did not find an explicit support for many of the security initiatives as
suggested by our data. We believe that this is an important finding and has the potential to
dramatically change the success of governance efforts.
Encourage Standardization of Controls (M14)
Our data suggests that ―Standardization of controls‖ as a security governance objective
helps in improving and assessing the nature and impact of security controls against the
mechanisms employed by other players in the industry. This provides avenues for
improvement by learning from others. Benchmarking security investments and governance
practices with industry standards provides motivations for improvement and implementing
innovations in the existing control practices. As voiced by an internal auditor from the
energy industry:
An organization should regularly compare and benchmark its security state,
investments, and actions with others in its market sector and community of
practice.
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It is prudent to compare the state of controls with standards across the industry and, in the
process, standardize the control development process within the organization. Our data
suggests that it is helpful to refer to the prevalent industry models and frameworks for
control formulation as it provides a baseline to start with. As a project manager from a
Bank responded:
Security is integrated into enterprise functions and processes. These include risk
management, human resources (hiring, firing), audit/compliance, disaster
recovery, business continuity, asset management, change control, and IT
operations. Security is actively considered as part of new project initiation and
ongoing project management and during all phases of any system-development life
cycle (applications and operations). Security controls should be standardized to
be able to fit into the other processes seamlessly.
Research literature in security governance is in favor of standardizing the controls.
Standardization is a process of alignment and entails stabilization and closure in definition
and boundaries of the standard (Hanseth et al., 2006). Some of the potential benefits of
standardization are that management‘s performance can be judged by how well the
organization performs in terms of internationally accepted information systems security
governance practices. (Eloff and von Solms, 2000) This ensures that management has
covered all security bases (von Solms, 2000). Eloff and von Solms (2000) suggest system
evaluation with process certification as an effective way of managing security. The authors
argue that such an approach manages security from a holistic perspective of process and
procedural domains. Standardizing the controls over a period of time will help the
organization compare its practices with potential business partners. It also increases the
trust and confidence of the external stakeholders. However, standardization has its pitfalls
too. Such standards can only be viewed as baseline reference frameworks and might not be
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adequate enough (von Solms, 2000) for all the contextual security needs of the
organization. The variety of standards and their interrelations as well as the socio technical
nature of the standards makes it difficult to achieve standardization (Hanseth et al., 2006).
In conclusion, standardization of controls can be helpful if performed for repetitive and
operational tasks. The task environment for routine business processes is less uncertain and
the management aims at adhering to the same routine to gain efficiency. Standardization of
controls for such tasks not only provides opportunities to improve it through
benchmarking, but also gives opportunities to gain in productivity owing to these
processes. We have argued against using standards ―as it is‖ for overall security
governance. Strategic processes and controls should not be standardized as it takes away
the unique advantage of the organization and decelerates innovation.
Maximize Training and Education (M15)
Educating and training employees about the usefulness of control requirements ensures
that users are aware of the controls, the risks and responsibilities involved in implementing
the controls. Our data suggests that controls training programs could illustrate the
relevance of controls with work related examples. Training with work related examples
would be useful in understanding the depth and reach of the controls. Also, increasing
awareness of social engineering issues is required. Education can be provided through
regular training sessions about the need and usage of the controls. As shared by one of our
respondents:
Applying knowledge in daily practice is important. I think the training should be
implemented in such a way that you not only develop the principles of security or
privacy but also let them know its common usages and where they should be used
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Our data suggests that regular training and education is good but should be assessed
frequently for its impact on the trained personnel. Training should be enforced and the
results from such efforts should be measurable in some way. As opined by a project
manager from retail industry:
How do you integrate your security and your development? If you have very
standard mechanisms, then you can go for training. Hardly anybody goes for it. I
haven‘t seen people going for security training, as it is not required. Interestingly.
I do not think there is any additional cost to be incurred because the infrastructure
is readily available.
Information systems security governance literature has long emphasized training and
education as major components of security governance program. Lack of security control
awareness is a major obstacle for effective information systems security governance
(Johnson, 2006). Proper training and education helps in adopting a more congenial mindset
and behavior towards security. Management should take measures towards increasing the
awareness of the intent and scope of the controls. Education about controls is required for
all levels of employees (Banks, 2004). Awareness about security issues and controls has
many benefits in the long term. Some of the major benefits include (Johnson, 2006):
increased customer confidence, better protection of confidentiality, increased reliability
and correctness, fewer internal errors, early detection of security incidents, improved
employee morale and improved compliance with laws. Organizational responsibility for
controls varies from the top of the organization to the bottom. In a holistic approach, the
organization has an unavoidable responsibility to educate all levels and functions in
controls fundamentals (Banks, 2004).
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Whitman (2003) suggests that employee security education, training and awareness
program should be designed early on in the process of an information security strategy.
This helps in increasing awareness of computer security problems and controls amongst
employees‘ right from the very beginning. According to Warman (1992, p. 308), ―It is
essential for the success of any computer security policy that staff at all levels fully
understand and implement the necessary procedures.‖
Newsletters can also improve employee awareness by publicizing new and previously
unknown hazards. This also encourages employees to remain alert for up-to-date
information and perhaps unidentified threats (Whitman, 2003). Consequently, education,
training and awareness programs will create an organizational culture that will enhance,
rather than compromise, security (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002). Understanding the
perceptions of an organization‘s Board members with reference to risks and market
expectations is another key to improving Information Security Governance (Ezingeard et
al, 2003).
Ensure ethical and moral values (M16)
Ethical environment is essential for information security governance mechanisms to work
effectively. Our data suggests that ethical and moral values tend to shape individual‘s
perception about the importance of security control mechanisms and these perceptions lead
to secure or un- secure behavior of the employees. It is important that the morality of the
staff is encouraged and shaped towards respecting and conforming to the controls
requirements. As explained by the systems manager, credit card services industry:
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Be aware of the morality of your staff. Allow them small things and don‘t wait for
things like notices or bureaucracy.
Individuals often associate self pride with their jobs and this should be encouraged by the
management. Self pride in the job actually shapes the work ethics in an organization which
would ultimately help the controls culture in a positive way. As mentioned by an internal
auditor, electronics industry:
I would say that personal ethical and moral codes have a big role to play in
security governance. Its very clear that people who are not honest or ethical, are not
going to uphold codes which they think are useless and unnecessary.
Ethical environments where the strong moral values are communicated by the leaders of
the organization tend to create a positive outlook about security governance and also a
normative pressure on employees around to behave in a certain way.
Research literature in information systems security supports is appreciative of the role of
ethics and moral values in shaping a positive security governance environment. Even
though technical and formal means of security controls are important, these can only
protect the data in the system. The contexts in which data is interpreted and used by
employees keep changing and require broader normative controls to ensure that controls do
work (Backhouse and Dhillon, 1995). Ethics and moral behavior is one of those controls.
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) argue that clear work ethics should be defined in work
security environment as the types of data crucial to business are constantly changing.
Policies, ethical and moral behavior should be communicated widely and clearly since this
helps in formalizing the normative structures in an organization.
Maximize Trust building Mechanisms (M17)

123

Our data suggests that good security governance practices should be able to build trust
relationships with stakeholders within and outside the organization. Given the nature of the
job description in security work, it is crucial to win the trust of employees in order to
ensure things run smoothly even in the absence of close supervision. One of the
respondents, systems administrator and insurance industry spoke in this vein:
We all must be capable of trusting everyone in the organization that comes into
contact with our shared assets.
An environment of ―lack of trust‖ and group politics, delineates people from the
organizational objectives and a culture of ―self before organization‖ creeps in.
As shared by a respondent, director IT services, state agency:
Politics, favoritism, and self-interest typically trump values and may undermine
the security of information systems.
Organizations should consciously try to maximize trust building mechanisms by ensuring
clarity, transparency and accountability in actions. The role of the management goes a long
way in shaping the trust building exercises. Management should work towards reducing
the fears of the employees about unknown turn of events. This can be communicated
through effective policies about sequence of events in case of deviation from the normal
routine.
Research literature in information systems security suggests the importance of trust in
effective security governance environment. Tsiakis and Sthephanides (2005) suggest that
lack of interpersonal trust create ideal circumstances for a security threat. Trust and
trustworthiness are fundamental for every security solution. The needs for trust elements
and tools that are used to implement it, affect the security mechanism of any commercial
124

system. Ratnasingham (1999) suggests that role of trust is an essential element for long
term ED1 trading partner relationships. The study suggests that trust leads to high
performance via better trading relationships. In another study on trust and security
measures, application interface was found to be important in terms of security. Trust needs
to be established with outsider about the interface integrity and data protection via it
(Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne, 2003). Trust refers to defining the appropriate levels of
norms and patterns of behavior that all members of an organization should be expected to
implement (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000). Trust is important for information security
governance as sensitive data is often handled in the absence of close supervision.
In summary, the list of seventeen means objectives for information security governance is
presented in the table 4.2 below. Under each objective, the corresponding sub objectives
are shown. In summary, all the objectives developed in phase one of this study, are
grounded in research literature.
Table 4.2 Means objectives for information security governance
Objectives

Sub-Objectives

M1

Ensure Efficacy of Audit
Processes

M2

Maximize clarity in business
processes

M3

Ensure Communication about
Controls

Develop audit practices for changing contexts of governance task
Develop audit process to integrate the information rules
Develop cross checking mechanisms for audit function
Ensure adequate access to auditors across the organization
Establish difference between audit functionality and actions
Treat internal auditors as consultants to ensure effectiveness of
controls
Avoid improper business processes
Establish clarity in business processes
Understand the business processes
Increase awareness of business activities and processes
Communicate importance of controls
Communicate the consequences of non compliance of controls
Communicate the nature and scope of controls
Communicate the consequences of internal controls breaches
Encourage communication amongst employees about control
issues
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M4

Ensure Alignment of
Individual and
Organizational Values

M5

Ensure data criticality

M6

Ensure punitive structures

Encourage debate amongst employees about control issues
Encourage efficient communication policy within the organization
Explain the purpose of controls
Explain the rationale behind controls
Explain the reasons behind organizational actions
Explain the risks and values of controls to users
Ensure damage assessment for individuals from lack of controls
Ensure damage assessment to the organization from lack of
controls
Encourage discussion amongst employees about control issues
Ensure responsiveness for media hyped issues
Align personal and organizational values
Align security control objectives with enterprise objectives
Respect other people‘s confidence
Respect other people‘s personal information
Respect the rights of others
Ensure employee satisfaction
Ensure honor of the employees
Protect self image of the individuals
Change attitude of executives about security controls
Understand people‘s attitudes and beliefs about controls
Develop a result oriented attitude
Develop people oriented controls
Encourage determination about following controls
Encourage dedication to the company
Encourage individuals to improve controls
Ensure that people see value in controls
Ensure good values about security governance
Establish control structure to reflect sensitivity in data
Assess the criticality of data integrity
Assess the sensitivity of the information
Define responsibilities according to level of confidentiality of
information
Identify data owners for sensitive data
Link data owners with authorizations
Ensure ownership of information
Ensure adequate technical controls
Develop identity management control
Ensure confidentiality
Set deterrence criteria to be followed
Ensure action against unethical behavior
Ensure disciplinary action against unethical behavior
Ensure protection against disgruntled employees
Ensure that action is taken against law breakers
Establish clear consequences for not complying with laws
Establish clear punishments for rule breakers
Respect company‘s rules
Encourage discipline in the organization
Explain the disciplinary actions clearly
Explain the consequences of failure to comply with regulations
Explain the meaning of criminal action to the employees
Create a fear of punishment in organizations
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M7

Ensure clarity in control
development process

M8

Ensure formal controls
assessment functionality

M9

Maximize monitoring and
feedback channels

M10

Ensure visible executive
leadership

Create counter measures to deal with destructive actions
Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators
Ensure environment of conformity that affects individual behavior
Define multiple layers of controls
Develop achievable objectives
Develop controls as a part of the change initiative
Develop controls for all the levels in the organization
Develop simple and easy to use controls
Discourage complex controls
Ensure that control usage is simple.
Ensure risks assessment to develop controls
Structure the information needs
Ensure that controls are easy to use
Encourage flexibility in controls
Ensure timeliness in controls
Institute controls as part of organizational design
Discourage planning about control implementation as ―after
thought‖
Establish controls department
Centralize the control functionality
Develop security governance as a functional requirement
Explain prioritization of tasks and actions for controls to members
Establish the relation between controls and IT architecture
Ensure IT architecture review for correctness of design
Develop dynamic internal control structures
Balance between gains and losses from the controls
Balance centralization-decentralizations
Balance convenience with usability
Increase understanding of stakeholder viewpoints
Ensure individual care to all stakeholders
Protect company assets
Avoid bureaucratic delays
Ensure adequate review of programs
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls
Ensure periodic review of controls from external auditors
Incorporate feedbacks from people on daily basis
Institute feedback channels for security governance
Review controls with respect to organizational objectives
Review the controls regularly for proper functioning
Ensure the veracity of claims
Institute corrective measures for continuous monitoring
Encourage informal feedback from people about controls
Encourage the management to ―walk the talk‖
Encourage top management to lead by example
Ensure respect for security leaders
Ensure that key individuals enforce rules and remedial solutions
Nurture relationships with employees
Provide strong leadership
Place committed IT personnel to be in visible positions
Encourage control conscious attitude of supervisors
Create an environment of leadership style and culture to minimize
intergroup rivalry
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M11

Maximize Group
Cohesiveness

M12

Maximize management
commitment

M13

Maximize resource
allocation for controls

M14

Encourage Standardization of
Controls

M15

Maximize Training and
Education

M16

Ensure ethical and moral
values

Encourage sharing the credit for good work
Encourage the ability to share work
Understand the group behavior driven by peer pressure
Discourage favoritism in groups
Discourage self interest in groups
Encourage internal competition to stay within groups
Encourage collaboration with peers
Understand the influence of peer pressure on individual behavior
Ensure efficacy of controls through the management
Ensure management commitment to controls
Provide rewards for conformity with policies
Discourage employee agitation
Discourage impeding people from their job
Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules
Discourage providing all rights to an individual
Discourage secrecy amongst employees
Establish positive reinforcement for doing the right thing
Ensure availability of the management
Accord priority to the controls from the management
Ensure that truth is told
Encourage open mindedness to provide inputs.
Reward good performance
Provide recognition for complying with policies
Establish suitable environmental and physical controls
Ensure adequate resources allocation for maintenance of controls
Discourage individuals from feeling restrained due to resources
Provide resources for compliance
Encourage co-ordination between MIS and accounting for
controls
Establish controls proactively
Benchmark security governance investments against industry
standards
Benchmark security governance practices with industry standards
Compare the state of controls with standards across the industry
Establish standardization in the control process
Refer to industry models and frameworks for control formulation
Create systemization in the control development process
Differentiate between lines of business.
Differentiate between types of industry
Define training programs to reflect details of internal controls
Discuss the relevance of controls adequately
Educate users regularly
Encourage education about internal controls
Ensure training with examples
Illustrate with specific work related examples
Ensure learning about internal control issues
Increase awareness of breaches because of social engineering
Encourage acceptable and respectable actions
Encourage honesty
Encourage access to individuals with strong moral values
Ensure strong moral values in auditors
Encourage personal integrity
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M17

Maximize trust building
mechanisms

Encourage self pride in the job
Understand the morality of the staff
Respect personal integrity in a group
Instill good principles into employees
Encourage trust building mechanisms for controls
Establish trust in the organization
Enhance an environment of trust in the organization
Discourage an environment of fear
Discourage an environment of mistrust
Discourage politics in the organization
Encourage free expression

4.4. Discussions
The first phase of this research proposed seventeen means and six fundamental value based
objectives for information systems security governance. The objectives presented in the
previous section have all emerged from our data. The means and fundamental objectives
developed in this research have implications for information systems security governance
research and practice. These contributions have been classified into three categories and
each category is individually discussed below.
4.4.1 Relevance of the proposed objectives
The ISG objectives proposed in this research is not a stand alone effort but built on the
cumulative knowledge in this area, above and beyond. Each objective proposed in this
research is substantiated by the research literature. Some key lessons can be drawn from
each objective. Table 4.3 presents the fundamental objectives proposed in this research
with the research support and key lessons. On similar lines, table 4.4 presents the means
objectives with research support and key lessons for practice.
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Table 4.3 Summary of Fundamental Objectives

F1

F2

Objective
Ensure Corporate
Controls Strategy

Encourage a
Controls- Conscious
Culture

Literature Support
Gregor et al. (2004);
Peppard, 2001; Peppard
and Ward, 2004; Alves et
al, 2006; ITGI, 2006; Da
Veiga and Eloff, 2007;

Julia and Westby, 2007; Da
Veiga and Eloff, 2007);
Dutta and McCrohan, 2002

Key Lessons
Control strategy aligns the security
governance and business objectives
Antecedent to complete security and
process integrity
Provides the departments with control plans
Risk consciousness in employees creates a
―prevention mentality‖
Helps in minimizing intergroup rivalry over
security governance initiatives

F3

F4

F5

F6

Establish Clarity in
Policies and
Procedures

Maximize
Regulatory
Compliance

Ensure Continuous
Improvements in
controls

Enable
Responsibility and
Accountability in
Roles

Ward and Smith, 2002;
COBIT, 2007; COSO, 2005;
Von Solms, 1996; Straub
and Nance, 1990; Moultan
and Cole, 2003; Cockcroft,
2002; Straub and Welke,
1998; Eloff and Eloff ;
2005; Tudor, 2000;
McCarthy and Campbell,
2001
Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007;
Tudor, 2000; Eloff and
Eloff, 2005; von Solms,
2006; Moultan and Cole,
2003; Dhillon and
Torkzedeh (2006)
Booker (2006);
COBIT(2007); COSO,
2000; Eloff and Eloff
(2005); Rees et al. (2003)

Pironti, 2006; Drummond,
2003; GISP security
principles; Dhillon, 2001

Creates environment where individuals
―watch out‖ for each other
Ensure the proper use of the applications
and technological solutions instituted
Make policies easily accessible
Reflect control requirements in the policies
Develop visibility of fair policies

Meet legal, regulatory and contractual
obligations
Use compliance as a driver to develop
security governance initiatives
Continuous and iterative control assessment
improves the controls environment
Understand the organizational context of
particular controls
Change in roles should be reflected in
subsequent controls
Provide clarity in roles and ownership of
decisions
Promote transparency in roles and avoid
sudden changes in responsibility structures
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Table 4.4 Summary of Means Objectives
Objective

Literature Support

M1

Ensure Efficacy of
Audit Processes

M2

Maximize Clarity in
Business Processes

M3

Ensure
Communication
about Controls

IIA, 2006; Drummond,
2003; Banks, 2004;
Wagner, 2000; Trc`ek,
2003;
Alves et al, 2006; Dutta
and McCrohan, 2002;
Moulton and Cole, 2003;
Banks (2004)
GISP, 2006; Leach 2003;
CobiT, 2007, COSO, 2005

M4

Ensure Alignment of
Individual and
Organizational
Values

M5

Ensure Data
Criticality

M6

Ensure Punitive
Structures

M7

M8

Ensure Clarity in
Control Development
Process

Ensure Formal
Control Assessment
Functionality

Key Lessons
Have frequent internal and external audits
Treat auditors as consultants to assess
management‘s adequacy

Dhillon and Torkzadeh
2006; Straub, 1990; Straub
and Nance, 1990;

Efficiently designed mature business
processes are better protected
Provide end-to-end view of business
process and manage changes
Have frequent debates about controls
Develop communications policy for
constructive communication within and
outside functional groups
Promote values such as respect for others,
privacy, integrity, self-pride in job and
honesty
Involve users in the development process
to understand individual‘s attitudes and
beliefs about security
Assess and classify data according to
sensitivity
Identify data owners to assign
responsibilities according to information
criticality
Link data with authorizations for
secure and reliable IT infrastructure
Establish clear consequences and
disciplinary actions against non
compliance with policies

CobiT, 2007; NIST 80053-2, 2007; COSO, 2006

Explain the meanings of criminal actions
and respond effectively in cases on non
compliance
Develop a favorable perception and
transparency of the controls

Leach (2003); Jones and
George, 1998; Baskerville
and Siponen, 2002;
Warman, 1992; Angell,
1996; Dhillon and
Torkzedeh (2006)
Volino, 2004; Finne,
1996; Sherwood, 1996;
Ward and Smith, 2002,
ISO 17799, 2006; Sandhu
and Samarati, 1994;
Booker, 2006

Ryana and Ryanb, 2006;
Dhillon and Moores, 2001;
Melling, 1994; Amer and
Hamilton, 2008;
Flowerday and von Solms,
2005

Develop simple, flexible, timely and easy
to use controls
Develop formal entity for control
assessment
Differentiate between lines of business and
industries before applying popular ISG
frameworks
Stakeholder‘s viewpoints needs to be
reflected in the governance process
Perform periodic cost benefit analysis and
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M9

M10

M11

M12

M13

M14

M15

M16

M17

Maximize
Monitoring and
Feedback Channels

Ensure Visible
Executive Leadership

Maximize Group
Cohesiveness

Maximize
Management
Commitment

Maximize Resource
Allocation for
controls

Encourage
Standardization of
Controls

Maximize Training
and Education

Ensure ethical and
moral values

Maximize trust

Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007;
CobiT (2007); COSO,
2006; Tudor, 2000;
Dhillon and Mishra, 2006;
Rees et al, 2003;
Kolokotronis et al, 2002
Julia and Westby, 2007;
McCarthy and Campbell,
2001, Tudor, 2000; Eloff
and Eloff, 2005; ISO
17799, 2005; Da Veiga and
Eloff (2007)
Lepine and Dyne, 2001;
Marks et al., 2001; Hogg
and Terry, 2000; Kanter et
al., 1992; Eloff and Eloff,
2005
Moultan and Cole, 2003;
Ezingeard et al, 2005; ISO
17799, 2000; Von Solms,
2001; Kankanhalli et al,
2003; McCarthy and
Campbell, 2001

IT architecture review for correctness of
design for the security controls
Helps in achieving the performance
standards set for the IT processes
Assures ―what is being claimed‖ is
accomplished
Incorporate the feedback into the controls
Fundamentally helps in improving the
perception of security governance
Lead by example and nurture the
relationships with employees executive
Group behavior influences and shapes
individual‘ perception about security
controls
Discourage favoritism and self interest in
groups and manage peer pressure
Reward for conformity with controls and
encourage values such as dedication,
determination, open mindedness and
truthfulness

von Solms (2000), ITGI,
2006; Dutta and
McCrohan, 2002

Establish effective controls as a ―top
priority‖
Groundwork before developing controls
requires coordination of multidisciplinary
functions

Hanseth et al., 2006; Eloff
and von Solms, 2000; von
Solms, 2000)

Allocate appropriate resources in politics
free environment
Create systemization in control
development process and assess against
mechanisms employed by others

Johnson, 2006; Banks,
2004; Whitman, 2003;
Warman, 1992; Dutta and
McCrohan, 2002;
Ezingeard et al, 2003
Dhillon and Backhouse,
2000

Ratnasingham, 1999;
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Benchmark security investments and
governance practices to learn from others
Awareness about social engineering issues
can be provided with work related
examples
Apply the knowledge in daily practice
with focused training and education
Propagate right ethical environment
Leadership establishes the right tone of
ethics in organizations
Develop a conducive environment for

building mechanisms

Johnston, Eloff and
Labuschagne, 2003;
Dhillon and Backhouse,
2000; Tsiakis and
Sthephanides,2005

controls deployment
Enhance trust with partners within and
outside the organization

4.4.2 Empirically grounded value based objectives
This research is presents a set of theoretically and empirically grounded information
systems security governance objectives. A critical review of the extant literature for
information systems security governance research suggests a lack of theoretically grounded
information systems security governance framework. The popular security management
standards such as COBIT, COSO, ITIL and ISO/IEC 27002 that are commonly used in
practice are not without drawbacks. In the available models, there is neither any theoretical
basis of the proposed objectives nor any of the frameworks proposed are grounded in data.
The above mentioned models are atheoreical, anecdotal, generic and lack grounding in
organizational context. Also, the above mentioned models are difficult to operationalize
and implement because these frameworks need to be interpreted and bounded depending
on the nature of the organization. As deliberated by a senior audit director at a fortune 500
financial services organization:
COBIT is a pretty big model and very generic. It teaches you to think about
what you have to think about. Look at COBIT and try to follow COBIT; you
may need a lot of interpretation, it is going to be a long process. Companies have
separate COBIT implementation project. It will help us greatly to look at that
framework. You go to seminars to understand how it works, COBIT is way too
much.
This research suggests 23 security governance objectives that are organizationally
grounded in the context of controls. This study used ―value theory‖ as a theoretical basis to
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develop value based security governance objectives. The theory emphasizes the
importance of values in human decision making and eventually behavior (Catton, 1954).
The methodology used is a value focused approach which has been used in information
systems research before (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Keeney, 1999; Sheng et al, 2001,
Drevin et al, 2007) but not in the context of information systems security governance. This
is an important contribution to information systems security research and a stepping stone
to take the work forward in this area. In information systems security governance
literature, there is a lack of guidance on ―how to develop security governance objectives?‖
In available security governance frameworks, not much light has been shed on how the
suggested objectives were developed. This research suggests a value focused approach in
developing decision objectives for information security governance.
4.4.3 Emergent nature of security governance objectives
There have been calls in the research literature about participative approach to security
governance (Warman, 1992). In this ―bottom up‖ approach, individual values are
considered in developing governance objectives as it facilitates alignment of individual and
organizational values. But none of the existing security governance models suggest
objectives that reflect the values of the stakeholders. This research proposes value based
security governance objectives. The process of developing a multi objective decision
model using value focused approach has certain other benefits in addition to the direct
benefit of creating better alternatives. Some of it‘s far reaching benefits include improving
communications between stakeholder groups and providing systematic and transparent
approach that often leads to uncovering hidden objectives (Merrick and Garcia , 2005).
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Value focused thinking has been applied in many fields such as healthcare, waste
management, transportation, port traffic management public health risk management
(Merrick and Garcia , 2005; Keeney, 1992; Parnell et al, 2001).
Values are general standards or principles that are considered as intrinsically desirable ends
(Jones and George, 1998). Considering that technological usage is influenced by the values
and goals imposed by the executive culture (Schein, 1996), it is important to explain and
reflect on the values of stakeholders for security purposes. People prioritize between
various options and make a decision based on the relative importance of the values, which
are their guiding principles (Rokeach, 1973). Value systems of individuals determines
which type of behavior, events, situations or people are desirable or undesirable.
Butler (1991) argues that when people view something as desirable, their internal values
strive to uphold the standard in behavior. For example an individual whose value system
emphasizes loyalty and honesty will strive to achieve the same loyalty and honesty in work
and personal life (Jones and George, 1998). Agreeing with the above researchers, we
believe that values become all the more important in security governance context as the
risk from circumventing controls can be catastrophic, a case in point being demise of the
Barings Bank (Drummond, 2003).
In the context of security, organizations have to learn about new emerging threats and find
means to deal with the threats proactively. As we know, organizational learning is the
process of assimilating new knowledge into the organization's knowledge base
(Abouzakhar and Manson, 2002). Organizational learning begins at the individual level.
New individual knowledge is incorporated into organizational knowledge only when it is
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shared and is assimilated into organizational routines, documents, and practices (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Incorporating the values of stakeholders into the governance
objectives is important as beliefs and value systems may be used as mechanisms for
strategic change (Marginson, 2002). As shared by a respondent:
More and more businesses and government talk a lot about these personal values
and train folks to understand the definition of the terms. What organizations fail to
do is actively promote these same values by rewarding positive behavior and
punishing unethical behavior [chief security officer, state agency].
This research provides a template for information systems security governance objectives
that are rooted in the values of the stakeholders and provides an outlet for the opinion of
individuals.
4.4.4 Synthesized information security governance objectives
The information security governance objectives presented in this research are grounded in
literature and none of the objectives have been proposed for the first time. The above
discussion on the proposed ISG objectives begs the question. ―So what makes these
objectives unique?‖ Research literature has presented much information security
governance objectives in the past (see chapter 2). In practice, there are some leading
frameworks such as COBIT, COSO and ISO/IEC 27002 which suggest ISG objectives
based on experience and best practices across industries. But these frameworks for ISG do
not suggest a comprehensive set of objectives that encapsulate all the dimensions of
organizational governance in a single framework. For example, COBIT, COSO
predominantly have formal socio-organizational orientation where the role of formal
management is emphasized over the other aspects of security governance. Similarly, ISO/
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IEC 27002 and ITIL have a technical orientation to security governance where formal,
socio, ethical and moral dimensions are overlooked or under emphasized. We believe that
these objectives are unique on several accounts. Their uniqueness lies in:
First, this research presents a synthesized set of ISG objectives which touches upon
technical, formal, informal, moral and ethical dimensions of security governance, leading
to a comprehensive internal controls program. While all our objectives have been generally
recognized in literature (see table 4.3 and 4.4), they have not been presented cohesively as
a synthesized ISG framework. This is a unique framework for ISG which incorporates
several aspects of security governance into one platform thus allowing the development of
a comprehensive security management program when implemented.
Second, the sub-objectives presented under each ISG objective clearly articulate the cross
functional nature and multi dimensionality of the proposed objectives. Even though
objectives by definition are generic in nature, the sub-objectives under the objectives so
suggest specific directions for operationalizing a particular objective and putting it into
practice. These objectives are more directive or prescriptive in nature. When implemented
through appropriate tasks and activities, these would help in achieving the overall
objective. Many ISG models in the research literature lack these powerful sub-objectives
(see discussion on ITIL, COSO, Ward and Smith 2002, Booker 2006 in chapter 2) which
facilitate the use and adoption of the objective.
Third, some of the objectives developed in this research have not been emphasized enough
in ISG literature but potentially can play a crucial role in security management. Objectives
such as ―establish corporate control strategy‖, ―establish punitive structure‖, ―establish
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clear control development process‖, ―ensure formal control assessment functionality‖, and
―maximize group cohesiveness‖ have been hardly designated as important for ISG in
research literature. Thus the comprehensive nature of the proposed objectives provides a
unique ISG framework for organizations.
4.5 Conclusion
Managing information systems security requires a holistic approach encompassing
technical, organizational and behavioral aspects of security. The proposed information
systems security governance objectives address risks to information assets from
technology, processes and personnel perspectives in all facets of information asset
environment. As Segev et al. (1998) note, the way towards security ―lies not with
technology, but with the organization itself‖. Effective information systems security
governance calls for internal controls objectives that are grounded in organizational
context and based on the values of the stakeholders in the organization. A common set of
principles underlie all levels of an organization for any activity or objectives and is
important to establish effective control (Galloway, 1994). In this chapter we have
developed a set of security governance principles or objectives that guides the overall
security program. The goal of this chapter was to present the data and the results of phase
one of our study. In the beginning, a description of Keeney‘s three step methodology and
the way it is used in this study was presented. The 17 means and 6 fundamental objectives
which emerged using value focused approach are presented. All the objectives are
grounded in the extant literature in the subsequent section. Having grounded the
objectives, an overall discussion on findings and contributions of this framework is
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presented. This phase of the research has produced theoretically and empirically grounded
information systems security governance objectives. But the objectives developed have not
been validated in an organizational setting to understand their relevance in real life. The
validation of the developed objectives is addressed in the next chapter. A case study was
conducted in the second phase of the research with two goals: reexamine the objectives in
an organizational setting and interpret the relationships between various objectives to
overall maximize security governance in organizations. The description of the case study
site is presented along with the interpretations of the usefulness of the objectives in the
particular setting.
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CHAPTER 5 Reexamining information security governance objectives at CCIT
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents findings of the case study that was conducted to reexamine the
proposed control objectives of the previous phase of the research. An in-depth case study
was done to understand the nature and significance of the developed governance objectives
in an organizational context. The case study site was the information technology (IT)
department of a major City Council (hereafter referred to as CCIT) in south east of United
States of America. CCIT was chosen for the case study for two reasons. First, the
organization is undergoing changes in its information security governance practices and is
in the process of establishing new objectives, policies and controls for security. This
seemed like a perfect fit for our purpose of examining the relevance of the proposed
objectives in an organizational setting. Second, the management at CCIT was open to the
idea of embracing changes in their ongoing security governance initiatives, based on the
third party assessment of the state of affairs. A copy of this report would be shared with the
organization.
This chapter has four goals. First, to establish if the objectives developed in phase one of
the study is meaningful and relevant. Second, to examine how well the means and
fundamental objectives help in explaining information security governance practices at
CCIT. Third, to improve both the fundamental and means objectives in light of the case
study at CCIT. Fourth, to comment on the security governance practices at CCIT, given
our understanding of the proposed governance objectives. Each of these goals is achieved
in the subsequent sections described below. The rest of this chapter is organized as
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follows. The subsequent section presents an analysis of case situation in the light of the
proposed objectives. The pertinent discussion about how CCIT is achieving each objective
provides insights into the importance and relevance of the dimension of ISG vis a vis each
one of these objective represented. The following section presents a synthesized
understanding of how the objectives are relevant to CCIT. After establishing the relevance
of the objectives, a discussion section is presented. The section shows how the objectives
from phase 1 were refined and improved during the case study. It also documents the
emergent issues at CCIT. Finally a conclusion section presents a summary of the case
study and establishes the need for the subsequent chapter.
5.2 Context of the case study: CCIT
The City council (CC) is a state agency responsible for the administration of the city. The
organizational goal is to work with customers to align business and technology objectives.
A set of guiding values have been explicitly stated in the mission statement of the
organization. Managing information security governance is identified as a strategic area of
improvement by the agency. Security architecture at CCIT is focused in five areas:
applications, authentication, networking & infrastructure, physical and process. The
management emphasizes that improving security controls will drive efficiency and
effectiveness across the city.
CCIT helps its citizens to receive more from the state government in terms of state of the
art facilities enhanced by a strong information technology network. It also supports
publicly accessible computers for free use by the citizens. The state uses an innovative
technology planning process, which is driven by business needs of the state and aligned
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with the city‘s business initiatives. The organization‘s CIO has implemented a new
approach to create business technology plans. The strategic plan of the organization is to
establish the common framework and processes that delivers IT services for each agency
and establishes an enterprise view. The intent of such planning is to establish more
enterprise level targets and evolve from agency focused goals. The benefits from such an
approach are manifold. An enterprise approach by the agency reduces the costs of
maintenance and helps manage enterprise level risks. Building common services leverages
the resources and establishes effective partnerships between CCIT and other agencies.
The organizational structure includes the CIO as the head of the agency. There are 5
managers who directly report to the CIO. The applications development manager is
responsible for all the in-house development work. End user services manager is in charge
of operations and support facilities. The infrastructure services manager is responsible for
enterprise systems and database administrators. The manager in charge of administration is
responsible for training and administrative support functionalities. The newly added
project management manager looks after the software development projects in the
organization. The organization overall has more than 100 employees at the time the case
study was conducted, with several positions open for recruitment, as well as some
consultants. The organizational chart is enclosed in figure 5.1
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Figure 5.1 The organizational chart at CCIT

The technology planning process is tightly integrated and requires investment of resources
from agencies and CCIT. Being the service IT provider for the entire state, CCIT has the
additional responsibility of keeping the data and services protected. It is mandatory for the
organization to keep its procedures auditable so that public scrutiny is plausible. The
organization, having the ownership of IT services, acts as a service provider to all the other
agencies supported by the state. To provide good infrastructure, the organization
approaches every agency individually and assesses the agency‘s information needs and
current state of technology utilization. The organization targets improvements based on
specific needs of different agencies. These improvements are based on joint maps created
with the IT organization and the agency.
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The City Council is central to the information technology (IT) changes within the city. As
IT evolves, it provides more and more ways to improve service delivery and operational
efficiencies, providing valuable information for decision making and leadership purposes.
CCIT plays an important role in the process of transformation of the ways in which
business is conducted. The organization plays a strategic role in the way business is
conducted in the city. The CIO of CCIT has initiated several task forces to implement
changes to manage the IT architecture. The IT infrastructure is based on city‘s business
needs and not on the latest technology trends.
5.3 How is strategic planning for information security governance being undertaken
at CCIT?
The previous chapter proposed six fundamental and seventeen means objectives for
maximizing information security governance. In order to understand the relevance, each of
the objectives is reexamined separately in the context of CCIT. The objectives are used to
explain the situation at CCIT, the measures taken by the organization to meet the objective
and their impact on the overall security governance at CCIT.
5.3.1 Regulatory compliance at CCIT
This section discusses how regulatory compliance is perceived at CCIT and what is being
done to accomplish it. Regulatory compliance, as a part of information systems security
governance program, ensures that all the legal and mandatory requirements about security
and internal controls are met in the organization. This objective entails formalizing the
process of compliance in the organization and promotes development of controls in
accordance with the legislations. Ensuring regulatory compliance is a fundamental
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objective for information systems security governance. It suggests following the
regulations in their entirety and using the legislations as a catalyst for the improvement of
security governance.
CCIT as a state agency does not come under the purview of Sarbanes-Oxley act yet. But
the agency has HIPPA and e-discovery as its main regulations to comply with. The agency
has compliance audit, both from internal as well as external auditors. The culture in the
organization is such that transparency about processes and availability of information are
considered of paramount importance. The CIO is aware of people‘s right to ask for
different types of information about the agency and use of taxpayers dollars in the
operations. In accordance with state laws, most of the information about the agencies‘
current and future plans is accessible through the website. The common perception about
the regulations and the compliance efforts in the organization is that of a ―necessary evil‖.
The middle level managers and the line staff consider compliance as the ―right thing‖ to do
but not necessarily helpful. This is understandable given the mammoth preparations
required for compliance. Compliance with laws such as SOX is costly (Bennett & Cancilla,
2005). It needs managerial as well as technical support to create an infrastructure in
organizations to meet the demands of this law. Some of the technical areas that need
special concern for compliance purposes are: data management issues (Volonino et. al.,
2004; Farris, 2004, Yugay and Klimchenko, 2004), security of data and system, choice of
software development methodologies that could incorporate the compliance issues in its
lifecycle, strong documentation for external auditing purposes, versioning and auditibility
of electronic record needs and file systems in use (Peterson and Burns, 2005).
145

The internal IT audit director for the agency considers the regulations as something that are
very helpful in providing a momentum to security and internal controls operations in their
organization. This view is supported in the research literature as well. Myler and
Broadbent (2006) argue that evaluation of compliance with the policies and procedures in
an organization and regular follow up of the recommendations are important. The
evaluation process helps in estimating the effectiveness and possible shortcomings of the
controls process. Delineating audit controls and tools to determine areas for improvement
(Myler and Broadbent, 2006) is what the IT audit director for the City believes in.
The chief agency head did not have a favorable opinion about the regulations though. As
applications development manager commented:
In my personal opinion compliance is reactive not proactive. You look at SOX.
Enron collapsed and so many people were ruined or hurt and then SOX came. So
compliance is a vehicle, the way compliance operates today, I don‘t think that
an organization should say ok…we rely on compliance as a mechanism for
developing our internal controls. If you do that you are going to be in bad shape.

This is an indication of the control consciousness and direction of the organization. The
chief security officer is skeptical about the use of the regulations in developing actual
controls. As he mentioned:
SOX and HIPPA and other kind of things are to help protect data. But these are
guidelines and they really don‘t mean anything by themselves because they don‘t
come down and tell you specifically what you are supposed to do.

Internal controls are considered as something so serious that the organization should begin
with these. At least this is what was apparent from our interviews. The general perception
of the management about compliance is that it drives the security governance efforts
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backwards. The regulations legislate something that should already have been a part of the
governance program in the first place. This perception is consistent with the majority of
research in this area. One of the biggest managerial issues that regulations imply is for IT
governance purposes (Fox, 2004). Effective IT governance would require the management
to plan for preparedness for quarterly reporting, security policies, cost management for
compliance and preparation for external audit. These measures need planning and effective
internal control assessment (Chin and Mishra, 2006). The management believes that the
preparedness should be there to begin with and not inserted as an after thought while
preparing to pass compliance.
Another interesting perspective about regulatory compliance came into light. Compliance
acts as a huge driver in getting all the resources that are required for the agency. The
security officer shared how in name of compliance, they order software, get management‘s
attention and other required resources. The responsibility of the regulatory compliance
efforts for the city does not lie with the agency. This explains a lot of discontentment with
the use of regulations in the organization. Officials at CCIT just comply with the requests
of auditors and supply all the paperwork required. The organization plays a passive role in
the City‘s compliance plan.
Overall, it did appear to us that regulatory compliance is important for the agency. Since,
the prime responsibility of being compliant did not lie with this agency; managers in the
organization were candid about it. CCIT used compliance as a means to get things from the
City which they would never get otherwise. Also, the organization is in the process of
developing new policies and controls. It remains to be seen that how these new controls are
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implemented and assessed. To sum up, compliance is important to CCIT but not in the
right spirit of the legislations. A summary of regulatory compliance at CCIT is presented in
the table 5.1 below.
Table 5.1 Regulatory compliance at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure
Regulatory
Compliance

Evidence from CCIT
“SOX and HIPPA and other kind of things are to
help protect those data but these are guidelines and
they really don‘t mean anything by themselves
because they don‘t come down and tell you
specifically what you are supposed to do‖

Measures at CCIT
Compliant with several
legislations for state as well
as federal
Internal audit department
guides through the process
Develop controls
proactively that easily meet
compliance requirements

5.3.2 Ensuring continuous improvements in controls at CCIT
This section explains how continuous improvement in controls is achieved at CCIT.
Instituting continuous improvements in controls implementation process has been
identified as a fundamental objective for maximizing information security governance. The
control implementation process should be iterative, continuous and adaptive in nature. The
controls need to be changed over time and this should be reflected in the implementation
process. Also, the importance of managing the changes in the controls is highlighted
through continuous improvements. Effective implementation of controls calls for putting
the right controls in right place at the right time and this can only be achieved through
flexible implementation practices.
At CCIT, the management identifies the need for a constant reevaluation of controls under
changing business conditions. Constant revalidation of the controls is very important for
CCIT. As the Chief Security Officer shared:
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You have to keep up with it…It‘s not what you are getting over with…you have to
constantly keep up with it…we do have some machines and software that are
from over 10 years old…but you have to keep up with it….what else can we
do..we need constant reevaluation as controls implementation is an evolving
process.

This Chief Information Officer at the firm has a similar vision of regularly testing and
updating the control structure. The importance of controls is appreciated in the
organization and majority of the employees understand the need for a structure in place to
accomplish the constant evaluation of the controls. The organization provides training and
education to the security staff about the changing needs of controls and policies. The
security officers are encouraged to attend conferences and seminars in the relevant area to
keep abreast with the upcoming trends and technologies in security area. As one of the
security officer said:
I am a firm believer that you can put whatever you want in place but if the end
user doesn‘t own it up, it is not going to work. I have been in seminars where I
dealt with fortune 500 companies, people who are making billions of dollars a
year as revenue and they still have the same problem. You know those guys
have everything, they have done every thing but it [control implementation]
needs to be a constantly evolving process. They have to learn and then
reeducate because things change.
It was apparent from our observations at CCIT that the management understands the
importance of the controls implementation process and maneuvers ways for everyone in
the city council to be on board with it. There were frequent meetings and seminars about
security controls and discussions on how controls should be used to overcome common
security breaches. We felt a clear disconnect in the attitude of the managers and the
operational people, about continuous changes in controls. The knowledge about the
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benefits from revalidation of controls is concentrated more on the management side than
on the operational side of the organization. The line staff and the non security people did
not have much of an opinion on this issue. The non security folks considered control
implementation as a technical requirement for the organization and clearly distanced
themselves from the domain. The perception in the non security staff, working in
development or other IT related areas, is that control implementation is primarily the work
of security staff. The majority of operational people believe that the security staff should
be responsible for the success or failure of the controls.
The situation at CCIT is not unique and the reasons for such responses from line staff is
documented in research literature. The non security staffs at operational level, do not
understand the significance of the security controls and governance for overall success of
the organization. The enabling value of security controls has to be clearly articulated.
Benefits of security governance should be linked with business objectives so that the
stakeholders see the positive impact of security on attaining profits, productivity and
growth. Security governance can help in avoiding negligence and enhance strategic
business goals hence acting as motivator for top management (Wright, 2007). Research on
the conditions which are conducive to information security problems clearly shows that
where there are inconsistencies, there will be security problems such as errors, frauds,
privacy and violations (Wood, 2006). It is important to ensure that security controls and
security management practices of the organization are regularly reviewed. Such reviews
could lead to finding mis-configurations in the systems and identify areas where security
protection is such that a single failure could lead to large exposures (Wilson, 2005). The
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changes introduced should not be radical and introduced with caution. An effort to
implement technical and physical information security controls without considering the
culture in the organization could have disastrous consequences (Thomson and von Solms,
2006). A summary of how continuous improvements in controls are being done at CCIT is
presented in table 5.2 below.
Table 5.2 Continuous improvement in controls at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure continuous
improvements in
controls

Evidence from CCIT
“We need constant reevaluation as controls
implementation is a always an evolving process‖
―I have been in seminars where I dealt with fortune
500 companies, people who are making billions of
dollars a year as revenue and they still have the same
problem. You know those guys have everything, they
have done every thing but it [control
implementation] needs to be a constantly evolving
process. They have to learn and then reeducate
because things change‖

Measures at CCIT
Constant reevaluation is
done
Considered an iterative
process
Attend seminars and
conferences and learn about
implementation practices
form others
Involve people across
discipline and other agencies
under city, to help in
implementation

5.3.3 Responsibility and accountability structures at CCIT
In this section we discuss how CCIT assigns responsibility and accountability for security
governance? Responsibility and accountability structures ensure that roles are defined in a
way that appropriate responsibilities are shared and stakeholders are held accountable for
their actions. This is identified as a fundamental objective for information systems security
governance. The objective prescribes that job descriptions should be not changed abruptly,
clear organizational responsibility for compliance should be defined, individuals should be
made responsible for appropriate accesses and transparency about the accountability
should be encouraged.
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The management at CCIT completely identifies with the criticality of having clear
responsibility and accountability structure for information systems security governance.
The Chief Information Officer said:
If you are talking about the outcome of the controls, then to me, its management.
The idea of having a documented hierarchy especially around data is a must. If you
think about it; we publish corporate organizational charts all the time. We should
have a controls organizational chart which says, okay, if you are at this level, this is
what you get [controls].
The CIO believes in the concept of having a ―controls chart‖ which is similar to the
organization chart. The controls chart clearly defines the responsibilities for the members
regarding security controls. The controls chart is like adding control responsibilities to the
organization chart. It helps in documenting the requirements for a role in owning up the
responsibility of controls. As we go up in the controls chart and the roles become more
crucial for security governance, the individual higher up should have more controls and
accountability associated with their work. Research in security governance suggests that
increased awareness and individual accountability can greatly affect how security practices
are implemented in an organization (Mellor and Noyes, 2006).
The concept of a controls chart, as suggested by the CIO, is that as one moves further
move up in the chart, the individual has more power in the organization. People higher up
in hierarchy have greater accessibility to sensitive data and have greater probability of
creating vulnerability in the system. Mellor and Noyes (2006) found that adding personal
accountability into the roles helps the cause of security governance. The concept of
controls chart is not implemented yet at CCIT, but would definitely be helpful for security
governance purposes. As explained by the CIO, it is important to understand what is it that
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we want to protect from a management point of view. If there is clarity in responsibilities
and roles, better controls can be associated with the position and the individuals. For
example, if the human resource people have high level of access to crucial personal
identifiable data of personnel in the organization, there should be stringent controls for
people in this department. As suggested by the CIO, such managers should be audited for
their access pattern on a quarterly basis just to ensure that the managers are doing what
they are supposed to do and security is not being compromised. Given the nature of the
sensitive information that human resources people have access to, it makes sense to have
better protection and accountability for such people. Research literature suggests that top
management should be proactive about responsibility assignment to roles. Myler and
Broadbent (2006) argue that corporate boards that undertake the challenge of plugging IT
oversights show that they understand the scope of their corporate accountability and
responsibility, and are proactive in their leadership duties. If organizations do not ensure
that all employees understand their information security roles and responsibilities, it may
become difficult to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
assets (NIST Special Publication 800-16, 1998).
CCIT has access to crucial data about the taxpayers in the City. The department has access
to DMV data, readings for gas, water and electricity consumption, property details and tax
details about the residents. One of the duties of the department is to ensure that the meter
reading for the household utilities is performed correctly as and when required. This
operation, if not performed correctly, could present serious threat to integrity of the data
recorded. As mentioned by the end user services manager:
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I think the accountability piece is required. How do they control, say even a meter
reading application? How do we insure that every meter gets read every morning?
You have meters that haven‘t been read and there has been no consumption on that
meter for over a year and the service is still on, then there is a problem. So put
controls and make someone accountable, that‘s how you guarantee that every meter
is being read and the consumption of gas and water is recorded.
Reading utilities meter requires that there is appropriate segregation of duties defined in
the organization else the security of the data could be compromised. It is essential to
separate developers who make the application from people who actually read the meters
and record the consumption by providing logical access to the groups. Else, it is possible
for the developer to enter the application and change the readings for themselves or friends
or whoever they deem appropriate.
At CCIT, management is concerned about assigning appropriate responsibilities and
accountability to users of the systems. But it seemed that there is a lack of clarity of roles
and responsibilities on many fronts. For example, when discussing the regulatory
compliance issues in the organization, there seems to be confusion about who in the city
council was actually responsible for the meeting compliance deadlines. People at CCIT
meet auditors‘ request for submitting required documents. No one is sure as to who is
finally responsible for putting everything together for compliance. A summary of how
responsibility and accountability is being ensured at CCIT is presented in table 5.3 below.
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Table 5.3 Responsibility and accountability in structures at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish
Responsibility and
Accountability
Structures

Evidence from CCIT
―The idea of having a documented hierarchy
especially around data is a must. If you think about
it; we publish corporate organizational charts all the
time‖

Measures at CCIT
clear segregation of roles
developing a controls chart
with clear control
responsibility and
accountability
encourages ownership of
information

―So I think accountability piece is required. How do
they control, say even a meter reading application?
How do we insure that every meter gets read every
morning? You have meters that haven‘t been read
and there has been no consumption on that meter for
over a year and the service is still on, than there is a problem. So put controls and make someone accountable

5.3.4 Corporate control strategy at CCIT
This section examines how the corporate controls strategy is accomplished at CCIT.
Controls could be a part of the bigger corporate strategy and security governance should be
incorporated as subset of bigger picture of corporate strategy. This objective suggests
establishing a corporate risks management plan and developing controls guidelines using
consensus. Clearly controls should be viewed as a cost of doing business and developing
control plans for every department. Security controls should be a non-negotiable budget
item and adequate planning for the governance initiatives should be ensured. A control
strategy establishes security governance as an antecedent to complete security and process
integrity.
The management at CCIT believes that long term strategic planning is required to establish
a security governance program in the organization. They need to have a clear vision about
the security governance and each department should actually have its own controls plan
and an enterprise level risk assessment plan. An information security risk assessment is the
staged process by which an organization‘s information assets are valued. Here, the
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vulnerabilities and threats are identified so that they then guide the implementation and
monitoring of control strategies and measures (Whitman and Mattord, 2005).
At CCIT, there is a lack of agreement between stakeholders on what controls should be put
and how should the controls be deployed and monitored. This disagreement is a direct
result of a fundamental lack of planning and understanding about what are the assets and
what is that actually needs to be controlled. A controls strategy can actually provide a
broad vision for the organization in this regard. As shared by security manager:
People should try to at first establish and see what the controls are. That‘s reflected
in your requirements to some degree. People need to know what they want to
control. You have to know what you want to control and the problem is that
you don‘t know what you want to control.

The basic process of controls development approach needs long term planning and
undying commitment on part of the management. The upper management seriously feels
the need for a strategic planning approach for the security governance program in the
organization. As shared by the infrastructure manager:
I think that the design has to be around not necessarily verifying every single
account but identifying what is the exception. What are the things that are causing
the organization pain today? Where is security lacking? Where is money lacking?
Where are people lacking? Where is time lacking? Why are the services not being
delivered according to what we agreed with the customers? So you need to
strategize about this stuff [controls design].

The CIO believes that if a strategy about controls needs to be established such that all
pieces of governance program comes together. As explained by the CIO;
You need to plan ahead and have strategy about controls and its success. You need
to figure out how am I going to be proactive rather than letting a reactive
compliance approach drive my internal controls that we use.
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Our observations at CCIT suggest that a ―bottom up‖ approach of developing security
governance objectives would not work in this organization. The operational level
management does not have a holistic picture about the role of controls in achieving overall
organizational objectives. The strategic inputs about security governance should flow from
the top management to the entire organization. Research literature is supportive of this role
of the top management in control strategy formulation. Governance objectives cannot be
decided from a bottom up approach. The lack of a control strategy would cause the,
controls to be laid without risks analysis and policies. This could provide expensive and
detrimental. With a top-down approach to management, a more appropriate strategy in the
shape of long-term policies, efficient procedures and technical safeguards could be
developed (May, 2005).
There are certain issues that do need strategic interventions for the betterment of security
governance at CCIT. For example, there is a serious lack of planning about protecting the
human assets in case of an emergency such as fire or flood. Without a sound strategy,
efforts will be wasted. Therefore, a structured methodology for developing a strategy will
increase the likelihood of success of the corporate initiatives (Shupe and Behling, 2006).
We believe this is a serious strategy issue where the management at CCIT and at the City
at large should think about: what is our strategy about protecting employees and
equipments in case of emergency? The management at CCIT seems distressed about the
fact that the City does not consider this issue important enough to discuss at high level
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meetings. The state of affairs at CCIT does substantiate our call for a controls strategy
which could plan about things such as this at corporate level.
Research literature in this area suggests that effective information security risk
management processes should ensure that information assets are protected through
selection and implementation of most effective control strategies (HB231, 2004). There is
a growing awareness of the need for such a strategy (Shedden et al, 2006). Information
security should be integrated into an organization‘s overall management plan (Lane, 1985,
Smith, 1989). Firms have to integrate the IT strategies with organizational strategies to
attain business objectives (Lainhart IV, 2001). In case of CCIT, the management could
have an oversight committee that sets an appropriate strategy for IT governance endeavors
(Myler and Broadbent, 2006) especially about the security events. A summary of the
control strategy initiatives at CCIT is provided in table 5.4 below.
Table 5.4 Controls strategy at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure
Corporate
Control
Strategy

Evidence from CCIT
―People should try to at first establish and see what the
controls are. That‘s some degree reflected in your
requirements. People need to know what they want to
control. You have to know what you want to control and
the problem is that you don‘t know what you want to
control.‖
―You need to plan ahead and have strategy about controls
and its success. You need to figure out how am I going to
be proactive rather than letting a reactive compliance
approach drive my internal controls that we use.‖

Measures at CCIT
Provide more resources
Enhance trust
Proactive controls
approach versus reactive
approach
Corporate level
planning for security
governance in advance

5.3.5 A Control conscious culture at CCIT
In this section we discuss how CCIT nurtures a controls conscious culture in the
organization. A control culture ensures an environment where individuals ‗watch out‘ for
each other. This fundamental objective emphasizes the importance of a control culture that
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creates and sustains connections among various security efforts such as polices, processes
and norms. A ―prevention mentality‖ promoted by the control culture of the organization,
helps in minimizing the friction between groups over security issues. It is important to
establish standard codes of conduct for the employees in carrying out their security
responsibilities.
The CIO of the organization believes in establishing a culture that needs to consider all the
information that CCIT has and protects it as something personal for the employees. The
CIO explained:
I think you need to have a clear core value; a clear company recognized or
accepted perspective, the role of having those controls. For example in my
mind I think you should treat everything, every data you handle like its your
information. Would you leave your wallet out in the middle of the street, on the
bench when you go to get a coffee? what type of care would you take if it‘s yours?
That is the kind of care you need to take.

Management espousing similar values as it claims should ultimately lead to the shared
tacit assumptions of employees becoming aligned with these espoused values of the
organization, thus progressing towards an Information Security Obedient Culture
(Thomson and von Solms, 2008). The management realizes that it is a long and tedious
process before a control culture is actually established. As the chief security officer
enunciated:
Establishing the concept [importance of controls] takes much time and
commitment, to do that you want to bring that culture and it takes time and it is
just a matter of time and that it will come, after you do it for long.
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The management feels that establishing a control culture would help the policies and
procedures in being followed properly and the management becoming more involved in
the security governance process. The implicit knowledge of information security practices
and procedures and the resulting behavior guides the day-to-day activities of the employees
in the organization. As a consequence, information security practices and procedures
should become part of the corporate culture of an organization (Thomson and von Solms,
2008). Culture is the glue that holds together various pieces of the puzzle and is a very
important objective to be achieved. Speaking in the context of the culture, the desktop
support manager commented:
we can not have controls every where but should have control in the places where
we can get the most benefit for the organization

From our observations in various meetings and even informal conversation with the
employees, we did not feel that the organization had a control culture where people treat
the information as they would treat their own property. Maybe it is the beginning of the
long and tedious process of establishing a control consciousness of this nature because the
leadership at the organization did seem determined to drive the organization towards
control culture. There is evidence in the literature that suggests that instituting an
organizational culture for controls is challenging, but important nonetheless. The controls
culture is crucial for security governance as it can act as a powerful, underlying set of
forces that establishes individual and group behavior within an organization (Schein,
1999). Ideally, a corporate culture should incorporate information security controls into the
daily routines and implicit behavior of employees (Thomson and von Solms, 2006). If the
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beliefs and attitudes are addressed by the management, it leads to changed actions and
behaviors of the employees and synchronizes it with the overall corporate security culture
in the organization (Thomson and von Solms, 2008).
Table 5.5 Controls conscious culture at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Control
Conscious
Culture

Evidence from CCIT
―I think you need to have a clear core value; a clear
company recognized or accepted perspective, the role of
having those controls. For example in mind I think you
should treat everything, every data you handle like its
your information. Would you leave your wallet out in
the middle of the street, on the bench when you go to get
a coffee? what type of care would you take if it‘s yours?
That is the kind of care you need to take‖
―we can not have controls every where but should have
control in the places where we can get the most benefit
for the organization‖

Measures at CCIT
Environment where
individuals watch out for
each other
Treat customers‘
information as if it is your
own information

5.3.6 Clarity in policies and controls at CCIT
This section discusses how the management maximizes clarity in policies and procedures
at CCIT? Establishing clarity in policies and procedures has emerged as fundamental
objective for information systems security governance and has received extensive attention
from researchers in this domain. This objective entails proper utilization of applications
and technological solutions instituted in the organization by providing concise and
consistent guidelines regarding its use. Policies should reflect controls requirements, fair,
visible and easily accessible to all in the organization. Clarity in policies, communicates
management commitment to security governance.
Policies and procedures are organizational laws that determine acceptable and
unacceptable conduct within the context of corporate culture (Whitman and Mattord,
2003). It is a means to communicate management‘s commitment to the security
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governance efforts (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). CCIT has a huge emphasis on
establishing clarity of policies and controls. The common norm is to explain the policies
and procedures frequently so that that it makes an impression on the user and stays with
them eventually. Usually the most common reason why employees make mistakes about
controls in the organization is the lack of understanding as to what needs to be done.
Research suggests that good policies can protect vulnerabilities (Lapke and Dhillon, 2008).
Better policies lead to deterrence as policies give the employees responsibility and
accountability in the job (Maynard and Ruighaver, 2007). The security team feels that
people never come up and ask about policies or controls unless they are in trouble. But to
be preventive, the management at CCIT explains the purpose and scope of the controls
proactively before the employees get into trouble. As the chief security officer explained:
Make the policy and procedures clear and accessible. [Establish] Clarity in
policies and controls, transparency in procedures and gradually standardization of
the process, everyone knows what it could mean. What you [employee] can do
to help & protect yourself without making those costly mistakes, make those
very clear and understandable because if people don‘t understand them and they are
not clear, people can‘t follow them and they make excuses.

The old security policies are not considered reflective of the current organizational needs;
hence new policies are being developed. Research literature in security policy domain
accepts the need for revisiting the policies periodically. For instance, it is becoming a huge
problem to prevent employees wasting their time on browsing the Internet during office
hours. Policies about personal use of computers during office hours needs to be clearly
defined. Restricted Internet use or unlicensed software usage should be discouraged (Essex
and Schauer, 2001). Maynard and Ruighaver (2007) maintain than besides the iterative
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nature, security policies need quality verification periodically. This assessment needs to be
carefully managed to ensure a balanced approach and make sure that stakeholders have
adequate skills and training to assess quality. The management also believes that polices
should be developed as a continuous process so that changing business needs are reflected.
The infrastructure services manager commented:
It‘s [policies and procedures] documenting and its following through. The key
thing is documentation and it needs to be a fluid process, it‘s not static. You
don‘t just do it once and throw it away, things change I mean. You had the best
policy and procedure during mainframe but now you move to the Unix
environment, that is no good.

The tax payers should actually be able to access the security policies in order to have
confidence in the city‘s security measures about protecting their data. Also, the current
policies have not been made easily accessible to the employees as well. This creates a
potential rift in minds of people about the policies. As the security staff officer explained:
We had regulation and policies established but did people know that? Make all the
required things accessible to people. Our policies are so hard to find on our
website that I don‘t know how anyone can ever read them. This is serious.

The management is developing a new set of security polices and procedures. It is planned
that the security policies would be made accessible to all the citizens at the web site. A
central repository of security policy and control resources would be created on the Intranet
which would be accessible to all Agencies City wide. To establish the clarity of new
policies, extensive educational sessions have been planned. It remains to be seen in the
future though that how well these measures play out in establishing effective security
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governance. A summary of how clarity of policies and procedures is being accomplished at
CCIT is presented in table 5.6 below.
Table 5.6 Clarity in policies and procedures at CCIT
Objective Name
Maximize Clarity
in Policies and
Procedures

Evidence from CCIT
―Make the policy and procedures clear and
accessible. [Establish] Clarity in policies and
controls, transparency in procedures and gradually
standardize the process, everyone knows what it
could mean. What you [employee] can do to help &
protect yourself without making those costly
mistakes, make those very clear and understandable
because if people don‘t understand them and they are
not clear, people can‘t follow them and they make
excuses‖.

Measures at CCIT
Explain the policies
repeatedly
Make the policies
accessible easily
Continuous iterative
process of development
Constant explanation of the
benefits

5.3.7 How is efficacy of audit processes ensured at CCIT?
Auditing acts as a catalyst for the management to accelerate its efforts for information
systems security governance. This objective is quite useful especially in the context of
change management, to ensure segregation of duties in the organization. The underlying
sub objectives point towards use of audit process for cross checking the business activities.
Auditors should be treated as consultants for a third party perspective about risk
management. Audit efficacy is required to assess management‘s adequacy with dealing
with vulnerabilities.
The role of auditing in improving the effectiveness of security controls is well understood
and communicated at CCIT. The top management emphasizes the importance of auditing
culture in the organization and claims that it should be undertaken frequently and on
demand. Research literature suggests various reasons for having frequent audits such as
estimation of organizational preparedness, identification of vulnerable areas, benchmarking
against standards and practices, and compliance with legislation (Goel et al., 2006). Audit
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trails can be designed to help in intrusion detection. Real time auditing can also help in
detecting other problems in the system other than break downs. Swanson (1996) argues
that auditing helps in creating individual accountability, reconstruction of events, intrusion
detection and problem identification. Audit provides traceability of user action and chain
of evidence can be reconstructed to actually understand when and how the system broke
down (Goel et al., 2006). The need for frequent internal audits was felt all across the
organization and not just the security group. The HR manager said:
You got to have some body audit behind them [employees]. You got to have
separation of duty and segregation of duty. Cross training is great, if works.
How do I control who should do what if I m not going to watch it?

The administrative manager at CCIT believes in cross training her team members for a
variety of roles such that the work does not stop in an individual‘s absence. But the
auditors enforce segregation of duties so that no vulnerabilities are created in the processes
because of interchange of the roles. Thus the auditing functionality helps in ensuring
appropriate role design at CCIT.
The perceived role of auditing at CCIT is to provide assurance about the quality of controls
that are in place and effective. The management believes that auditing ―gives them a
meaning for doing things‖. Even though the medium of business transactions have changed
from paper format to electronic data, the traditional wisdom accrued from auditing and
accounting standards is still valid. As commented by one of the managers:
I think auditing provides quality assurance which is very important. If you don‘t
have audit you have no compliance. Right now, you have to audit because all
the process are not automated, you can‘t expect control at every single process. I
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think 60% of all processes here don‘t have any electronic support or
computers at all. People do the work, so we have the audit.

The general perception in the organization is that audit helps in establishing and enforcing
punitive structures. It is a means to ensure that people keep doing what they are supposed
to do or else they would be penalized during auditing phase. Also, auditing is increasingly
being viewed and accepted as a requirement for regulatory compliance preparations (Fox,
2004). Frequent audits help people in perform their jobs within accepted boundaries and
ensure that organization is geared up for compliance purposes. As explained by the
infrastructure services manager:
They [auditors] make people honest. If you know someone is watching and will
look at what you are doing, you know it makes a difference. Even if you don‘t
look, 90% of the time just the threat that you are going to be looked at, you
don‘t know when, makes a big difference on compliance. I would like to say
human nature is such.

At CCIT, there is an apparent contradiction in what management believes that should be
done and what it actually does about auditing. In theory, the management unanimously
agrees to the importance of internal auditing functionality and its benefits for security
governance in the organization. But in practice, there are fewer number of audits than we
expected. One possible explanation of this contradiction could be that there is an
underlying sentiment in the organization (as gathered from various informal discussion and
observations) that usually in a government agency, auditing is perceived as a tool or excuse
to ―get back‖ at someone or some department i.e., to punish them for some unrequited act.
The under current is that if the boss is unhappy about something from an agency, that
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agency faces the brunt by getting frequent audits. As shared by manager, ―We got to get
over the idea that auditing is not losing control. Auditing is to keep us on top of things‖. It
remains to be seen though that in the new security policies and controls that are under the
way, what role would be provided to the auditor in the security governance framework.
But as of now, CCIT gets very few internal audits and fewer security audits. A summary of
the audit efficacy initiatives at CCIT is presented in table 5.7 below.
Table 5.7 Audit efficacy at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure Efficacy
of Audit
Processes

Evidence from CCIT
I think that if I took over, if I became the CIO, I would
be looking at every one of my team members and I
would tell them to prepare for an audit. I would bring
an auditor here and each one of my team will get
audited. That would give me a base line as a new boss
to work on, I can only improve. If it got any worse my
job should be gone that‘s what I would do.
Management should be responsible for what‘s going
on. Economy improves if the government works.

Measures at CCIT
Management believes in
frequent audits
Use audit as a deterrence
tool
Used to provide quality
assurance
Helps in keeping on top of
things
Audit on demand

5.3.8 Communications about controls at CCIT
This section describes how the management communicates about controls at CCIT.
Communication about controls is important to articulate the vision of the management
about security and establish a constructive debate about the usefulness of such activities. It
pays to clearly establish the intent and the scope of the controls and this can be achieved
through open and constructive communications. Frequent discussions, not only within the
security and control groups, but also with other functions in the organization, establishes a
clear baseline of expectations from the employees and prevents unintentional breaches.
The management at CCIT is serious about communication with the employees regarding
controls. The CIO has an informal meeting on every second Friday with the employees
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where the pertinent issues about security and controls are discussed, employee feedback is
taken and agreement on future course of development is reached. The chief security officer
adheres to the following principle about communicating with employees:
Make things very clear to the employees, these are our policies, these are our
procedures and controls and these are our expectations. It is essential to
communicate this.
The management has a preventive mentality and clearly wants to protect people from
creating vulnerabilities in the system. The accepted point of view is to communicate the
controls in a clear and concise way so that people understand the expectations.
Consciousness-developing communications helps employees to identify with the
organization and the work that they do in groups. The security officer explained:
The best time to do that [communicate] is during orientation, a sound
understanding of what is expected from you [employee] and how things happen. I
prefer accent on the positive rather than on negative thing. It doesn‘t mean
that consequences shouldn‘t be mentioned but I think rather than emphasizing that
part let‘s emphasize procedures and the prevention because that‘s what you
really want. You don‘t really want to punish people for mistakes who have done
something wrong. You want to prevent somebody from the beginning.

The emphasis on communications about controls stood out clearly, in our observations,
through the actions of the management at CCIT (see table 5.8). Research literature in
information security governance emphasizes the role of communication in the success of
governance program. Fuller et al (2007) suggest that there exists a positive relationship
between interactivity and knowledge retention about information assurance in an
organization. The interactivity is best facilitated by open communications. Communication
activities with stakeholders are critical for controls (AS/NZS 4360, 1999). A good way to
achieve communications is through the standardization of controls. At CCIT, in the
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process of the development of new security policies and controls, the management held
meetings with employees‘ representing other non security expertise areas, and took their
feedback on what were the most important issues for the security of the organization and
the city. A list of priorities was decided based on the feedback from this meeting. The
management proceeded with requisite actions in the direction agreed upon in the meeting.
Thus management at CCIT is open about communications and feels that it pays to
communicate, even when the payoff is not apparent immediately. The HR manager
observed;
They [employees] like to know the reason, why? They like to hear things. People
may not communicate to us but people like to be communicated to, it may not go
both ways all the time but in my experience I found that people like to be told

Even though the communication culture seems strong within the organization, there is a
lack of communication between the organization and other agencies under the City about
the security policies and the controls. Organizations clearly communicate values and
visions such that employees can internalize it and make sure that it is synchronized with
their own (Wright, 2007). But this is not true for the directors working for the different
agencies at the City. The fate of the newly developed security policies depends on the
committee that comprises directors from other agencies under the City. It requires a lot of
communication between these directors and CCIT to actually establish what policies the
City needs and should be signed and made official. Evidences from research warn about
such situations in organizations. Poor communication is itself a security risk (Wright,
2007). It allows security policies to be misinterpreted, security messages to be
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misunderstood, and ignorance about real security threats is cultivated. Communication is
essential for a proper security governance program. But there is lack of communications
partly because of the group dynamics within the City council. It is to be seen in the future
how this communication gap would be addressed by the CIO of the organization in order
to facilitate the efficacy of the policies.
Table 5.8 Communications at CCIT
Objective Name
Encourage
Communication
about Controls

Evidence from CCIT
―Typically in our case, we would draft a policy, edit
it and go to city. Managers and other directors from
other agencies need to work on this but there is no
communication among them. So there is no
feedback. If there are thing that you don‘t agree with,
tell us, we need to get there input. They need to be
treated differently, they are different departments‖.

Measures at CCIT
Meetings with employees
every second Friday
Communicate with people
even when they communicate
back
Prevention is better than
creating vulnerability hence
communicate to protect the
people

5.3.9 Data criticality at CCIT
This section explains how data criticality is achieved at CCIT. Establishing data criticality
has emerged as an important objective for maximizing information systems security
governance in an organization. Establishing data criticality entails assessment and
classification of data according to sensitivity, identification of data owners and assignment
of responsibilities according to information criticality. Maintaining the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of the data is not only required for securing business processes
but also needed for regulatory compliance purposes. Linking data with authorizations helps
in creating secure and reliable IT infrastructure. This is one of the most prevalent security
governance objective, both in research as well as in organizations.

170

The core business for CCIT is IT service delivery to other agencies under the City. Since
CCIT forms and supports the backbone of the IT infrastructure for the City, it is imperative
that the organization ensures protection of critical data and make it available to all. The
chief information security officer explained:
We do have data that is crucial. We may have health data, we may have social
security numbers and the names and dates and all of those things. Also
employee details that we need to keep private as well. We interact with other
state agencies and there is other information. We have access to DMV that
means details of basically any body who owns a car, so lot of data. We must ensure
that data doesn‘t go anywhere where it shouldn‘t be, so from that point this
is what we are going for. All of the IT security controls are really all about the
data.

Maintaining the criticality of data is absolutely essential as CCIT acts as the custodian of
all sensitive information about the City. Being the centralized IT service provider to the
entire City, CCIT prides itself on providing a technically superior state of the art service
centre with 24/7 hotline and helpdesk services. A compelling need for data security at
CCIT is materialized through stringent access control and authorization mechanisms.
Research literature suggests the importance of establishing data criticality through security
governance mechanisms (Finne, 1996; Sherwood, 1996; Ward and Smith, 2002). Security
controls are important as assurance hinges upon the integrity of the critical underlying IS
change and configuration management processes (Hinde, 2006). At a higher level, even
security strategy is incomplete without planning for measures to safeguard data integrity
(Tickle, 2006). A control strategy about data criticality provides users with confidence in
the integrity of data and the end result is trust in the IT infrastructure, really valuable in
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today‘s business world (Tickle, 2006). The management is appreciative of strict controls
for access data. As mentioned by desktop support technology officer:
I think that what you would have to do is that you force the system to make them
[employees] doing things. If a person doesn‘t change his password, in thirty
days, he gets locked out the system. Don‘t allow them to fool around.
The management at CCIT feels that developing controls for proper access of data requires
adequate segregation of duties. Separation of development, test and operational facilities
helps in reducing risks of unauthorized actions (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). The director
for internal audit asserted that it is critical that people on the development side of the
environment, ones who write the actual codes for the applications, do not have access to
the production environment and that each and every change in the production environment
is documented and logged properly for audit ability purposes. As explained by the chief
internal auditor for the City;
Security controls are revolving around data, the ability to keep integrity of the
data. It [controls] revolves around internal and external access of the data. In
processing all sorts of access there you want to make sure that all the access is
limited to the data somehow there is need to for a segregation of the production
data and that is accomplished in many-many ways.

The security team also checks the external access devices for security purposes. The
security team feels that even if there is a modem which is not very prevalent, let loose on
the network somewhere, it could become a threat. It is crucial that only authorized people
get access to authorized sites which include databases and other parts of the network. To
ensure that the access rules are designed properly, frequent audit is encouraged. This helps
in tracking the vulnerabilities in the systems and taking action about the weak points. As
mentioned by the Chief Internal Auditor:
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There are several tests that a security auditor would perform such as penetration
test where the auditor would try and acts like a hacker and try to break into the
network. If the auditor is successful he will uncover various vulnerabilities of the
system and the network. The security people have to figure out how to deal
with these vulnerabilities without opening additional vulnerabilities. Thus quality
of network improves to the point that it becomes really good.
The management believes in good access control polices and even better authorization
mechanisms. At CCIT, access is defined for the users depending on the sensitivity of the
data. It is important to ensure that the person who has the appropriate access is the person
accessing the data. The management emphasizes strong authorization mechanism, which
tells us how important data criticality is to the management. Many managers feel that
security governance is all about managing risks through right access to right people at right
time and making sure that those very right people are getting the access through right
authorizations. A summary of how data criticality is achieved at CCIT is presented in table
5.9 below.
Table 5.9 Data criticality at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Data
Criticality

Evidence from CCIT
Measures at CCIT
―We do have data that is so crucial. We may have
ensures confidentiality,
health data, we may have social security numbers
integrity and availability of
and the names and dates and all of those things. Also employee
details that we need to keep private as well. W
data to all
the IT security controls are really all about the data‖
Provides a technically
superior state of the art service
centre with 24/7 hotline and
helpdesk services.
Segregation of duties
Stringent access control
policies
Strict authorization
mechanisms
Strict password policies
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5.3.10 Clear controls development process at CCIT
This section discusses how clarity in controls development process is established at CCIT.
Clear control development process creates a positive perception about the controls and
ensures transparency in control activities. This objective emphasizes the importance of
systemization in control development process and defines achievable goals. Also, a
balance between stringent and useable controls is desired, which can be achieved by
structuring information needs for risk assessment to determine the scope of the controls.
This objective encourages developing simple, flexible, timely and easy to use controls.
Clear control development process helps in protecting critical business processes through
multiple layers of controls as the requirements of such complex controls is evidently
established for everyone.
The management at CCIT clearly believes in the importance of establishing clear control
development process for information systems security governance. As one of the security
officer said:
Actually creating the policy and the procedure needs to be clear because if no
body knows about the controls and procedures or understands it, they are not
going to follow it.

Clarity in controls development processes is emphasized at CCIT. The management
encourages employees to clarify any doubts about the policies and welcomes questions
about them. The management has also created a channel through which such requests are
formally processed and quickly responded to. The human resources department in this
organization is responsible for enabling all the employees to get access to any resource that
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the employees might need to understand the policies better. Also, it is encouraged in
developing simple and easy controls that can be easily understood and quickly
incorporated in daily work. As mentioned by the service engineer lead:
You got to put it [controls] in a way that it‘s not complex, it‘s not complicated. So
you put together a check list and put together a general list [controls]. More
general the list, larger the deviation from what you want. You have to be specific
but you don‘t want so detailed [controls]. You have to define how far you want to
go. So if you want City‘s webpage to be the homepage, you got to define in that
check list and make sure that it‘s [making City‘s webpage as homepage] one of the
things you do.

Research literature in this area suggests ways to enhance clarity in controls development
process. Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) argue that patterns of behavior must be well
defined and explained thoroughly in company policies to enhance trust within the
organization. This can be achieved only through clarity in development process for
controls. Dhillon (2001) establishes the benefits offered by clarity in controls development
process. He suggests that clarity in controls development process and incorporating
controls in systems development would have better impact on technical controls and thus
enhance data criticality. Controls, where possible, should be transparent or viewed as
positive contributions to job performance. The extension of controls that increase
constraints on people should be minimized (Parker, 1996). Mature organizations have well
established and institutionalized processes which help in the segregation of duties and lead
to effective cross checking mechanisms such as auditing.
The management‘s attempt to establish clarity in controls development process seems to
work for the employees at CCIT. But with a change in policies and controls coming into
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effect very soon, it remains to be seen how well the management is geared to help people
understand these changes in controls structure. It would require a lot of planning and
coordination to actually implement the new policies and controls effectively and establish
the clarity of the controls in the minds of the employees, crucial part of the success. A
summary of how that management encourages clarity in controls development process is
provided in the table 5.10 below.
Table 5.10 Clear control development process at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Clear
Control
Development
Process

Evidence from CCIT
― Actually creating the policy and the procedure
needs to be clear because if no body knows about the
controls and procedures or understands it, they are
not going to follow it‖

Measures at CCIT
Encourages employees to
clarify doubts
Make all resources about
controls accessible
Simple and easy to use
controls

5.3.11 Formal control assessment functionality at CCIT
Formal controls assessment functionality allows establishing security governance as a
functional requirement. Security has always been considered a non functional requirement.
But security cannot be represented only by nonfunctional requirements since security goals
often motivate new functionalities, such as monitoring, intrusion detection and access
control, which, in turn, need functional requirements. In addition, a distinctive feature of
security requirements is that they are asset-driven – their goal is to protect the set of
identified assets (Antilla, 2007). Having a centralized entity for controls assessment would
allow separate budget allocation for security governance functions and help in establishing
a business case for security governance. A controls department would integrate controls
into the business processes. Formal controls assessment functionality also entails
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establishing a relationship between IT architecture and controls, dynamic control
structures, balancing centralization-decentralization of controls and encouraging job
designs around information systems needs. A formal entity for controls in the organization
also helps in avoiding bureaucratic delays for controls purposes, prioritization of resources
and tasks and institutionalization of controls as a part of organizational deign. A security
governance objective of this nature is not emphasized in the extant literature.
CCIT is in the need for a formal process or channel through which all its control related
work is managed. It came up repeatedly during the interaction with the organization that
controls should be treated in a way that other departments are treated. As manager of
development puts it:
I would say sign off on the requirements that the key stakeholders have agreed
upon. Develop the feasibility metrics so that you can take each requirement and
trace it through out the whole system all the way from requirement to
functional design. This process has to be done formally

The budget and monetary considerations is a huge thing for the organization. At CCIT,
money allocation at any step is heavily bureaucratic hence delayed. Resources for controls
need separate budgetary allocation and this could be achieved through establishing a
formal entity with separate budgetary needs. As shared by manager security;
The biggest problem is that controls have limited resources. We want to do so
many things but can‘t do it. Like it [controls] needs to be constantly modified and
monitored but that [modification and monitoring] needs investment. Do we
have separate money for this as a department? We are always in a cash crunch.
The chief security officer shared the similar view:
You have to provide proper resources and assess the proper control requirements.
Hackers are not fools, you cannot use off the shelf controls and put these in
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place and expect them to work. We can ensure that it works but we need
resources for that and we don‘t essentially have those resources. To get the
resources, it is helpful to have separate budgets.

The management feels that it is prudent to perform the cost benefit analysis to establish the
worth for the investments in controls. Unless a business case in terms of cost and benefit is
made, the directors up in the City council are hesitant to allocate resources for control
purposes. The manager, enterprise systems team explained:
Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How do you balance cost of the
control versus the risk? Risk is great; cost of control may be worth it. How do
you balance cost of the risk to the control? It is same as security. You can make it
so hard to get into the system such that they [employees] spend all day just to
figure out how to get in, takes all the time and work is never done. That‘s
obviously not the goal but protecting our data is very important

It is evidenced in research literature that cost benefit analysis for security measures is
important to establish the credibility of the efforts. Cost-benefit analysis of access controls
devices should be done periodically (Schauer and Essex, 2001) to understand the risks
involved. It is critical for organizations to ensure the most effective and cost-efficient
controls strategies are selected. The management also needs to ensure that balance in cost
of controls, the level of security and access to the system by end users is achieved. It is
important to bring various user management, permission and access control functions
together and to investigate how technology can be deployed to simplify or centralize
management, reduce costs and achieve higher levels of control, security and assurance
(Wilson, 2005). This can be adequately done through development of separate controls
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assessment functionality. Establishing an entity of this sort entails new requirements for
the management.
Though it was not clearly articulated, the management suggested a need for centralizing all
the controls initiatives for governance purposes, it remains unclear if any step towards this
direction has been taken by the management. The job descriptions for individuals working
in the controls assessment department could prove critical to security governance of the
organization. Jobs dealing with confidential information should also have stringent hiring
requirements and ensure that individuals being given these roles take their roles seriously
and have an eye for details (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). It is important to remember that
the control environment has a pervasive structure that affects all business activities such as
management‘s integrity and ethical values, operating philosophy and commitment to
organizational competence (Ramos, 2005).
Table 5.11 Formal controls assessment functionality at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Formal
Control
Assessment
Functionality

Evidence from CCIT
―The biggest problem is that controls have limited
resources. We want to do so many things but can‘t
do it. Like it [controls] needs to be constantly
modified and monitored but that [modification and
monitoring] needs investment. Do we have separate
money for this as a department? We are always in a
cash crunch‖
―Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How
do you balance cost of the control versus the risk?
Risk is great; cost of control may be worth it. How
do you balance cost of the risk to the control? It is
same as security. You can make it so hard to get into
the system such that they [employees] spend all day
just to figure out how to get in, takes all the time and
work is never done. That‘s obviously not the goal
but protecting our data is very imp‖
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Measures at CCIT
Cost benefit analysis for
controls
Ensure resources
Needs a formal entity for
centralized controls
management

5.3.12 Monitoring and feedback for controls at CCIT
Monitoring controls requires effective and established channels to incorporate feedbacks
for further enhancements. This helps in achieving the performance standards set for the IT
processes and assures the management ―what is being claimed‖ is being done. Periodic
review from external auditors strengthens the controls structure and helps in analyzing the
alignment between control objectives and overall business objectives. Monitoring the
controls and incorporating the feedback from employees into the controls structure has
been emphasized by almost all the prevalent governance models (COBIT, 2007; COSO,
2003).
CCIT believes in strong monitoring and feedback channels for the success of information
security governance. It has a monitoring program, for the most part, for all its processes
and controls. Research literature in information security arena accepts the critical role
played by monitoring and feedback process in the success of security initiatives. The post
implementation monitoring and review of controls is a critical phase for success of overall
controls program (Shedden et al, 2006). Another positive result of good feedback is
improved communication between the management and the employees. Straub and Welke
(1998) suggest that regular feedback sessions lead to better communications in
organization. These values are communicated through departmental meetings, and
informal chatting. CCIT also believes in getting regular backups of the data set as a result
of routine monitoring process. The backups help the management stay in touch with
performance of the controls in real time. Having backups ensures that not only the
unauthorized use is prevented, but also continuous authorized use is encouraged (Schauer
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and Essex, 2001). Regular backups should be encouraged irrespective of the storage cost as
the benefit from recent backups is immense in case of a disaster. The HR manager is
optimistic about the monitoring tools that she has in her department. As she commented:
The system in which I am right now, I am in a place where I am able to find out
what they have done whatever needs to be done, seeing the audit trail. If they
haven‘t done their work, we find that pretty quickly
Monitoring the controls and using the feedback for improvement is the norm at CCIT (see
table 5.12). The management understands the role of monitoring in the success of
governance efforts and takes the responsibility seriously. As shared by manager:
So the control has to be more than the lip service, some how it got to be enforced.
There got to be some way to guarantee that if I give you access in security form,
how we know he gave that access to the right person at the right time. Even
if the person is authorized to do that, security controls are needed also about
how things are being misused even when legitimate access is there

CCIT implements stringent authorization process and strict password policies to ensure
that right people get the right access. The management follows the philosophy that the
feasibility of the controls can be verified only through monitoring. Monitoring process
validates that everything is being followed correctly and the feedback allows in assessing
the feasibility of the controls. Feedback about the controls is encouraged at CCIT. As
shared by the security manager:
It‘s kind of like you want to go back and constantly go back to people and keep
looking. Is this really working for us? Asking people if this is what they can work
with is important.

It is evident that monitoring and feedback does consume resources at CCIT. The
effectiveness of monitoring techniques and policies requires employees‘ willingness to
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comply with their use (Booker and kitchesn, 2007). Insights into employees‘ intentions to
comply with policies or circumvent monitoring tools are helpful in promoting effective use
of these technologies. The insights can be drawn from the feedback received. Monitoring is
taken seriously and performed frequently. So is feedback from the operational level
employees. The management at CCIT strives to create a controls culture where monitoring
and feedback are valued in the organization. However, with forethought and purpose to
build a culture of trust, employees will be more likely to embrace the need for monitoring
techniques that prevent criminal and negligent activity (Fleming, 2007).
But it is not clear that what is being done with the feedback? It is one thing to take
feedback about things and make people involved in the process. The fact that employees
get to voice their opinion of controls could actually make them feel empowered and hence
more receptive to the controls. But is important to actually incorporate the feedback and
implement the improved version of controls. Since this study collected cross sectional data,
we did not get the opportunity of actually observing the new set of controls or policies
being implemented based on the feedback received from the people. A summary of what
CCIT is doing to improve monitoring and feedback is provided in table 5.12 below.
Table 5.12 Monitoring and Feedback at CCIT
Objective Name
Develop
Monitoring and
Feedback
Channels

Evidence from CCIT
―The system in which I am right now, I am in a place
where I am able to find out what they have done
whatever needs to be done, seeing the audit trail. If
they haven‘t done their work, we find that pretty
quickly‖
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Measures at CCIT
Has tools for monitoring
Sessions for obtaining
feedbacks
Feasibility analysis of the
controls through monitoring

5.3.13 Achieving group cohesiveness at CCIT
Enhancing group cohesiveness helps in regulating the group behavior about security
controls. Our data shows that peer pressure and groups‘ behavior influences and shapes the
behavior of the individuals. The sub objectives under this are: encourage ability to share
the work and credit for good work, discourage favoritism and self interest in groups and
respect personal integrity in the group. Developing teams (Eloff and Eloff, 2005) is an
important objective. People derive part of their identity from work groups (Hogg and
Terry, 2000). The groups influence whether particular rules and controls would be
followed or not. Thus encouraging cohesive groups with favorable security governance
perception can help the organization‘s security program.
The management at CCIT believes that it is in the best interest of the organization to assign
critical and vulnerable jobs to groups and not individuals. As observed by the manager,
end user services:
[We need to know] which roles have greatest vulnerability to assign groups. A
great example of that is, if you multiple people together, collusion is lot harder
compared to one person doing something wrong. So it‘s a similar type of thing,
people in groups are afraid that others might know what they are doing. Groups
have an impact on their behavior.

The management believes that it is easier to regulate and manage group behavior than
individual‘s behavior. So if the groups are tight and cohesive, it would be beneficial to
impart good knowledge about controls to the groups and expect the dynamics of the group
to take care of the conformity part. The management also encourages the groups to achieve
goals. The groups‘ achievements could actually trickle down to the individuals. As
explained by enterprise systems team lead:
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What can you say at the end of the day that you have contributed? Ideally, you
want the employees to plan in the beginning of the day; what they can
accomplish that day, what is the next thing that they can do to accomplish their
goals and then achieve something at the end of the day. Here is what I started out to
do and here‘s what I did in the day, goals and accomplish on daily, weekly, and
monthly basis in the way it‘s measurable. So control would be to motivate them as
a group. Groups have a profound impact on the individual behavior.

The management at CCIT seems to follow this ideology to the core. There is evidence in
research that suggests that individual behavior is influenced by the group that they belong
to. Henry (2004) argues that conscientious and diligent employees can become the
strongest link in an organization‘s information security infrastructure.
It was also evident from informal meetings and observations that the organization really
has strong ‗group‘ culture. There are several informal groups in this organization and
solidarity of the members towards the group is quite committed. Open discourses with
several employees suggested towards the politics of groups in decision making at the City
council level. The awareness and knowledge about the controls did seem to vary a lot from
group to group in the organization. It is apparent that enhancing group cohesiveness would
certainly have an impact on the controls knowledge and behavior in this organization.
Security governance efforts require teams with representation from all functionalities in the
organization. The challenge is to organize the work of this team, to clearly specify roles
and responsibilities, to train and sensitize team members to the work to be done, and then
to make sure that they are in fact doing the work that management has indicated (Wood,
2006). Thus enhancing group cohesiveness in the security teams allows a coherent
interaction channel with the management. A team approach to information security is
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absolutely necessary if an adequate level of information security is going to be achieved
(Wood, 2006). Chau (2006) argues for security professionals in development team from
the beginning of the project. Trust also helps in making the groups tighter. Mutual trust
helps in developing a strong sense of team within the organization as employee satisfaction
is greatly dependent on their relationship with top management (Fleming, 2007). Research
in group dynamics suggests that personal issues in groups can cause more damage to the
organization than having job related issues. In a study by Trimmer et al (2000),
relationship conflict was found to be more seriously detrimental to team success than task
conflict. However, a high level of team conflict resulting from either source negatively
impacts a team‘s success. IT staffers often demonstrate a sense of belonging to the IT
team, due to their common expertise and training. If the managers implement clan controls
(Ouchi, 1979) self-interested behaviors can be reduced. A summary of how group
cohesiveness is enhanced at CCIT is presented in table 5.13 below.
Table 5.13 Enhancing Group cohesiveness at CCIT
Objective Name
Enhance Group
Cohesiveness

Evidence from CCIT
―What can you say at the end of the day that you
have contributed? Ideally, you want the employees to
plan in the beginning of the day; what they can
accomplish that day, what is the next thing that they
can do to accomplish their goals and then achieve
something at the end of the day. Here is what I
started out to do and here‘s what I did in the day,
goals and accomplish on daily, weekly, and monthly
basis in the way it‘s measurable. So control would be
to motivate them as a group‖

Measures at CCIT
Set group targets
Encourage group activities
Track the people based on
their groups
Educate groups about
controls

5.3.14 How does CCIT ensure management commitment for security governance?
Management needs to actively participate in security governance initiatives by rewarding
conformity with controls and encouraging values such as a dedication, determination, open
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mindedness and truth. If management communicates effective governance as ―top
priority‖, the controls instituted are considered seriously by the employees. Our data
suggests that management should assess damage to the organization, as well as individuals,
from lack of controls and take appropriate measures to instill desire to meet expectations
about controls. All stakeholders should be allowed to participate in controls development
process and the management should ensure that the voices are reflected in the controls.
Management at CCIT participates actively in ensuring that right controls are developed and
implemented in the organization. The input from the upper management is crucial for the
success of the controls. There is evidence in the literature that suggests the direct
relationship between security initiatives success and management commitment. Successful
deployment of information technology requires management commitment, a structured
decision making process and a strategy based on understanding of the vision and
architecture of the organization (Shupe and Behling, 2006). Security would fail without
consistent support of the management (Wright, 2007). Regular meetings and briefings with
the top management reminds the management of the ongoing nature of security
governance. By their commitment, corporate managers help pave the way towards the
information society (Savola et al., 2005). It is clear from the attitude of the executives at
CCCIT that if the management has the power, resources and the willingness to make the
security governance a success story, nothing can stop the governance initiatives from
flying. As explained by team lead of operations:
Taking inputs from people is important, managers and directors. Decide how they
want a particular environment, the money and resources to be used and the
controls. Employees want more flexibility but really don‘t know what they
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want. Employees are always asking- why do we need to do this when you
incorporate their inputs. Better approach would be stick to the top and find out what
the management really wants and work with your given constraints. Find out
what is it that you can do with these resources.

The top management feels that it needs to involve the city council and directors from the
board to ensure that security governance is effective at CCIT. In case of developing new
security policies and the controls, the managers are hesitant to take unfinished product to
the board of the directors because once a decision is refuted by the board, its takes forever
to actually get the decision changed. As the chief security officer shared;
It [new policies and controls] should not go from us directly to the top, there are
chances that it will not be approved. We should make it right the first time before
we actually implement it. We need everyone‘s [directors from other agencies]
perspective. It seems most of the things fall through the crack because of this[not
involving other agencies], things don‘t work that way.

The CIO of CCIT gets involved in the development process of the controls and the policies
at every stage and demands weekly progress report. He is also willing to provide resources
to aid the process. The CIO invites outside consultants to provide their view on the policies
and had ordered expensive textbooks, from where the policies could actually be referred.
The top management shares the view that it is their job to protect the organization from
risks and exposure and everything else is designed around this fundamental job
requirement. As the CIO shared:
At the end of the day, everyday, what‘s my job? My job is to manage risks. I
assess risks and I make my decisions based on that. If you look in that regard, the
idea that you should have a control program almost becomes common sense. The
whole idea of having an internal controls program is to minimize risks and
exposure. That‘s really what we do everyday in everything that we do; that is what
management does.
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The management has separate security department and has designated security officers
who look after the controls management issues. This in itself is an indication of the
management‘s commitment towards information security governance. As explained by the
director, internal audit:
Security officer position is a very critical position in the organization. That
position has a formal training to manage these controls. To establish and manage
these controls, security auditors try to make sure that security officer is doing
the work competently

The management has to be proactive and work towards changing the corporate culture, and
the resulting employee behavior (Drennan, 1992). The management at CCIT is clearly
involved with security controls initiatives which provide a lot of visibility to the controls
program in the organization. But a lot of security governance decisions need an ‗okay‘
stamp from the higher management at city council level. Selling some of the governance
ideas to this diversified gathering of board of directors is not easy. It is the duty of the
management, nonetheless to use all the knowledge avenues and come up with the right
decision for the organization. Management should be concerned about creation, protection
and distribution of knowledge in the organization as it is a sources of competitive
advantage.
Since the current CIO is committed to the cause of effective security governance, it
appears that many of the initiatives might actually get approved by the board. The future of
the governance program at CCIT is contingent upon several factors which are beyond the
control of the immediate management. The tenure of the CIO, the political clout of the CIO
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with the directors higher up and the vision of the city mayor about these things greatly
impact the organization. We also observed that the top managements‘ involvement at
CCIT actually deters non compliance in the organization. Research literature supports this
relationship between the management commitment and deterrence impact. Organizations
with top management support lead to greater deterrent activities than ones with weaker
support (Kankanhalli et al, 2003) and eventually to better overall security. A summary of
the assessment of management commitment at CCIT is presented in the table 5.14 below.
Table 5.14 Management commitment at CCIT
Objective
Name
Encourage
Management
Participation

Evidence from CCIT

Measures at CCIT

―Taking inputs from people is important, managers and
directors. Decide how they want a particular
environment, the money and resources to be used and
the controls. Employees want more flexibility but really
don‘t know what they want. Employees are always
asking- why do we need to do this when you incorporate
their inputs. Better approach would be stick to the top
and find out what the management really wants and
work with your given constraints. Find out what is it
that you can do with these resources.‖

Upper management
participates in group meetings
Management seeks inputs
from people
Management ensures that
only the perfect version of the
policies and control is presented
to the higher management as
City level
CIO is supportive and gets
updated on weekly basis
Management ensures
resources for the new
development of policies and
controls

5.3.15 Standardization of controls at CCIT
Standardization of the controls helps in benchmarking the governance activities, such as
design and implementation of controls and investment security governance activities,
against other players in the industry. It is important though to clearly differentiate between
what needs to be standardized versus things that are best left unique to the organization.
Standardization provides opportunities for learning from others and avenues for growth. It
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also helps organization gain acceptance internationally in the eyes of regulatory authorities
or third party vendors.
The controls developed at CCIT need to be specific to the organization. Being a service
delivery organization, CCIT needs to set clear standards for what is expected from them
and what would be acceptable. Having an idea about acceptable services, controls need to
be designed in a way that at least the threshold level of performance is achieved. To
provide a basic level of service, CCIT requires standardization of the process and hence
controls. As explained by manager, development functions:
I guess one of the other things which is very important and lot of people don‘t do
this, establish acceptance criteria. That means that you are going to determine what
the controls will do and how everyone has to act, for it to work, and then to ensure
that it does act. It has to be consistent.
The management develops its own set of controls and then strives to standardize the
controls such that maximum benefits could be derived from it through improved
coordination. As shared by manager infrastructure services:
I think every bureau has their own method [of developing controls] and in many
cases may be they don‘t need to be at the same point because they have different
applications. They all have a different way to do it. So it‘s key, it‘s important that it
probably should have some form of standardization. I mean they [employees] need
to be trained so they understand it works and a standard process helps in this
[training].

One way of standardizing the controls is to look at the available governance models in the
industry. Organizations should exercise caution while implementing the available
frameworks as most of these frameworks cannot be used ―as it is‖ and need customization.
Use of established standards has been criticized in literature. Standards contain hidden
complexities and nuances which can overwhelm the risk mangers who implement them.
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Also effective implementation of standards requires a great deal of expertise on part of the
assessor regarding risk assessments probably requiring additional trainings for the staff at
large in order to make good use of formal methodology. Standards also suffer the problem
of subjectivity where every organization interprets it according to their convenience
(Lichtenstein, 1996). There is little doubt that security standards are not being readily
adopted amongst the business community (May, 2007). But it also sees the value of
looking at such frameworks. As explained by the director of the internal audit at the city;
Somebody needs to do this, make sure that those objectives are being met by the
systems. Those things [governance frameworks] have come into existence by
looking at the experiences of several people who have suffered breaches. So, it‘s
kind of learning from someone else‘s experience. It is critical to look at the
frameworks.

There are benefits of actually standardizing the controls benchmarked against the
commonly accepted frameworks in the industry. Research literature suggests benefits of
standardization process of the controls. Standards are one of the best methods for
companies to develop a proactive strategy for information security (May, 2005). The
benefits are manifold: helps in developing structured strategy for security, offers
reassurance to outsiders‘ vendors and boost to organization‘s marketing potential.
Research suggests the importance of defining baseline controls and standard builds for
platforms, systems and applications. These baselines may be the common ground of all
risk treatment processes or it is possible to develop specific baseline sets for platforms of
different roles, based on the level of risk (Wilson, 2005). As suggested by DeMaio (2002),
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a significant characteristic needed to develop e-Trust in the network economy is the
standardization of processes, interfaces and technologies.
The management also feels that standardizing the controls increase the acceptance of the
organizations processes amongst vendors and enhances its credibility in the eyes of the
regulators. The standardization process also helps in meeting the compliance criteria and is
seen positively by the external auditors. In the process of development of new controls, the
organization has not looked at the available frameworks so far. It would not be surprising
though if the internal auditing demands adherence to existing governance objectives which
forces the management to comply. It remains to be seen though, if the organization puts a
blanket approval to all the controls from any standard framework to be used in the
organization or only controls of operational nature are copied and the strategic ones are
developed inside. A summary of standardization of controls at CCIT is presented in table
5.15 below.
Table 5.15 Standardization of controls at CCIT

Objective Name
Encourage
Standardization of
Controls

Evidence from CCIT
― I guess one of the other things which is very
important and lot of people don‘t do this, establish
acceptance criteria. That means that you are going to
determine what the controls will do and how
everyone has to act, for it to work, and then to ensure
that it does act. It has to be consistent‖

Measures at CCIT
Consistent controls
Refer to the industry
frameworks
Required for the theird
party vendors

5.3.16 Alignment of individual and organizational values at CCIT
This objective implies that security controls should be in alignment with individual‘s
beliefs and values such that the probability of success of governance program increases.
This alignment could be achieved in so many ways. Respecting other people‘s opinion,
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involving other stakeholders in the control development process and incorporating
employees‘ perspective in control design are some of the ways to approach the alignment
task.
The CCIT management is appreciative of the fact that employees need to play an important
role in development and implementation of the controls. Leach (2003) argues that in
situations of conflict between individual and organization value systems, most people are
unable to survive the tension for long. Even in the light of various legislations the agency
had to follow, there were incidents of non-conformity with rules and regulations. It is to be
noted that in the recent past, two employees form the department were terminated for non
compliance with Internet surfing policies. These employees visited web sites that were
restricted for the department network. In a newspaper report (not cited for confidentiality
reasons), one of them had mentioned that he did it because he thought it was okay once in
a while. The rules and the laws can only provide a direction for accepted behavior. But
unless the rules are in sync with the individual values, there is a higher probability that it
would not be followed. As the chief information officer of the agency mentioned:
So we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in
reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do
the best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. If my personal values
allow then only I will follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t legislate
that; you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that.

The organization, as mentioned above, was in the process of development of security
controls for the entire city agencies. Being the IT department for the City, all the controls
developed and approved by this organization would be applicable and enforced on other
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agencies under the City. This means representation from various quarters of various
agencies which were not even working directly with this organization. This represents a
unique situation for control development. The agency which is responsible for
development and enforcement of the controls is not in touch with other agencies which
need to comply with the controls. The security officers, in charge of leading the control
development process, understood the complexities involved. The Chief Security Officer at
CCIT explained:
It‘s very complex [developing controls]. Reach out to HR, legal people, get all
resources to learn from them. Draft things that can actually work for everyone. You
need to take all stakeholders in confidence, win their trust and ensure that you are
working for them [individuals] not against them. It is what they need.

The management at CCIT uses psychometric measures to influence people to think that the
controls are about them and not about the top management in the organization. The CIO
has developed mechanisms to informally bring the end users on board with the controls.
The security team in the organization reaches out to the people in a way so that they find it
appealing. It is common in this organization for the security people to have frequent
lunches with other stakeholders in order to ―draw them in‖. Sometimes the bosses higher
up make it mandatory to attend the sessions about controls and policies. But the intention
of the people responsible for the controls is to make it more appealing to the users. The
controls are being portrayed as something that is important for the employees, to protect
them from any damage or harm in case of a security breach or a natural disaster. It is also a
vehicle that makes the daily work easier. The managers accepted though that it is hard to
ensure that the users continue to listen to them.
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The influence of environment on individual beliefs and attitudes is well documented in
literature (Thomson and von Solms, 2008; Kilmann et al, 1985; Dhillon, 2001). Lack of
alignment between individuals and the organization leads the employees to work against
management expectations, miscommunications, lack of cooperation from employees and
environment complacency (Sathe, 1983). A lack of alignment leads to user resistance about
the controls. User resistance manifests itself in various ways, including improper use of the
security mechanisms (Schultz et al., 2001). Systems with a poor usability design tend to
evoke a greater degree of user resistance (Al-Ghatani and King, 1999) and employees
exploit the vulnerability already present in the system. The management and the security
team at CCIT are aware of the importance of incorporating individual inputs into the
controls. The management clearly wants the controls to be incorporated well into the
processes and takes extra efforts to explain to the users about significance of the controls in
their lives. Getting security controls and polices approved in the City is a very tedious and
political process that involves managers and directors from various other agencies. In an
environment such as this, efforts for individual and organizational alignment can go only
so far. But the recognition of the fact that individual values matter should be helpful in the
long run for CCIT. The attempts of changing the attitude of executives about security
controls and developing people oriented controls should help in better understanding of the
controls. No matter what the extent of technical and formal controls, prevention of insider
security breaches demands certain normative controls. Such controls essentially deal with
values, belief system and culture for the individuals (Dhillon, 2001). Behavioral change is
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ultimately the result of changes in beliefs (Dhillon, 2001). A summary of the initiatives to
align individual and organizational values at CCIT is presented in table 5.16 below.

Table 5.16 Ensuring alignment of individual and organizational values at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure
Alignment of
Individual and
Organizational
values

Evidence from CCIT

Measures at CCIT

―Draft things that can actually work for everyone.
You need to take all stakeholders in confidence,
win their trust and ensure that you are working for
them [individuals] not against them. It is what they
need‖
―I mean, in reality, our personal values, our own
values should define that we are going to do the
best we can, do the right thing at any point of time.
If my personal values allow then only I will follow
the rules‖

Use psychological measures
to understand employees
Have frequent lunches to
―draw in‖ the employees
Portray controls as something
to protect the employees against
harm. Its about them not the
bosses

5.3.17 Resource allocation for controls at CCIT
Resources are the lifeline of the security governance program. Before developing the right
controls and implementation plan, organizations need to take initiatives to develop the
right environment for controls. Some of the proactive control initiatives that this research
suggests are getting adequate resources for developing physical controls, encouraging coordination between departments and discouraging an environment of fear and politics in
the organization. A clear vision about security governance is required to start groundwork
before establishing the controls infrastructure. The dividends of such actions a priori
planning eventually help the security posture of the organization.
The biggest issue that emerged from the case study at CCIT is the concern of the
management about lack of physical and environmental controls. The management was
worried about inadequate protection of not only the physical assets in the form of computer
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monitors, CPUs and printers but also the crucial information in garbage cans. As shared by
the administrative head of the organization:
The other issue which we have had is the physical security of assets by temporary
workers. The cleaning people are not the city‘s employees, they are from a
company. They are brought in as temporary workers and are managed by a city
employee. They come in and they got a giant trash can with them. Actually we
have lots of equipments lying around, it‘s not a lot of money but it is some money.
They can take away anything they want. How can I control that? They got to get in
and clean the trash. If someone puts all the papers in the trash can and take it away,
I won‘t know.
The manager‘s concern did not seem unwarranted for. The protection measures of physical
assets in the office complex seemed complacent and half hearted. For example, a general
protocol for a visitor in the office area is to first sign in at the registration desk, get a batch
and wait to be escorted by the person they are supposed to meet. The visitor is also entitled
to be shown the way out to the reception after the meeting. It is a control put in place for
restoring physical security of office space and assets. But the employees feel it is a
ridiculous requirement to have. The argument being that several vendors visit the premises
on a weekly basis for years and it is silly to go get them every time and escort them back. It
takes the employees away from work. An important point to be noted is the furniture
layout in the office area. All the employees at manager level have closed cubicles and
directors have their own rooms. There are no open area work stations in the entire
organization. But a lot of equipments such as printers, copiers, monitors, CPUs and mouse
are lying around in open areas where everyone has a common access to it. The layout is
such that, for the most part, you cannot watch the activities in the open area from a cubicle.
The concern of the administration manager seems genuine since there is lot of equipments
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and important papers (in the printers and copiers) lying around and anyone can walk away
with these papers without getting noticed. As she puts it, ―we haven‘t got into lot of trouble
yet because we have been lucky so far‖. Some of the directors echoed the similar threat
and shared their disappointment at not doing anything concrete about it.
Currently the administration manager is the warden of the floor at City Hall where CCIT is
situated and she does not have access to any blueprint of the building with her. As she
observed:
It really upsets me. They have made me the floor warden; I don‘t even know how
to get into those nooks and corners of the floor. It costs money to develop
reorganize things in an easily accessible manner. There is lot of complacency
because of that.

The administration manager has no way of knowing, in case of an emergency, where are
various people exit doors in the building and how to reach various corners of the office and
check if anyone needs help. For the sake of emergency preparedness, City does store some
wheel chairs and masks for the employees within the facility. But the administration
manager made a mockery of this ill planned attempt of the management saying that she
was the floor in-charge for emergency needs and even she had no clue about how the
digital locks work where the emergency equipments are stored. To her knowledge, the
locks were quite old and no body was quite sure how it actually works.
All the stakeholders at CCIT unanimously argue for more resources to be injected into
security controls to take the security governance plans forward. In this state agency, the
resources are allocated after deliberations through several layers. This delays the benefits
of some of the measures. The organization requires resources in monetary form as well as
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more personnel urgently. These resources are important for the governance program but
are lacking nonetheless at CCIT. As shared by the security officer:
You know I want to do encryption of certain things that helps me to be able to
monitor. People send me ssn [social security number], credit card information and I
want to protect that. We have tools you can buy and put them in place to protect
that [data]. We don‘t currently have those; it‘s a great job to get those tools, to get
the funding for that, to get the people for that.

The political environment at City headquarters gets the better of the CIO and many a times
good security control initiatives do not produce intended result. The management at CCIT
should understand that developing adequate security mechanisms is a process of trade-offs
between high security, usability and cost (Savola, 2007). The adequate level of security has
to lie in the intersection of these three planes. All stakeholders, such as managers,
developers, security experts and end users, should be on board in making such tradeoff
decisions (Savola, 2007). Security governance decisions require coordinated efforts from
all levels of management. The management at CCIT should influence directors at the City
level about priorities and resource allocation for security and early involvement of security
specialist in new projects or initiatives. Research literature has evidences to suggest that
such teams are helpful in getting the right resources. Appointment of an expert team to
conduct the strategic planning and resources to carry it forward (Shupe and Behling, 2006)
helps the cause of security governance. The case at CCIT establishes the resources as a
vital requirement for effective security governance program.
Research literature in security governance suggests that physical access is one of the most
important but neglected issue in security management (Schauer and Essex, 2001). And this
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is what we observed at CCIT. Security governance program at CCIT realizes the need for
resources for physical security measures. The result is a compromised security control
structure that is vulnerable on several fronts and needs immediate attention. Organization‘s
building and premises, equipment and information processing facilities must be fool proof
to prevent unauthorized intrusions and access and possible theft issues (Parker, 1996). The
risk of poor security should be articulated such that budget and resources allocation is not
compromised (Wright, 2007). Extant literature suggests measures that CCIT could adopt to
get proper resources. Management must discuss with personnel the appropriate actions to
be taken in the case of unknown people entering the premises or leaving it (Schauer and
Essex, 2001). Devices to lock computers can be installed (Schauer and Essex, 2001).
Laptops security should be ensured when the user is away from office and the organization
should have strong policies and about this. Keeping a watch regularly on trash habits
includes printed reports, diskettes, hard drives and zip drives that are being discarded or
given away (Schauer and Essex, 2001). Applying such measures could help CCIT deal
with the pressing concern about physical and environmental controls. A summary of
resources allocation efforts is presented in table 5.17 below.
Objective Name
Maximize
resource
allocation for
controls

Table 5.17 Maximizing resource allocation for controls at CCIT
Evidence from CCIT
Measures at CCIT
―Consistently they [employees] must learn to trust. When
Enhance trust measures
you say you are doing something it means you are doing in the organization
it; when you say you will get back to them, you get back
Seek more resources to
to them‖
get the controls working
“We have tools you can buy and put them in place to
Registering at the front
protect that [data]. We don‘t currently have those; it‘s a desk before entering the
great job to get those tools, to get the funding for that, to organization and at the
get the people for that‖
time of departure
―It is like buying auto insurance the day after you had an
Escorted by the
accident. It is not going to help you the damage is done
employees into and out of
already. So is the case with the security controls for the
the office
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management. If you are not doing something to police it
on your own then you are going to find about it after it
really happens. So there is really nothing you can do,
there is nothing you can do to protect yourself as you
have already experienced the vulnerability‖

5.3.18 Visible executive leadership accomplished?
Effective information systems security governance program requires visible leadership to
provide the direction to controls management in the organization. This objective entails a
leadership style and philosophy that provides the momentum to the controls program. The
perception about security governance is created by the leaders who should be able to ―walk
the talk‖. This objective demands that the leadership in that organization should present
exemplary behavior and be able to nurture relationships with cohorts. Promoting
executives with good security governance understandings in visible leadership roles should
be an integral part of the governance program.
The security managers at CCIT have faith in their leader i.e. the CIO of the organization.
But the other factions of the top management at the City are ignorant about the needs of the
security program and have little interest in knowing what‘s best for the organization. As
explained by the security manger:
With the city, it‘s not hard to get the support of the CIO. He is supportive of our
actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues, the other directors, who need to
approve it but have no clue about it.

The lack of support from the leadership is hurting the new security governance program at
the City. The general perception is that if the CIO is supporting the cause of the security
controls, the program would be in effect sooner or later. The vision and dedication of the
current CIO has actually been crucial in developing new security initiatives at CCIT. As
201

suggested by the objective, managers in this organization believe that leaders should be
able to set an example for the rest of them to follow (see table 5.18). No control program
can work if the leadership in the organization conveys contradictory message about the
intent of the controls. Research literature in information security area calls for consistency
in leadership about security issues. The executive leadership should espouse that controls
are important and be consistent in behavior to convey what is espoused is real (Drennan,
1992). Senior managers can communicate policies and codes of ethics to guide employees
(Krull, 1996). It is the responsibility of the leaders to serve as a role model for the behavior
it wishes to promote (Krull, 1996). Executive leadership sets the tone for employee trust as
the core for company‘s success and is reflective of the culture in the organization
(Fleming, 2007). If a control is being endorsed by the executives in the top management
positions, it is important that the control is followed. As explained by application services
manager:
A very good example here is that in an organization you tell people, if you share
your password and this is the law, you will be fired. Then president of the
company, she goes to some other site and shares her password with others. You
need to make sure that if you set something up, you need to set an example for
others to follow and then you can control the process.

In the light of the above objective, the organization is actually undergoing great changes in
security governance program under capable leadership of the current CIO. The head of the
organization has great understanding of the security issues and is willing to instill good
values about security governance at CCIT. It is a part of the governance duties of the
executive management to encourage employees to adhere to the behavior expected to
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contribute towards the successful protection of information assets (Thompson and von
Solms, 2008). Visible management is required to actually employees at all levels really
internalize the code of conduct they want employees to follow. Leadership also leads to
trust building and ethical environment in the organization when employees see consistency
in behaviors. But being a part of the bigger organization (the City), CCIT does suffer
temporary setbacks in their security governance program due to non cooperative directors
and their lack of knowledge about security issues. Visible leadership plays a decisive role
in every security initiative planned by the organization. a summary of leadership initiatives
at CCIT is presented in table 8.18 below.
Table 5.18 Visible executive leadership at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Visible
executive
Leadership

Evidence from CCIT
―With the city, it‘s not hard to get the support of the
CIO. He is supportive of our actions. The hard part is
getting to his colleagues, the other directors, who
need to approve it but have no clue about it‖

Measures at CCIT
CIO is supportive of the
new security policies and
controls
Take into confidence the
leadership at the city level

5.3.19 Ethical and moral values instituted at CCIT
This objective suggests development of appropriate ethical environment for information
security governance. An ethical organization would encourage right work ethics and
institute appropriate moral values in the employees to shape a favorable perception about
security controls. Management should encourage people taking pride in their jobs and that
right display of morality is rewarded and valued in the organization. A strong leadership
helps in actually establishing the importance of ethics and morality in the organization.
At CCIT, management believes that ethical and moral values as something integral to the
employees and there is not much that can be done to change it. Research literature supports
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this assertion. In a study about impact of general and IS specific codes of ethics on
computer abuse intentions, general codes had no impact of users intentions while IS
specific codes ethics has a slight effect on one type of computer abuse (computer
sabotage). Organization can have a code of conduct as documenting its ethical values but it
is difficult to assess the operating effectiveness of such a control (Ramos, 2005).
Management has to evaluate the effectiveness of such a code (Ramos, 2005). At CCIT, the
director gave an example of regulatory compliance issues in the organization. Even though
regulations are meant to ensure that people do the right thing, it really does not help
organizations in this direction. The director said:
so we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in
reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do
the best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. If my personal values allow
then only I will follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t legislate that,
you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that
The management at CCIT believes though that if the leaders ―walk the talks‖, they can
certainly be exemplary in the organization and thus set an ethical and moral standard to be
followed by the employees. The CIO of the organization is one such leader who is ―looked
up to‖ by the employees in general. The management respects personal integrity of people
and rewards examples of the ethical and moral behavior through a ―star of the month‖
program. In this program, employees who have in some way set examples of good ethical
behavior, which can influence people, are acknowledged publicly by the management
monthly and the description of the behavior along with the winner‘s name is displayed in
the meeting areas. This has actually influenced people positively and communicated a
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message from the management that ethicality and morality are important and these
qualities are valued in the organization. There are evidences in literature to support the
management‘s belief that it can influence the ethical and moral environment in the
organization. Information Systems professionals generally demonstrate a solid
understanding of information security ethics as they apply to organizational goals. Dhillon
and Torkzadeh (2006) suggest that instilling value based work ethics would help in
ensuring an ethical environment which leads to employees‘ deterring from unacceptable
behavior for a secure organization. The security governance initiatives must supplement
the old technical and procedural mix of controls with the ones aimed at morality of the
insiders. The security technology design often neglects the moral or ethical element of the
governance process which is one of the most important aspects of security management
(Gupta and Sharman, 2008). Addressing this pertinent issue, Gupta and Sharman (2008)
suggest a model that offer insights into social behaviors that unravel the risk exposure of
the organization from social engineering attacks. The authors develop a social engineering
susceptibility index (SESI) that uses social network theory and organizational dynamics.
Krull (1996) argues that employers must create an environment that encourages employees
to recognize and respond appropriately. Standards and codes of ethics must also become
part of the organizational culture and reward system. Whistle blowing can be encouraged
by establishing policies that define appropriate responses to perceived problems (Krull,
1996). We observed that top management at CCIT works towards creating an ethical and
moral environment. A summary of initiatives to ensure ethical and moral values in CCIT is
presented below in table 5.19.
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Table 5.19 ethical and moral environment at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure ethical and
moral values

Evidence from CCIT
Measures at CCIT
―so we can make a rule, we can make a law that you
―star of the month‖
have to be honest. I mean, in reality, our personal
program
values, our own values should define that we are
Leadership is encouraged
going to do the best we can, do the right thing at any
to ―walk the talk‖
point of time. my if my personal values allow then only I willManagement
follow the rules.
My personal
belief is that you
provides
the
right environment

5.3.20 On trust building mechanisms at CCIT
The objective emphasizes the importance of role of trust in success of security controls in
organizations. Building trust is important to ensure that individuals can work according the
expectations of the management without close supervision. Trust is the enabling of
confidence that something will or will not occur in a predictable or promised manner. The
enabling of confidence is supported by identification, authentication, accountability,
authorization, and availability. A positive environment where the leadership is dependable
and the management less politicized, helps employees to trust the intentions of supervisors
and each other for the best for the company. Employee beliefs about strong security
governance in the organization are a good predictor of security success in the organization
(Stanton et al, 2004). Outsider stakeholders should be able to trust the security measures in
the organization to work with it and develop a positive perception about the reliability of
the firm in the market.
The management at CCIT believes in trusting employees about day to day activities (see
table 5.20). This is evidenced from the fact that there are a lot of equipments lying around
in the organization without being locked. These equipments are not stolen and the
employees believe that no body is going to take the City‘s property. Self-control can be
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helpful in this environment (Kirsch, 1996). One of the mechanisms to build trust within the
organization, as employed by the management, is to maintain consistency in behavior. As
explained by the security director:
They [employees] must learn to trust. When you say you are doing something,
[make sure] you are doing it. When you say you will get back to them, you get
back to them. You got to have that consistency.
The data suggests that trust is perceived as pivotal in the success of the controls at
CCIT. The director of project management is of the view that trust needs to be cultivated
on a daily basis with the co workers by respecting their points of view and engaging them
in the decision process. As observed by manager project management:
Consistently they [employees] must learn to trust. When you say you are doing
something it means you are doing it; when you say you will get back to them, you
get back to them. You got to have that consistency and managing controls is going
to be the same thing, here is the policy, procedure, you must do it and it will be
done.

Trust is an indicator of series of direct relationship with people and not with a series of
organizational entities or policies (Fleming, 2007). This is evidenced in CCIT‘s trust
relationship with other agencies under the purview of the City. There have been a number
of incidents about the policies and the controls being developed at the CCIT being rejected
by the council. As mentioned by the application development manager:
I am talking about the whole city. They [other agencies under the City] have to
trust IT to develop these policies and controls. We have best interest in doing so. It
is good for compliance as well with any federal state and local law.

Other agencies and its directors are at loggerheads with CCIT top management about the
content of the policies. The other directors at city council are afraid that these policies
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would provide excessive power to CCIT over the other agencies with the City. Several
board meetings and drafts later, CCIT is still struggling to get the policies okayed. The
need for inter-organization trust building mechanisms is obvious at the City office.
Research literature can guide CCIT in this situation of lack of trust with partners in
business. Companies should be able to guarantee its trading partners that they enjoy a
minimum level of acceptable security and have a certificate to prove that. This leads to
trust building between trading partners (Trompeter and Eloff, 2001). CCIT could also try a
novel concept that will enable information security professionals to implement effective
security is ‗e-Trust‘ (DeMaio, 2002). Inter-organizational business requires standardization
of processes, interfaces and technologies that help in development of mutual trust in
collaborating partners in business (DeMaio, 2002). Other agencies could use pre
established criteria to assess what CCIT proposes. Organizations could use performance
evaluation criteria that emphasize trust, security and control requirements (DeMaio, 2002).
Research suggests that lack of trust in policies and monitoring systems can make the
employees alter systems and simply not complying with controls such as not sharing
passwords or taking confidential data out of the office on laptops (Booker and kitchens,
2008). This is what we observed at CCIT. Lack of trust impedes the optimal functioning of
organization, as conveyed by one of the incidents shared with us. In one of the disaster
situation, the organization sent a laptop to affected site for resuming normal functioning.
Since the manager had to sign the receipt of the equipment and be responsible for it, she
walked away with the equipment as she did not trust anyone to deal with it appropriately.
The manager in question took it with her on a vacation; meanwhile, all the work that could
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have been done could not be accomplished. This certainly shows how the spirit of the
controls s defeated due to lack of trust amongst groups and mangers. On the other hand,
there needs to be a caution in establishing trust with outsiders as it could be exploited for
social engineering attacks (Gupta and Sharman, 2008). A summary of trust building
mechanisms at CCIt is presented in the table 5.20
Table 5.20 Trust building mechanisms at CCIT
Objective Name
Maximize trust
building
mechanisms

Evidence from CCIT
―I am talking about the whole city. They [other
agencies under the City] have to trust IT to develop
these policies and controls. We have best interest in
doing so. It is good for compliance as well with any
federal state and local law‖.

Measures at CCIT
Equipments are lying
openly in the office as there
is mutual trust about not
stealing City‘s property
Managers maintain
consistency in ―saying and
doing‖

5.3.21 Ensure punitive structures at CCIT
Punitive structures require the management to establish clear consequences for non
compliance with policies and ensure disciplinary action against unacceptable behavior. The
impact of deterrence activities, according to our data, is significant for impeding non
compliance with controls and policies. Deterrence helps in creating fear of punishments. It
is important to explain clearly the meaning of criminal actions and in cases of non
compliance, it is critical to take quick and responsive actions. Developing countermeasures
helps in conformity with rules and regulations. Information systems security research has
established the importance of deterrence criteria for better security (Dhillon and
Torkzadeh, 2006; Straub and Nance, 1990, Straub, 1990). Researchers in information
security governance domain have undermined the importance of deterrence activities and
have practically not explored work in this area.
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The management at CCIT, especially the CIO, is clear about establishing clear deterrence
criteria as preventive measures for information systems security governance. As observed
by the CIO;
I also think what you have to do is to have a clear punitive structure because big
things are at stake. A punitive structure is a must. So you must have some type of
thing that says even if the employee violates this, what is going to happen to him.

A punitive structure constantly reminds the employees about the consequences of their
actions. There are evidences from research to suggest that punitive structures actually deter
employees from non compliance with policies. For instance, Darcy and Hovav (2007)
empirically examined user awareness of security policies, security-awareness programs,
computer monitoring, and preventive security software and their effect on user intentions
regarding IS misuse. Their results suggest that a combined proactive and preventive
approach to security deters users from IS misuse (Darcy and Hovav, 2007). Repeated
efforts are required to instill the results of non conformity with polices into the minds of
the employees. As shared by security manager;
It is very important to establish consequences and give constant reminders. We
have to go there again and again. What constitutes a violation? What are different
levels of violations? Establish the penalties, the parameters of what constitutes non
conformity. Nothing can be done later if you do this and if something happens do
take some action

The top management also feels that one of the biggest drivers for establishing deterrence in
not adhering to the controls in the organization is frequent auditing. The management
believes that the process of auditing implies that ―you are being watched‖ and ―you will
get caught‖ if you are deviating from the accepted behavior. This constant reminder
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actually helps in deterring the employees form risk behavior and encourages respect for the
controls.
Since the organization has fewer audits that it actually thinks it needs, the impact that this
complacency has on deterrence is unpredictable. If people think that the audit is not going
to take place, say for next three years, they actually might get tempted to break the law
more often. If the employees think that there is no way of getting caught for the next three
years, the behavior might be modified accordingly. This could actually have serious
implications for the security governance in organizations.
Research in information security suggests several measures that could be adopted by CCIT
to deter employees from deviant behavior. For example, the management could study
employees‘ compliance and resistance behaviors and identify the most vulnerable areas
which are not easy to be policed. This helps in creating deterring activities aligned with the
employees‘ tolerance towards such measures (Booker and Kitchens, 2008). CCIT could
use more deterrence efforts to develop a preventive security management approach.
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) argue that greater organizational deterrent efforts (in the form of
person-hours expended on IS security purposes) and preventative efforts (in the form of
more advanced security software) were associated with higher perceived IS security
effectiveness. security countermeasures that include deterrent administrative procedures
and preventive security software results in lower computer abuse (Straub, 1990). For
maximizing deviant behavior, CCIT could reinforce positive beliefs and attitudes, in other
words first clarify what behavior is unacceptable through clearly establishing the ethics and
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morality expected from the staff. A summary of establishing a punitive structure in
organization is presented in table 5.21 below.
Table 5.21 punitive structure at CCIT
Objective Name
Ensure punitive
structures

Evidence from CCIT
―I also think what you have to do is to have a clear
punitive structure because big things are at stake. A
punitive structure is a must. So you must have some
type of thing that says even if the employee violates
this, what is going to happen to him.‖

Measures at CCIT
Explain consequences and
send reminders
Clear punitive structure
Punish in case of security
breach or non conformity
with controls

5.3.22 Training and education about controls at CCIT
Education about need for controls creates awareness in the organization about risks,
responsibilities and social engineering issues. Training employees about usage and scope
of controls helps the end users in understating the impact of controls on day-to-day work
and also reminds people to apply their knowledge in practice. Training should be enforced
and the impact of such measures should be assessed periodically. Our data establishes the
importance of training with specific focus and work related examples. Regular training
programs should be designed early on in the security governance strategy.
Training and education is greatly emphasized in CCIT, in theory and in practice. The upper
management in the organization schedule regular training of the employees on various
issues including security awareness and controls. The belief in training and education is
echoed by a security officer:
You can put control such as discussing the policies. But in my opinion controls are
not going to do anything unless you educate your end user. Understand that
controls don‘t do anything for you unless you educate end users.
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The management has a preventive approach towards security management and invests in
protecting the organization and the employees proactively from vulnerabilities. Training
the employees on use of various applications for business processes and other related
technologies ensures a better understanding of the expectations from the employees. The
management is proactive about providing enough information to employees about policies
and control and is perseverant about making sure that the employees actually read the
material are aware of its contents. As shared by chief security officer;
Human nature it is that they [employees] may read the policy and go ―ok I do know
that‖ but they wouldn‘t read in the details. There is an education factor also, to get
the word out to people. When you sign these forms, this is what it meant and
you are held responsible. Part of the procedure and guideline will hold, make it
standard this is what happens when you don‘t do this, first warning, second
warning, third warning. I believe that our HR is working on some of that now
[chief security officer]

The management takes extra measures to ensure that the education is actually reaching the
end user and provides extra incentive so that the material is read and understood y the user.
As the administrative manager commented:
Education and reaching out to the employees [is important]. Reward them
[employees] for reading and knowing the controls. Give a gift certificate. If you do
this, take this test after reading and pass, you can go for this incentive.
Typically if you make it mandatory, they [employees] go and find it because they
have to go and look. Make it appealing to the employees, .explain that it helps me
in my normal everyday life and not because it is a burden or something that needs
to be done to survive.

The training and education emphasis at CCIT has been helpful in creating awareness about
security controls and governance. There is evidence in research literature to support
CCIT‘s efforts on training and education. The success of IS security depends largely on
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end-user behavior and awareness (Darcy and Hovav, 2007). Defining ways to inform and
educate users on what constitutes legitimate use of IS resources training involves alerting
users to known vulnerabilities and threats and through preventive security technologies
(Darcy and Hovav, 2007). Fuller et al (2007) conducted a study to examine the impact of
training on information assurance awareness and knowledge retention in the organization.
The results suggest that employee information assurance knowledge erodes over time
suggesting a need for recurring training.
The management utilizes resources for the knowledge of its employees about security
control issues which in turn prevents the unintentional breaches of security. Training could
communicate higher level concepts such as security action cycle but also detailed
information about specific vulnerabilities. End users need to be educated on risk factors
and how it affects bottom line (Garigue and Stefaniu, 2003). They should also be aware of
emerging technologies and threats and business impact of potential security incidents.
Extensive training is required to make the standards a part of organizational controls
culture (Krull, 1996). The employees on the other had did not seem too happy with the
training programs. It seems that the people who actually got the training did not see much
value in the exercise. The importance of the training for the employees needs to be
communicated clearly. It should not be a checkbox exercise which is to be done. The
management‘s efforts of explain the employees ―what‘s in it for me‖ does not seem
adequate. This emphasis needs to be changed when the new controls program in instituted.
A summary of training and education initiatives at CCIT is presented in table 5.22 below.
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Table 5.22 Training and education at CCIT
Objective Name
Encourage
Training and
Education

Evidence from CCIT
―Human nature it is that they [employees] may read
the policy and go ―ok I do know that‖ but they
wouldn‘t read in the details. There is an education
factor also, to get the word out to people. When you
sign these forms, this is what it meant and you are
held responsible. Part of the procedure and guideline
will hold, make it standard this is what happens
when you don‘t do this, first warning, second
warning, third warning. I believe that our HR is
working on some of that now‖.

Measures at CCIT
Extensive training about
applications and business
processes
Explain with work related
examples
Encourage use of
knowledge in work
Provides incentives for
education (gift cards)

5.3.23 Clarity in business processes at CCIT
Establishing clarity in business processes is absolutely essential to maintain business
integrity. This objective emphasizes the role of adequate understanding of the work flow
and the coordination that is required for smooth operating environment. Unless the
interrelationships of the business activities and the flow of information are clearly
established, it is difficult to integrate appropriate security controls seamlessly and protect
the business. Many businesses suffer vulnerability because of the lack of a deep
understanding of the business processes resulting in inappropriate controls being
implemented.
At CCIT, the management believes that controls should be integrated in the business
processes and build along in a way that there would be no flow of processes if controls are
not executed. For governance purposes, it is crucial to understand the business system and
dynamics of business processes within the systems for good security (Savola et al., 2007).
Especially it is important to recognize linkages of information security with business
processes and have abilities to create and distribute new knowledge horizontally and
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vertically in organization by using normal business interactions (Savola et al., 2007). The
right measure of the importance of an imbedded control is that you cannot do your
business if you surpass the controls. As mentioned by project management manager:
Internal control means that you are following the right process, the right vigor, to
deliver what the business wants. What does that mean? It means that you have to
start in a clear, precise way about the scope of what you want. Clearly define the
requirements and then you get everybody who is involved to agree on those
[requirements] and then from there, you build out your processes.

The controls should be aimed at improving the business efficiency. The provision of clear
insight and advice in terms of IT strategy ultimately contributes towards an improved
system of internal control that better supports the organization's overall corporate
governance objectives (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). The general sentiment of the
management regarding controls is that it should be planned way ahead and instituted in the
processes proactively and not as an afterthought (see table 5.23). The common belief of the
management was echoed by, security manager:
I think they [controls] should be designed to help to ensure that your data and
processes are sound, that your money is accounted for and your resources are
applied correctly. Also, your performances and expectations are met as an agency.
It should basically improve the business process.

There is again an apparent contradiction about what the management believes and what it
does. At CCIT, the business processes are institutionalized and controls are always added
as an afterthought. Service delivery being the prime business of the organization, it is
important to ensure that data is accurate before providing it to the customer. A summary of
efforts to achieve clarity in business processes is presented in table 5.23 below.
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Table 5.23 Clarity in business processes at CCIT
Objective Name
Establish Clarity
in Business
Processes

Evidence from CCIT
―I think they [controls] should be designed to help to
ensure that your data and processes are sound, that
your money is accounted for and your resources are
applied correctly. Also, your performances and
expectations are met as an agency. It should basically
improve the business process‖.

Measures at CCIT
Control the software
purchasing system
Controls build along the
business process
If controls are not
executed, cannot run the
business

5.4 Relevance of ISG objectives at CCIT
The management at CCIT identifies security governance as a strategic driver for ensuring
effective service delivery to the other agencies under the City. The organization is in the
process of redefining its security governance program. The desired changes in the security
governance objectives in the new program are reflective of the managements‘ dedication to
develop a critical IT infrastructure free from vulnerabilities. The proposed ISG objectives
were discussed at length with the representatives from the top level, middle level and
operational management in the organization. Depending on the nature of their roles,
respondents from each level of the management identified with different types of
objectives. The interaction with CCIT offers three different perspectives on the use and
importance of the developed objectives. Each of these perspectives is discussed below and
a synthesis is presented in conclusion of the section.
5.4.1 The top management perspectives on ISG objectives
The top management is responsible for the defining the strategic direction, providing
leadership and resources for the security governance program. The CIO and the directors at
CCIT could identify better with the objectives with leadership and strategic aspects of
security governance. The objectives, Maximize resource allocation for controls, Ensure
corporate controls strategy and Ensure visible executive leadership emerged as really
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important for the top management at CCIT. By definition, the role of the top management
is about strategizing and allocating resources for security purposes (Ansoff, 1985). The
objectives Ensure punitive structures, Ensure formal controls assessment functionality,
Maximize management commitment and Ensure ethical and moral values were rated as
important for the success of the security governance program.
The top management at CCIT believes in commitment to security governance initiatives
and consequences of non compliance are very important for the success governance
program. Establishing separate controls assessment functionality could only help the cause
of strong controls in the organization. As explained by the chief security officer:
He [CIO] is supportive of our actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues, the
other directors, who need to approve it but have no clue about it. But we depend on
the CIO to get the things done. He helps in getting them [other directors in the city
council] on board.

The top management perspective about security governance at CCIT is about emphasizing
the importance of resource allocation for making sense of the controls program. This
perspective emphasizes the importance of resource allocation in attaining a feasible
security governance program. Resources in the form of finances, people and technology
are essential for effective security governance. As one audit officer pointed out:
A strategy for good governance is good, but we do need the resources, may it be in
the form of money, people or infrastructure.

The extant research literature in this area recognizes the importance of the objectives
important to the top management at CCIT. The need for controls strategy has been
articulated in the research literature even though not explicitly. In the literature, there have
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been explicit calls that information security should be integrated into an organization‘s
overall management plan (Perry, 1982; Lane, 1985, Smith, 1989).
Perry (1982) argues that computer security and control strategy establishes a climate and
need for control. Since strategy is such an integral part of control design, it must be
understood and formulated prior to designing the controls. Organizational strategy
establishes the managements‘ intent, concern and means to achieve the control objectives
(Perry, 1982). Management needs to convey the expectations about the controls to the
employees. Thompson and von Solms (2008) argue that it is a part of the governance
duties of the executive management to encourage employees to adhere to the behavior
expected to contribute towards the successful protection of information assets. The
executive leadership should espouse that controls are important and be consistent in
behavior to convey what is espoused is real (Drennan, 1992). This should ultimately lead
to the shared tacit assumptions of employees becoming aligned with these espoused values
of the organization, thus progressing towards an Information Security Obedient Culture
(Thomson and von Solms, 2008). The management has to be proactive and work towards
changing the corporate culture, and the resulting employee behavior (Drennan, 1992). This
leads to establishing punitive structures which allow policing and safeguarding
organizational resources within the organization.
5.4.2 The middle management perspective on ISG objectives
Establishing process integrity through efficient auditing practices, standardization efforts
and superior technical competencies come together as key aspects of information security
governance for the middle level managers at CCIT. The middle management perspective
is in emphasizing the due process in achieving process integrity for information security
governance. The objectives that emerged as the important ones to the middle level
managers at CCIT are Ensure Efficacy of Audit Processes, Ensure data criticality and
clarity in control development process. The middle level managers believe that audit
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should be done frequently. The control development process should have clarity and data
criticality should be strived for through adequate access controls and authorization
mechanisms. As senior audit manager explained:
If you don‘t understand that HR may be the one place you go. I [an employee]
don‘t understand what it [polices and procedures] means, ask this upfront. Having
to own the policies, it [the management] should be responsible for the procedure
for this procedure, be responsible for answering those questions. Clarifying the
concepts helps people in believe in the governance program in the management.

Also, the objectives Encourage Standardization of Controls and Maximize trust building
mechanisms were deemed significantly important by this group of people. The middle
level managers strived for developing benchmarking standards in controls development.
The managers also believed that trust within the organization and with the stakeholders
outside the organization is crucial for the success of the security governance program.
Research literature acknowledges the importance of the objectives identified by the middle
level mangers at CCIT. Data criticality is important and if organizations do not ensure that
all employees understand their information security roles and responsibilities, it may
become difficult to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
assets (NIST Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 12). For governance purposes, it is
crucial to understand the business system and dynamics of business processes within the
systems for good security (Savola et al., 2007). Especially it is important to recognize
linkages of information security with business processes and have abilities to create and
distribute new knowledge horizontally and vertically in organizations by using normal
business interactions (Savola et al., 2007). This perspective of ISG acknowledges
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importance of developing and maintaining process integrity for security governance.
Management should be concerned about creation, protection and distribution of knowledge
in the organization as it is a sources of competitive advantage (von Krogh, 1998). This
allows a controls strategy to fit into the overall organizational strategy for business growth
and security is viewed as a strategic governance issue (Lane, 1985, Smith, 1989). All the
above measures require trusting people in organization to do the right thing at the right
time in the right way. Trust measures work within the organization to coordinate and
improves the controls initiatives and outside the organization to enhance the perception
about security governance efforts of the management.
5.4.3 The operational management perspectives on ISG objectives
The operational management respondents comprise security officers, auditing officers and
help desk people. The operational people are the ones who are actually responsible for the
operational efficiency of the business. The staff works with the controls on daily basis, yet
their representation in the development process of the control is minimal. This group of
respondents identified themselves with the objectives that emphasized the importance of
individual user involvement in the success of security governance. There was a unanimous
agreement in the group about the importance of having a control conscious culture in the
organization. The operational people felt that the culture would guide them in times of
confusion.
The objective Maximize clarity in business processes was considered very important by
this group. This is because the objective directly impacts their domain knowledge expertise
and work. Clarity in business processes is crucial to develop controls that do not allow
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vulnerabilities to seep in the business. Ensure Communication about Controls objective
advocates well established communication policies about open discussions on controls
between the management and the employees. Communicating was considered crucial by
the operational people since it is really important for them to clearly understand the scope
and intent of the controls. Maximize monitoring and feedback objective is also crucial for
this group as it provides an opportunity to actually change the controls that hinder the work
process. The objective Maximize Group Cohesiveness was rated as very important by this
group. The respondents felt that peer pressure and behavior of other group members played
an important role in the acceptance of the controls. Ensure Alignment of Individual and
Organizational Values signifies the importance of individuals‘ value system aligned with
the management‘s philosophy and organizational values. The respondents felt it is really
important to understand if the organizational values are in line with their personal value
system. The objective Maximize Training and Education implies continuous training and
education of the end users and members of the operational group felt that unless adequate
training is provided to them about the controls, no governance initiative will sustain in the
long run. As mentioned by a security officer:
They [users] need to be educated about the initial controls as well as the reasons for
change. Communicate clearly and effectively about the changes in controls because
things change, business needs change and so do controls. Business processes
should be well understood for this.

The operational management people could identify more with the objectives that represent
an underlying theme of the importance of individual participation for the success of
security governance. This conjecture is supported by the research in information security
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governance area. Conscientious and diligent employees can become the strongest link in an
organization‘s information security infrastructure (Henry, 2004). Pointing out the
importance of individual participation in governance efforts, Thomson and von Solms
(2008) argue that the environment within the organization has the most influence on
employees‘ beliefs and attitudes. If there is a misalignment between individual and
organizational values, the employees might move in the wrong direction and against the
expectation of the management (Kilmann et al, 1985). Such an environment can be
detrimental to security governance in the organization and may lead to miscommunication,
lack of cooperation from the employees and complacency in performance (Sathe, 1983).
5.4.4 What do the perspectives mean for information security governance?
The three perspectives at CCIT suggest three emergent dimensions of information security
governance: user involvement, process integrity and resource allocation. A synthesis of the
three perspectives suggests the relevance of all the proposed objectives for CCIT. The
emergent perspectives are the conceptualizations about security governance that is
reflective of the nature of the work an individual does and the kind of organization she
belongs to. The perspectives from three levels of management are not something unique to
CCIT. Research literature in management and information systems suggest three
dimensions of managerial decision making. Weill and Ross (2004) and Peterson (2004)
suggest similar dimensions or perspectives in organizational governance for information
technology. The authors claim that actions of decision makers across business units in the
organization requires three coordination mechanisms namely process based, structural and
relational. Process-based mechanisms are the formalization and institutionalization of
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strategic IT decision making or IT monitoring procedures (Peterson, 2004). This dimension
is similar to the middle level managers‘ perspective about the importance of process
integrity for security governance at CCIT.
The structural mechanisms are formal positions, roles, teams, and committees established
to coordinate decision making in business and IT (Peterson, 2004). This dimension is
similar to the top level management perspective about strategy and resources at CCIT. It is
not surprising that the development of controls strategy and allocating resources for
controls emerged as most important objectives for the top management. The relational
mechanisms foster voluntary and collaborative relationships among corporate executives,
IT management, and business management (Peterson, 2004) to help in clarifying
differences and find creative solutions to problems. Self-control can be helpful in this
environment (Kirsch, 1996). IT staffers often demonstrate a sense of ―belonging to the IT
team‖ because of their common expertise and training. If the managers implement clan
controls (Ouchi, 1979) self-interested behaviors can be reduced. This dimension is similar
to the operational level managers‘ perspective about importance of individual in the
success of controls.
The dimensions proposed by Weil and Ross (2004) are in the context of effective IT
governance in an organization. Being a subset of the overall IT governance in the
organization, information security governance domain can theoretically extend the
concepts. All of the three perspectives need to be integrated for designing comprehensive
security governance at CCIT. All the objectives fall into one or more of these perspectives
and are extremely relevant for the organization. A security governance program needs to
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be designed along the lines of these underlying objectives such that the benefits from such
a program are maximized. Based on the discussion about the emergent themes from the
three perspectives, the relationship between the dimensions is shown in the figure 5.2
below.

Figure 5.2 The User-Process-Resource (UPR) matrix for information security governance

The proposed User-Resource-Process (UPR) matrix shows the interdependence of the three
dimensions of ISG. In the above matrix, the intersection of the two dimensions, user
involvement and process integrity results in four stages of ISG, dependent on the resource
allocation dimension. The lower quadrant on left side represents low process integrity and
low user involvement with piecemeal resource allocation for controls. The result is poor
ISG practices for organizations in this quadrant. Moving away from this quadrant in the
clockwise or anti-clockwise direction (it would be very difficult to move directly in the
diagonally opposite quadrant) and organization can either increase process integrity or user
involvement. The resources allocation in these quadrants would be skewed in either
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direction (depending on which quadrant the organization is) resulting in mediocre ISG
practices. For example, if an organization is in the top left quadrant, in here the resources
are skewed towards more user involvement and less process integrity initiatives. Similarly,
if an organization is in the bottom quadrant at right, the resources are skewed towards
increasing process integrity and user involvement is neglected. To reach in the ideal state
i.e. the quadrant at top on right, where there is high user involvement and high process
integrity requires balanced resource allocation for both the dimensions. Organizations in
this quadrant would have superb ISG practices and this is the desired state to be in. This
matrix explicitly establishes the relationships between user involvement, process integrity
and resource allocation for maximizing ISG in an organization.
5.5 Discussion
In phase two of the research, the data from CCIT clearly establishes the importance of all
the information systems security governance objectives developed in phase one. The
objectives are considered important by the organization and each and every objective, to
some extent, is being realized by the management through various measures at different
levels. A list of the measures is provided in each discussion of every objective. All of our
objectives were supported by the data from CCIT. We had to revisit the list of subobjectives under each objective. After several iterations, based on our understanding of the
objectives and CCIT, the list of sub-objectives was condensed. The following subsection
discusses about the refining process of the objectives in details. Further exploration for
new underlying constructs from the data was done but no new objectives emerged.
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A careful evaluation of each objective was performed based on the evidence from the data
to corroborate the claim of CCIT actually meeting that objective. A subjective
understanding of various measures employed by CCIT to actually realize each and every
objective was also developed. Combining both the evidence as well as the measures
suggests an understanding of the objectives in the organization and the management‘s
desire to actually meet the objectives. There were some apparent contradictions noticed in
what the management claimed versus what it actually did. These are discussed below.
5.5.1 Refining ISG objectives: Lessons from CCIT
We initially developed 23 objectives and 245 sub objectives in our fist phase of the study.
We conducted several interviews and shared our objectives with the managers and the
operational level employees at CCIT. We shared and discussed our objectives and sub
objectives with two goals. First, we needed to understand if the objectives make sense to
CCIT. To achieve the first goal, we generated discussions to understand ―how do the
proposed objectives influence its security governance practices‖. Second, we wanted to
develop a parsimonious set of sub objectives that could more effectively be communicated
for security control design purposes. To achieve this goal, we showed our sub objectives to
the respondents and got their opinion on how well the sub objectives, without redundancy,
conveyed the essence of the objective. The first goal was achieved by triangulating various
sources of data (interviews, manuals, memos, policies and audit directives) at CCIT and
critically interpreting it in light of the developed objectives. The analysis was presented in
the previous section. All our respondents at CCIT unanimously felt that there was no
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redundancy in our objectives. Each and every objective presented a unique and important
dimension of information security governance.
Table 5.24 Condensing sub objectives at CCIT
Objective
Ensure
Regulatory
Compliance

Initial sub objectives
Define controls for compliance with regulations
Encourage regulatory compliance to internal controls
Encourage respect for laws of the society
Ensure regulations are followed
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and sustained
improvement in business processes
Ensure that the regulations are followed
Avoid turning compliance into ―check the box exercise‖
Explain the importance and need for compliance to
technical people
Understand the impact of regulations on controls
Formalize process of compliance in the organization
Use regulations as a catalyst for better practices
Follow regulations in entirety
Establish a compliance culture

Final sub objectives
Encourage development of
controls for regulatory
compliance
Ensure that compliance is a
substantive and sustained
improvement in business
processes

Encourage diverse groups
about importance and need for
compliance
Ensure compliance is used as a
‗catalyst‘ for security
governance

For our second goal, we found that there was a lot of redundancy in the sub objectives. The
respondents believed that many of our sub objectives were suggesting the same idea and
could be actually condensed into one category that conveys the main theme. For example,
table 5.24 shows the case of the objective ―ensure regulatory compliance‖. We started with
14 sub objective in this case. Our respondents suggested that the first 4 sub objectives
suggested the same concept, that of encouraging controls development for compliance. So
having 4 sub objectives signifying the same thing added redundancy to the objective. In
essence all the 4 sub objectives were clubbed or merged to develop one single sub
objective ―Encourage development of controls for regulatory compliance‖.
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Similarly the last four sub objectives in the middle column pointed towards the same
theme of using compliance as means to make security governance better. Hence all the
four sub objectives were condensed to form a single sub objective ―Ensure compliance is
used as a ‗catalyst‘ for security governance‖. In the same way, we discussed each of the
objectives and sub objectives with members at CCIT and condensed the sub objectives for
a more parsimonious set of sub objectives. We condensed the initial 245 sub objectives to
88 sub objectives. In one case, we had to change the label of our objective. We initial had
an objective labeled ―Encourage proactive controls initiatives‖ (see table 5. 25)
Table 5.25 Changing label of objectives and condensing the sub objectives
Objective Name
Encourage
proactive controls
initiatives
Renamed as:
Maximize
resource
allocation for
controls

Sub objectives
Establish suitable environmental and physical
controls

Condensed sub objectives
Ensure enough resources for
controls

Ensure adequate resources allocation for
maintenance of controls
Discourage individuals from feeling restrained due to
resources
Provide resources for compliance

Enable appropriate
environmental and physical
controls

Encourage co-ordination between MIS and
accounting for controls
Establish controls proactively

Ensure cross functional group
agreement on controls

After analyzing the sub objectives, our respondents felt that the label did not necessarily
convey the underlying theme of the objective. So the objective was renamed as ―Maximize
resource allocation for controls‖ as suggested by the respondents. Again in this case, 6 sub
objectives were condensed into three. We believe that our data at CCIT helped us better
articulate our objectives and develop a parsimonious and coherent set of sub objectives.
5.5.2 Emergent Issues
Regulatory compliance issues
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First issue that emerged is about the organization‘s stand on regulatory compliance issue.
We talked to several people in the management and the signals were contradictory.
Explaining the benefits of regulatory compliance, the manager of internal audit division
said,
Regulations are very helpful. It gives you guidelines like there is a blueprint that
you are comparing with a real operation to see whether there is a match. If the
operation matches the blueprint, that is great. If not, where are the differences?
Why are those differences here to begin with? It is very important to have such
guidance
Some of the managers agreed that regulations are a big driver for the organization to revisit
its internal controls objectives. The regulations helped the organization to reorganize
things for the compliance purposes which was helpful as it is something to it should have
done anyways. Regulatory compliance efforts helped the organization to achieve the
resources that it should have gotten to make the controls better. Compliance helped the
organization in providing the much needed boost to improve its control efficiency. With
the top management supportive of the compliance efforts, the organization would be able
to utilize the opportunity to make lot of changes it wished for. On the other hand, the
manager, infrastructure services, when enquired about the regulations as drivers for
changes commented:
No it [regulations] does not drive anything, should it? Probably, I don‘t think it
does because there is no mechanism or there are no means to enforce them. I mean
when is the last time you heard that anybody got in trouble for violating HIPAA?
Never! Who is enforcing it?
This statement depicts the perception of some of the senior mangers in the organization
and also the overall informal attitude of the organization about compliance. Some of the
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members of the management felt that compliance is only reactive and take things
backwards. Any organization that takes its internal controls program backwards or starts its
controls development process looking at the regulations would never succeed in having
good security governance. People felt that compliance is the job best left to the auditors.
The employees have to participate at the minimum only providing what the auditors need
to let them off the hook. The prevalent sentiment in the organization about regulatory
compliance is what was shared with us by manger end user services, ―They [regulations]
are of no help to me but to them [government] it is the right thing to do‖. Most of the
organization did not see any value for the organization in the compliance efforts. But what
is the actual state of affairs in this regard for the organization; compliant it is and lots of
resources are devoted by the organization in being so.
Internal auditing issues
The second issue that emerged is about the state of internal auditing in the organization.
Almost all of the respondents felt that auditing is something very crucial to establish the
importance of security governance objectives. The CIO believes that auditing adds to the
deterrence efforts and creates a consciousness about the controls. The senior manager
added that:
Auditing is no different to that [as a mechanism to inventory in the military]. They
[auditors] come in and they check and look at best practices. We add time to this so
that we can follow up on it, so that we are compliant to the direction that we agreed
to move on it. They [auditors] need to follow up again based on dates that we
customers told them to check if we would meet their recommendations.

The management feels that there are several benefits of performing regular audits within
the organization. The auditors, who have industry experience, are in a good position to
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assess the performance of the management on security governance issues and provide an
independent their party perspective about the state of affairs. The independent assessment
assures other stakeholders such as regulators and investors and helps in building the
organization‘s goodwill. Also, the auditors provide a benchmark assessment about the
controls and provide a direction for the future governance initiatives. The manager,
security, seemed really optimistic about the auditing of the organization and commented:
I think that if I took over, if I became the CIO, I would be looking at every one of
my teams and I would tell them to ―prepare yourself‖ for an audit. I would
bring an auditor here and each one of my teams will get audited. That would give
me a base line, for me as a new boss to work on. I can only improve, if it got any
worse, my job should be gone that‘s what I would do. Economy improves if the
government works well.
Considering the fervor and the emotion attached to auditing by the management, it
appeared that the organization was frequently audited and took the feedback from the
auditors to improve the security governance process. On the contrary, there are very few
audits in the organization and the perception about auditing is not very favorable in the
employees. Commenting about the frequency of the internal auditing, manager () shared;
We have had so far 3 audits. One desktop support, one licensing and helpdesk and I
think one was administration. I believe that is all it is. I have been here 9 years.
It‘s [auditing] not frequent. We are pretty much organized and we are not too bad
to get it.

Through our observations and informal conversations to the employees and managers, the
reason for this apparent contradiction was, to some degrees, clear. It seems that at a typical
state agency, auditing, over the years, has been used as a tool to punish agencies that create
trouble for the top management. Thus, if a particular department is not following the orders
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or doing things in a manner which is not appreciated by the bosses higher up, that
department or agency is subjected to an immediate audit. This way the trouble making
department is answerable to the bosses ‗higher up‘ for the findings by the audit team. Now,
this might not be the case at CCIT. It is possible though that the bosses higher up are happy
with CCIT and hence a lack of audit. Whatever the reason might be, it is apparent that
perception about auditing in the organization is not a constructive one.
Segregation of duties issues
The third issue that emerged from our data alludes to the organization‘s position on
segregation of duties. The interview data suggests that, for the most part, management
feels that segregation of duties as a control is very important for the organization. As
shared by the manager, infrastructure services:
How do you deal with this [internal fraud or security breaches]? Design proper
controls. Ensure responsibility and accountability, have multiple layers of controls,
segregate duties, have auditing. Segregation of work is important, make sure
people in a group just keep doing what they are doing and never cross the line.
They should not know about how others do their work.

The security team felt that segregation of roles is a very important control for security
governance. It is as important as designing correct access controls and authorization
mechanism for the systems because an inadequate segregation of role would provide
unauthorized access to people who have no reason to get access to certain things. For
example, the developer who writes the code for the application that is used for the meter
reading purposes in the City, should not have administrative access to the system. There
are chances that if he can misuse the administrative access and get into the production
environment and make changes which no one can notice or know. An inappropriate
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segregation can be devastating to the integrity of the business processes. The management
at CCIT understands this and claims to follow this practice of segregating the roles to the
core. As shared by manager administration;
You have to have internal controls to have separate roles for people so that you
know employees are never put in a position that looks like compromising. If you
are writing the checks, you are never going to be the one balancing the budget
and showing in the checks or something like that. If you are writing the checks,
there is someone else to find what you are doing, who tells u how to write the
checks, so that if you are absent my business continues to move. In my
administration staff, I have done all of it.

But we did get evidence to believe that segregation of the roles are not done all the times.
There have been instances where people have had inadequate accesses in the name of cross
training in the organization. The manager of administration seemed to understand and
know this but was unapologetic nonetheless. Sometimes, in name of cross training, the
staff at helpdesk performs the job of assessing the adequacy of their own work. There is a
helpdesk team (say primary) that takes request from the city users and there is a team (say
secondary) that supports their functions as back up. There is another team (say
surveillance) that performs frequent and random checks on the work requests to ensure that
all work orders are being addressed adequately. There have been times when the person
doing the primary work of support checks his own work the next day in the surveillance
team. The manger justifies this in name of cross training. She shares;
Cross training is your safest bet. You can‘t have one person with all the
institutional knowledge, you will die. You have the take the risk, it‘s worth it.
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This situation can create a major vulnerability for the organization where the primary team
members do a fraud and approve the fraud next day from the surveillance team. Many of
such issues are overlooked by the management in name of resource crunch and
understaffing. It appears that there could be a potential fraud lying somewhere in this
organization which in matter of time would be detected. Since nothing has gone wrong so
far and all the employees are old and trusted by the manager does not guarantee that things
would remain as they are in the future.
In summary, the contradictions proposed in this section remain unresolved. We have
suggested, based on our understanding of the organization and its culture, some line of
reasoning to make some sense of the anomalies. Currently, a theoretical analysis to explain
the anomalies observed at CCIT is beyond this scope of this research. However resolving
these anomalies call for a fresh investigation into the matter with new set of research
objectives and scope. We intend to work along those lines in the future.
To summarize, the case study at CCIT allows us to empirically reexamine the objectives
proposed in phase one of the study. This research, for the first time in information security
governance research, proposed theoretically and empirically developed security
governance objectives and then validated the objectives through case study data. Some
issues emerged from the data which have been documented. The issues explained in this
section remain unresolved. We have suggested, based on our understanding of the
organization and its culture, some line of reasoning to make some sense of the problems.
Currently, a theoretical analysis to explain the reasons for the issues observed at CCIT is
beyond this scope of this research.
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5.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the case study at CCIT provided interesting insights into security
governance objectives and practices in a real organization. The management in the
organization is dedicated to the cause of developing robust security governance practices
and thinks proactively about all the aspects of a good controls program. All the objectives
developed in the phase one of this study are reexamined in this case study. Most of the
objectives are being used in this organization and the remaining the objectives are
appreciated by the management and are being considered for their security governance
program. We have presented a list of measures that CCIT takes to achieve the proposed
objectives and the evidences from the case study in support of the objectives. This chapter
presents a list of 6 fundamental and 17 means objectives for maximizing information
systems security governance in organizations. These proposed objectives are based on
theory, grounded in the values of organizational stakeholders and empirically examined
through a case study. The next chapter presents a synthesis of the entire research and
answers the ―so what‖ question about this research, both phase one and two.
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CHAPTER 6 Interpreting ISG Objectives: A synthesis

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the all-important learning for successful development of ISG
objectives in an organization, which has emerged from both the phases of our study,
Interpreting the meanings and implications of the developed objectives, the principles for
good ISG are proposed. The emergent principles are the basic propositions for achieving
adequate ISG in organizations. The goal of the chapter is to synthesize our findings and
establish its significance by articulating the new insights from the study. In order to
articulate the findings, two questions would be answered. First, how can organizations
achieve adequate ISG? Second, what are the contributions of this research which go
beyond current thinking? The entire chapter aims at answering these questions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Following the introduction, the second
section presents the principles of ISG which are proposed and establishes their
significance. A means-end framework for maximizing ISG is presented. In section three,
the developed objectives are positioned in context with other leading governance
objectives in literature. A discussion is then generated about the relevance of the objectives
in the light of other established ISG objectives. Finally, a concluding section is presented
with implications of the research.
6.2 ISG principles for organizations
The objectives developed in this research help in increasing the importance of information
security governance in organizations. A critical analysis of the data from the study
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suggests interrelationships between the objectives and emergent ISG principles. By
definition, fundamental objectives help directly in achieving the strategic objectives of the
decision context and means objectives lead to the fundamental objectives. Organizations
can maximize ISG by achieving the six fundamental objectives. In this section, we present
a discussion about how organizations can achieve the fundamental objectives and the
principles of ISG. Based on the relationships, a means-end framework is presented.
6.2.1 Defining a Corporate Controls Strategy
Security presents several governance challenges, which require new policies, technologies
and organizational capabilities (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Karyda et al., 2005). These
challenges could be in the form of: new unwanted costs for protection of assets, the
diversion of resources for controls purposes creating new vulnerabilities; temporary nature
of solutions. A controls strategy helps in planning and coordinating in advance to meet
these challenges. The strategy for security governance defines the business context in
which information security will be managed and prioritizes the resources allocation for the
objectives. The real benefits from the information would not be achieved if the information
systems and technologies are applied in an unfocussed and piecemeal way (Doherty and
Fulford, 2006). The process of formulating an information systems plan helps to explicitly
focus the planners‘ attention on available opportunities for exploiting information (Ward
and Peppard, 2002).
There is evidence in research literature pertaining to information security governance
which corroborates the relationship between strategy, leadership and management
commitment. For instance, Lane (1985) suggests the integration of security into overall
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enterprise strategy. Security governance would get its due in an organization only as an
enterprise strategy issue. Shupe and Bheling (2006) argue that successful deployment of
any IT plan requires management commitment, a structured decision making process and a
strategy based on an understanding of the vision and architecture of the organization. The
awareness for the need for control strategy is increasing (Shedden et al, 2006). Effective
control strategies require efficient risks management processes. Management needs to be
committed to implementing an effective risk assessment procedure where vulnerabilities
and threats are identified. These can then guide the implementation and monitoring of
control strategies and measures (Whitman and Mattord, 2005). Therefore, a structured
methodology for developing a strategy will increase the likelihood of success of the
corporate initiatives (Shupe and Behling, 2006). Any strategy would fail without consistent
support of the management (Wright, 2007). Regular meetings and briefings with the top
management keeps the focus on the ongoing nature of security governance for the
management and establishes the importance of the controls. This leads to our first principle
of information security governance:
P1: Security governance activities shall be planned, coordinated and executed by
developing a strategy for controls by the leadership to encourage management
commitment for allocating resources.
Security controls planning and resource allocation needs strategic attention. The problem
with the existing security guidelines, prescriptions and best practices is that all of these
take an operational view of risks. Research literature suggests forward planning for
likelihood of attacks and argues that plans, programs and actions that reduce the frequency
and seriousness of incidents, reduce risks. More often, organizations take a standard
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approach, based on best practices, to controls formulation and deployment. Standard
frameworks assume that controls are applied universally, have no strategic influence and
are not context dependent.
The strategic management of security controls focuses on the competing demands for
enterprise resources and their opportunity costs, and seeks to identify security benefits that
justify related costs (Anderson and Choobineh, 2008). At the strategic level of an
organization, the benefits of information security (considerable reduction in damages and
losses), must be balanced against security costs (Sklovos and Souros, 2006). Expenditures
for security that exceed this balance may further reduce expected losses, but may be
excessive given their opportunity costs (Gordon and Loeb, 2006). The role of leadership
and management commitment is crucial in achieving the controls strategy. Also, resource
allocation for security governance is a part of the strategy and can not be optimized
without the management‘s total commitment to the governance program.
Our data suggests that visible executive leadership influences the management to become
more committed towards the security governance initiatives. If the leader is committed to
governance program, he ―draws in‖ the management and ensures that management
provides all the right inputs for controls. For instance, the CIO at CCIT is really committed
to the security controls initiatives and it is due to his dedication that the security
governance program is effective. As shared by the security manager:
He [CIO] is supportive of our actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues,
the other directors, who need to approve it but have no clue about it. But we
depend on the CIO to get the things done. He helps in getting them [other directors
in the city council] on board.
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Management commitment is also required for maximizing resources for allocation of
controls. The management has to be committed to security governance initiatives for the
controls to work as intended. Controls require resources in the form of finance, people and
technology. Resources are imperative to be able to develop a dynamic control structure. As
we found at CCIT, managers at CCIT rely on their bosses to provide such resources. As
explained by the security manager;
I would recommend going to the top and finding out what the management really
wants and then working with those supervisors to find out what it takes to serve
that operation everyday. Make things available. You have to have the top on
board with the work. Find out what you can do with these resources.
Involving the management in day-to-day activities is the first step in getting their attention
and eventually the resources. At CCIT, employees keep the management in the loop about
all initiatives and discussions about controls. For example, when the organization needed
new resources in reference to the security policies development, the security manager
presented all the available resources to his boss. This way the money was made available
for the subscription to some firm‘s website. Research literature also suggests a relationship
between management commitment and resources allocated for any initiative. It is
managements‘ responsibility to articulate security risks in a way that resources are not
compromised (Wright, 2007). Managers influence the top management about priorities for
security governance that includes the induction of adequate skilled and knowledgeable
personnel or security specialists. Shupe and Behling (2006) suggest appointing a team to
conduct strategic planning for resources to carry forward the control program. Leadership
should understand the tradeoffs between high security, usability and cost (Savola, 2007).
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These tradeoffs are strategic decisions and should be taken in the planning stage of the
security governance program. It is important to involve the managers as well the users in
strategic planning about resources. The success of the decisions depend on the operational
level management (Savola, 2007).
6.2.2 Developing regulatory compliance within organizations
Regulatory compliance is a crucial aspect of an enterprise security governance program.
Emergent from our study, and supported by the research literature, there is a tangible
relationship between audit efficacy, business process clarity, deterrence practices and
regulatory compliance preparedness. Measuring the compliance preparedness and
enforcement has become pivotal to good Information Security Governance in general (von
Solms, 2005). In preparing for regulatory compliance, an in depth knowledge of business
processes is required. Leading regulations describe specific requirements for various IT
related business processes which require comprehensive documentation to demonstrate
how personnel decisions implement standards and regulations. Clear business processes
help the auditing function fish for anomalies in the systems. Frequent audits can help
organization maintain the clarity in processes and also the fear of non compliance. This
helps in increasing the probability of being caught in case of deviant behavior.
Management needs to evaluate compliance with the regulations to estimate effectiveness
and possible shortcomings (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). Auditing can help to determine
areas for improvement (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). Given the regulatory environment in
IS domain, the importance of security audit functionality is exponentially increasing. An
audit process is a strong tool to contrast the policies versus practices of an organization.
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Based on the discourse above, our second principle of information security governance is
proposed:
P2: Business process clarity should be encouraged through efficient audit processes and
punitive structures to achieve compliance.
Auditing deters the creation of anomalies in organizations. By virtue of the fact that they
are watched, employees tend to behave in accordance with rules. As suggested by the CIO
at CCIT:
They [auditors] make people honest. If you know someone is watching and will
look at what you are doing, you know it makes a difference. Even if you don‘t
look, 90% of the time just the threat that you are going to be looked at, and you
don‘t know when, makes a big difference on compliance. I would like to put this
down to human nature.
The clarity of business processes improves efficacy of audit practices in the organization. It
is crucial to understand the work flow in an organization such that the controls can be
integrated into the business processes in a manner integral to the functionality of the
system. Auditors require well understood and established business processes to examine
the flow and suggest ways to enhance the integrity of the process. Management should
ensure that there are established acceptance criteria for the performance of systems which
helps the auditors to check the actual performance of the systems versus the expectations
from the system. An assessment of actual versus expected performance of the system helps
in testing the accuracy of the data that is provided to the customers in the organization.
The verification of the anomalies in the business process requires external intervention in
the form of auditing. Auditors can be efficient only if they are able to understand the
intricacies of the process and can then suggest how integrity can be restored in the system.
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Security governance requires an end to end view of the operations in an organization which
can be achieve through clarity in business process. Savola et al. (2007) argue that
understanding the dynamics of business processes is crucial for governance purposes. The
linkages of security with business process helps in creating knowledge horizontally and
vertically in organizations. The vulnerabilities in business processes can lead to breakdown
of compromise of the systems, intentionally or otherwise. In such cases, preventive
security mechanisms and active deterrence measures protects the organization. Darcy and
Hovav (2007) argue that combined proactive and preventive approach to security deters
users from IS misuse. Frequent audits are one of these preventive tools. Auditing helps in
achieving good security governance providing traceability of user action and a chain of
evidence that can be reconstructed to actually understand when and how the system broke
down (Swanson, 1996). Audit controls track the operations on file and in-built audit trail
capabilities in the software. This helps in accessing logs for pattern of usage. One of the
most important usage of audits is to help the organization in meeting regulatory
compliance (Goel et al, 2006). Security countermeasures include deterrent administrative
procedures (such as frequent audit) and preventive security software, lead to lower
computer abuse (Straub, 1990).
This study also shows that regulatory compliance requires standardization of the controls
such that the stakeholders of the organization are able to trust the management with critical
information. Clarity of controls development is a must for actually standardizing controls
and establishing trust within and outside the organization. Regulations are basically
intended to protect the interest of external stakeholders, such as the investors and the
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business partners. Standardization of the controls is one of the best strategies to proactively
establish respect for the organizations security program (May 2005). Loss of trust and
confidence which results from an organization‘s inability to meet the expectations of users
and to protect their identity and privacy would compromise business objectives. This leads
to our third principle of ISG:
P3: Standardization and clarity in controls should be developed to enhance trust within
and outside the organizations and to achieve regulatory compliance.

Regulatory compliance helps organizations do things in a manner that is consistent,
transparent and open for review. Clarity in controls development process assures an
expected pattern of behavior which leads to enhancing intra-organizational trust for
security measures (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Trust is an indicator of a series of direct
relationship with people and not with a series of organizational entities or polices
(Fleming, 2007). If there is lack of trust in the organization, regulatory compliance would
be compromised and would be not entirely in the spirit of the legislation.
Standardization of controls helps in trust building both within and outside the organization.
The standardized control and established procedure for security governance facilitates the
communication process within the organization and outside it, with other agencies. The
management should encourage standard protocols for controls development as it makes it
easier to find the deviations in the systems and help in covering any vulnerabilities. As
shared by an internal auditor from energy industry:
An organization should regularly compare and analyse its security state,
investments, and actions in relation to others in its market sector and community of
practice.
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Standardized controls help in ensuring that expectations on the stakeholders‘ part are being
met. In case of non compliance with agreed procedures, the standardized controls structure
also communicates the need to be compliant and consequences of non compliance.
Research literature suggests that one of the main purposes of having standards is to ensure
effective trust with stakeholders.
Clarity in control development process leads to trust building mechanisms as well. Clarity
and transparency in control development process helps end users in understanding the need
for the controls for security governance and their individual roles in fulfilling the need. At
CCIT, through clear controls development, the management conveys that it wants to
protect the employees from committing avoidable errors through sheer ignorance. The
management also provides support in clarifying the doubts of the end users about the
controls. As shared by the security manager,
If you don‘t understand anything, then HR may be the one place you go. I [an
employee] don‘t understand what it means, I ask this upfront. Having to own the
policies, it [the management] should be responsible for the procedure, be
responsible for answering those questions. Clarifying the concepts helps people to
believe in the governance program in the management.
The practice of supporting employees‘ efforts to understand controls establishes an
environment of trust in the organization. Top management should ensure that there is a
formalized route available when employees have doubts about controls and they should be
able to get the confusion cleared. This also assures the employees that the management
wants to protect them from causing unintentional harm and getting into trouble, and that it
is actually protecting the employees. Also clarity in controls helps other business partners
to identify with the controls and trust the management to take due care of the critical data.
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6.2.3 Defining continuous improvements for controls
In this research, continuous improvement of controls has emerged as a key requirement for
adequate ISG efforts. One of the important aspects of information security governance is
testing and validating controls against business requirements. Business needs are dynamic
and change with time and so should the controls which are designed to protect this
information and processes. A change in the business needs should be reflected in the
corresponding controls. This can be achieved by regular monitoring and feedback on the
controls, by providing adequate training and education to the users and by communicating
the changes clearly inside the organization. The monitoring and review of controls post
implementation is a critical phase for success of the overall controls program (Shedden et
al, 2006). End users should be able to understand the changes in controls so as to be able to
use the systems properly. This can be achieved through developing open communication
policies where discourse about controls is encouraged. The employees should be willing to
comply with the use of the controls. A monitoring technique can be effective only if the
employees understand and are willing to use the controls and provide feedback (Booker
and Kitchesn, 2006). This willingness can be increased through training about controls and
communicating the uses and needs for the controls. Straub and Welke (1998) suggest
feedback leads to develop better communication channels through departmental meetings
and informal chatting. The results in this study suggest a healthy relationship between
frequent communications, regular monitoring and feedback and training and education
with continuous improvement in controls. This leads to our fourth principle of ISG:
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P4: Frequent communication should be encouraged through regular monitoring and
extensive training for iterative development of controls
Monitoring and feedback channels in the organization add to the effectiveness of
communications about controls. Management needs to constantly revisit the controls based
on the feedback from the employees. The feedback needs to be communicated in a way
that it is actually incorporated in the next iteration. The security officer at CCIT articulated
this best when he said:
We need to constantly monitor and develop an evolving environment which is
changing continuously. I mean this can be done through talking to people, by
communicating properly and then actually going and constantly modifying it based
on what they say.
Training and education improves communications about controls. Training, specifically
about controls, emphasizes using knowledge about the relevance of controls in daily
practice. The end users should be adequately trained and educated about usage of controls.
The knowledge thus imparted leads to more enquires and frequent communications about
the controls. As the security director said:
Make things very clear to the employees, these are our policies, these are our
procedures and controls and these are our expectations. It is essential to
communicate this. Education and communication are absolutely vital.
Training in security controls create effective communication channels and facilitate open
discussions and debates of important issues about controls. Regular training helps in
surfacing the lack of knowledge about the security and control issues and effective
communications help in resolving those issues.
This study also suggests a relationship with resource allocation, clarity in control
development and formal controls assessment functionality in achieving continuous
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improvements in controls. Resources are required to institute changes in the governance
structure. The acceptance of the changed and improved controls would be enhanced when
the process of control development is open and transparent. This clarity in controls
development process facilitates quicker adoption of the changes being introduced in the
governance program. Instituting controls assessment functionality ensures that all the
control initiatives are centralized and adequate budgetary allocations are appropriated for
security governance purposes. One of the major drawbacks for controls program has been
the lack of resources. The centralized functionality ensures a cost benefit estimate of the
controls for long term benefits. This leads to our fifth principle of ISG:
P5: Controls development shall be clear, transparent and easily understandable to the
organizational members’ and adequate resources need to be allocated to institute formal
controls assessment functionality.
At the strategic level of an organization- the benefits of information security (reduced
damages and losses) must be balanced against security costs. The strategic management of
security focuses on the competing demands for enterprise resources and their opportunity
costs, and seeks to identify security benefits that justify related costs (Anderson and
Choobineh, 2008).
Resource allocation for controls is required for developing formal controls assessment
functionality in an organization. Resources for controls are always an issue as controls
assessment is not a separate functionality and no department owns up this cost. As
explained by the security manager CCIT:
The biggest problem is that controls have limited resources. We want to do so
many things but can‘t do it. Like it [controls] needs to be constantly modified and
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monitored but that [modification and monitoring] needs investment. Do we have
separate money for this as a department? No-we are always facing a cash crunch.
Adequate controls always require good resources to protect business integrity. However
good the security governance plan is, if there are no resources to support that plan, not
much can be done. As explained by the security manager in a healthcare industry:
Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How do you balance cost of the
control versus the risk? Risk is great; and cost of control may be worth it. How do
you balance cost of the risk to the control?
Resources would be available if there is separate controls assessment functionality with
individual controls budgets. Developing control assessment functionality is a new concept
introduced by this research and currently does not have any support from research
literature.
Clarity in controls development also helps the cause of creating formal control assessment
functionality. Our data suggests that if there is clarity in how controls are being defined, it
would be easier to have a formal controls assessment entity that could validate the
requirement of the controls and provide adequate support for it. As explained by a senior
manager, software development, in financial services industry:
Clearly define the requirements and then you get everybody who is involved to
agree on those [requirements] and then from there, you build out your processes.
You need to formally integrate the requirements into the controls and do periodic
assessment of these [controls].
Lack of clarity in controls can lead to vulnerabilities endangering systems. Formal controls
assessment functionality looks into the possible vulnerabilities and seeks solutions to deal
with the threats. As explained by a manager, purchase department, electronics industry:
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If you suspect what is generated is not right, then you should investigate instead of
giving a blanket approval to all transactions. This is where assessment of controls is
required, does it work?
There exists a pressing need for developing a formal control assessment functionality
which can centrally manage the information security governance activities.
6.2.4 Establishing a controls conscious culture in organizations
Control conscious culture is achieved when the implicit knowledge about the security
controls starts guiding the day-to-day activities of the employees in the organization. This
entails that controls have to become the part of the corporate culture (Thomson and von
Solms, 2008). Controls have been internalized by the employees and have been accepted at
an informal level of management as well. This state of security governance can be
achieved if the individuals are able to align their values about controls with those of the
organization. The controls culture is crucial for security governance as it can act as a
powerful, underlying set of forces which establishes individual and group behavior within
an organization (Schein, 1999). Encouraging group cohesiveness helps in propagating the
right values for security controls. Our study suggests that controls conscious culture is
facilitated by strong communications, cohesive groups and alignment of individual and
organizational values about controls. This leads to our sixth principle of ISG.
P6: Controls consciousness shall be developed through regular communications and
forming cohesive groups which leads to alignment of individual and organizational values.
Management should espouse similar values to those it practices in order to help employees
identify with the organizational values about controls. If the beliefs and attitudes of the
employees are addressed by the management, it leads to changed actions and behaviors of
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the employees and synchronizes with the overall corporate security culture in the
organization (Thomson and von Solms, 2008). If there is alack of alignment several
problems occur such as miscommunications and lack of cooperation from employees
(Sathe, 1993). Hence communication channels should be established and debating the
controls in the open should be encouraged. Normative controls would always be required
to hold together the security governance initiatives and these controls comprise values,
belief systems and culture for the individuals (Dhillon, 2001). Communication activities
with the stakeholders are critical for controls (AS/NZS 4360, 1999; Bandyopadhyay et al,
1999). Fuller et al (2007) suggest that there exists a positive relationship between
interactivity and knowledge retention about information assurance in an organization. The
interactivity is best facilitated by open communication. Establishing controls culture
requires enhancing group cohesiveness in the security teams. This allows a coherent
interaction channel with the management. A team approach to information security is
absolutely necessary if an adequate level of information security is going to be achieved
(Wood, 2006).
Establishing open communication polices about controls helps in individual and
organizational alignment of values and maximizes group cohesiveness. Effective
communication practices help in explaining management values and ideology in a way
such that users can identify with the organizational values for controls. To ensure an
alignment of end user values and organizational

values, it is critical to communicate

about the policies, procedures, controls, strategies and controls. As explained by a security
manager at CCIT:
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Communication is important but the hard part is to ensure that users continue to
listen to you. Something that is going to bring the users on board ought to be
helpful so that the users can find it appealing. Something they can identify with, so
yet again their values come in play.
Communicating about controls develops clarity about their intent and scope. This clarity is
required for individuals to understand what is expected from them and whether it is
something that they can or want to do. At CCIT, the controls were made appealing to the
end users by communicating something which makes their work and life easier; it‘s about
them and not the bosses. Communication plays can important role in bridging the gap
between individual and organizational values about controls.
Communications also influences the group cohesiveness in the functional groups.
Managers should encourage frequent communications with their groups as it makes the
group ‗tight‘. At CCIT, inter group communications about controls and security related
responsibilities make the groups more cohesive and the managers strive to protect their
group members against all odds. Cohesive groups influence the behavior of the individuals
in the group and there are chances that individuals will better align their values with those
of the organization in the realm of security governance if the groups‘ values are aligned. It
is evident at CCIT that the individual adopts the groups‘ values about security governance
as their own. Their perception about security controls is almost the same as their groups‘
perception about security governance. The management should understand these needs of
the individuals and always ―sell controls‖ to the end users as something to protect the users
from harm due to ignorance.
6.2.5 Establishing clarity in policies and procedures in organizations
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Higgins (1999) argues that the information security ‗policy is the start of security
management‘. The strategic information systems plan is a critical prerequisite for policy
formulation (Doherty and Fulford, 2006). Information security policy is the basis for the
dissemination and enforcement of sound security practices, within the organizational
context (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002; Doherty and Fulford, 2005). David (2002) argues
that formal policy is a prerequisite of security. Similarly, Lindup (1995) asserts that
security policies are the foundations of information security management. Establishing
data criticality requires clarity in policies and procedures. Efficient audit process and
clarity in controls development help in achieving data criticality. An audit process is a
strong tool to contrast the policies versus practices of an organization. Our results suggest
that clarity in policies and procedures can be achieved through data criticality, frequent
audits and clear controls development process. This leads to our seventh principle of ISG:
P7: Data criticality shall be established by ensuring frequent audits and a transparent
controls development process to enhance clarity in polices and procedures.
Audit provides traceability of user action and chain of evidence that can be reconstructed
to actually understand when and how the system broke down. Real time auditing can also
help in detecting other problems in the system other than break downs, thus ensuring the
data integrity, confidentiality and availability. Controls, where possible, should be
transparent or viewed as positive contributions to job performance. Complex controls that
increase constraints on people should be minimized (Parker, 1996). Clarity in controls
development process and incorporating controls in systems development would lead to
better technical controls and thus enhance data criticality (Dhillon, 2001). Separation of
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duties between developers, testers and administrators in operational facilities reduce risks
of unauthorized actions (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). This separation is ensured by audit
functionality. Thus frequent audit provides users with confidence in the integrity of data.
The end result is trust in the IT infrastructure which is really valuable in today‘s business
world (Tickle, 2006).
Audit efficacy leads to ensuring data criticality. It is essential that these controls and access
are constantly revalidated and checked from an independent perspective. This is where the
important role of auditors comes into play. Segregation of duties, right access and adequate
authorization mechanisms are required for data criticality. Auditors ensure that these
mechanisms are sound and work for the organization. As the internal auditor at CCIT
suggests:
Is it possible for developer to go into production data base and goes to his or her
own household and reduce consumption by 50% every month? If that‘s possible
and then you get audit break down, you have a controls breakdown. So whenever
you have people that have unwarranted access such as developer has access to
production, we [auditors] need to come in.
The efficacy of audit practices depends on how well the auditors are able to protect the
data in the system. Auditing ensures that during changes in roles, access to information is
changed as well. Auditors bring in a lot of experience and knowledge about best practices,
suggest changes which are important and follow up on the implementation of those
changes. Clarity in controls development process also helps in establishing data criticality
in an organization. To maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data, it
essential to develop clear controls for access, authorization, classification and segregation
of duties in data usage. Also, change management controls are crucial in ensuring
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criticality, which can be a potential source of threat to an organization. At CCIT, the
management makes sure that people follow the controls or else they would be kicked off
from the systems. This requires that everyone be clear about the controls and the business
process, which help in establishing data criticality.
6.2.6 Establishing responsibility and accountability structures in organizations
It is important that organizational members own up the responsibility of their actions and
are accountable for their decision for the success of any security governance program.
Responsibility and accountability in structures requires visible leadership that motivates
people to be responsible in their jobs and take the blame for their actions. Leadership can
set an exemplary ethical and moral environment which allows the members to trust the
management about its intentions. Increased awareness and individual accountability can
greatly affect how security practices are implemented in an organization (Mellor and
Noyes, 2006). This study suggests that responsibility and accountability structures is
established in an organization with the help of leadership guidance, ethical and moral tone,
punitive structure and trust building measures. The research literature supports this
relationship. This leads to our eighth ISG principle:
P8:Trust building measures shall be appropriated through executive leadership and
punitive structures to establish the right ethical tone for the organization for the assigning
of responsibility and accountability in its structures.
Corporate boards, that undertake the challenge of IT oversight, show that they understand
the scope of their corporate accountability and responsibility, and are proactive in their
leadership duties (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). To establish trust and ethical conduct,
leadership should be able to ―walk the talk‖ and espouse controls that are important and
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then follow these personally (Drennan, 1992). It is the part of executive duty to set an
exemplary ethical and moral conduct for the employees to follow (Thompson and von
Solms, 2008). Senior managers can communicate policies and codes of ethics to guide
employees (Krull, 1996). It is the responsibility of management to serve as a role model for
the behavior it wishes to promote (Krull, 1996).
Information Systems professionals generally demonstrate a solid understanding of
information security ethics as they apply to organizational goals (Pearson et al. 1997).
Normative controls aimed at guiding the ethics and morality in the organization are
important. The security technology design often neglects the moral or ethical element of
the governance process which is one of the most important aspects of security management
(Gupta and Sharman, 2008). Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) suggest that instilling value
based work ethics would help in ensuring an ethical environment which will lead to
employees abstaining from unacceptable behavior and a secure organization. Mutual trust
between employees and management is important to ensure that responsibilities are
internalized by the employees. Lack of trust in policies and procedures can make the
employees alter systems and simply not comply with controls such as not sharing
passwords or taking confidential data out of the office on laptops (Booker and kitchens,
2008). Punitive structure also helps in acceptance of ethical codes in the organization. For
maximizing deviant behavior, it is best to reinforce positive beliefs and attitudes. In other
words first clarify what behavior is acceptable through clearly establishing the ethics and
morality valued in the organization.
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Ensuring ethical and moral values helps in establishing the punitive structures in an
organization. The ethical environment in the organization creates normative pressure on
the people to do the right thing and not break the law. Personal values and morality shapes
an individual‘s tendency to conform to the laws and rules. As explained by the manager
infrastructure manger at CCIT:
So we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in
reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do
the best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. If my personal values
allow, then only will I follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t
legislate that, you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that.
Visible executive leadership helps in propagating ethical and moral values in
organizations. Executives in visible leadership positions should lead by example. This is
exactly what the administration manager at CCIT does. Leadership also leads to trust
building mechanisms in an organization. The executive leaders, who build the controls,
need to be trusted by the employees who actually use the controls. As security manager
CCIT explained:
It‘s very complex [developing controls]. Reach out to HR, legal people; get all
resources to learn from them. Draft things that can actually work for everyone. You
need to take all stakeholders in confidence, win their trust, and ensure that you are
working for them [individuals] not against them. It is what they need.
Leaders have to win the confidence and trust of the stakeholders to successfully implement
the security program. Thus we postulate that visible leadership leads to trust building in the
organization. Research literature in this area supports this claim.
Our study suggests that establishing punitive structures helps in trust building mechanisms
in an organization. Clear punitive structures in an organization establish the fear of
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consequences of non compliance with the rules. This environment leads to the formation of
more trusting relationships between employees and the management. The employees need
to clearly know what‘s acceptable and that it‘s their personal responsibility to make sure
things do not deviate from normal behavior. It provides a fallback plan for the employees
where they know they can trust the management to be fair and just, in cases of beaches
which are not their fault.
Management should ensure that all the policies and procedures are easily accessible to
employees leading to clear deterrence criteria. Having established the boundaries for the
employees, management facilitates an environment of trust by relying on the individuals‘
sense of responsibility to do the right thing every time. It is important to establish the
framework within which individuals can be flexible with work responsibilities. There are
equipments lying around at CCIT without any extra precaution or surveillance to protect
them from theft but nothing has gone missing ever. This is because people trust each other
and know what happens if they get caught. Deterrence leads to trust not only within the
organization but also for the outside stakeholders such as investors, regulators, partners,
possible clients and employees.
In summary, based on data from phase 1 and phase 2 of this study, we developed a meansend framework (Figure 6.1) for maximizing information security governance objectives in
organizations. The paths in the diagram show a directional preference. The relationships
are postulated based on our understanding of the data, observations at CCIT and the extant
research literature in information systems security governance area.

259

Figure 6.1 Means-end framework for maximizing information security governance

The framework contains six fundamental objectives integral to maximizing information
security governance in an organization. There are seventeen means objectives that add to
these fundamental objectives and play a subsidiary role in attainment of the final strategic
objective of maximizing information security governance. A detailed discussion on the
implications of the fundamental objectives and ways to achieve these objectives is
presented earlier.
6.3 Discussions
The key to setting the right controls is defining the correct control objectives. In order to
know if a control is effective or not, the first questions that the management should pose is,
―Do we have the right objectives?‖ (Galloway, 1994) Considering the importance of
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having the right objectives, this research suggests a set of control objectives that have not
been articulated, emphasized or used in information security research. All the objectives
developed in this research are rooted in the research literature for information systems
security, information systems security governance and related disciplines such as strategy,
management, psychology and sociology. The cross functional nature of security
governance needs to justify the inputs from other disciplines. While most of our objectives
have been acknowledged in the extant literature, some of them have not been emphasized
enough. Objectives such as ―establish control strategy‖, ―establish deterrence criteria‖,
―establish clear control development process‖, ―establish formal control assessment
functionality‖, ―ensure efficacy of audit processes‖ and ―enhance group cohesiveness‖ call
for special attention. Our analysis suggests a crucial role of the above objectives in
information systems security governance. Neither the commonly used security
management standards nor the available security governance models highlight any of these
above objectives. These objectives seem like anomalies in the commonly used governance
frameworks. A search for the word anomaly in dicitonary.com shows ―a deviation from the
common rule, type, arrangement, or form‖. There is little support for the above objectives
in security governance area. Hence, we propose these objectives as ―theoretical anomalies‖
since the governance models have not mentioned these objectives. It should be noted
though that some of the sub objectives of the above mentioned governance objectives do
get mentioned in the research literature (see chapter 4 for discussion of above objectives).
But none of the available frameworks argues for the above objectives specifically. We feel
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these objectives are important on their own and need to be considered for comprehensive
governance programs. Each of these five objectives is briefly discussed below:
Issues and concerns with a corporate control strategy: Control strategy is required to
understand the security governance environment and how it fits with the overall
organization‘s business strategy. Organization‘s security requirements should be driven by
enterprise requirements and the solution should fit enterprise processes such that strategic
benefits are realized (Anderson, 2001). Control strategy helps in aligning security
investment with enterprise strategy and agreed upon risk profile. There should be an
alignment between the organization and its control environment. The alignment process
involves arranging internal structures and processes in a way that people can come up with
creative strategic alternatives and develop new competencies to meet the challenges of the
future (Jemison, 1981). We have seen that organizations are increasingly using
management control systems to enhance their strategy process (Simons, 1995) as controls
may be used as agents to secure strategy implementation (Marginson, 2002). Simons
(1994) posits that control systems are used by management to overcome organizational
inertia, communicate new strategic directions, establish implementation timetables and
ensure continuing attention to new strategic initiatives.
Realizing the importance of controls in the overall strategy of organizations, it seems
logical that developing controls strategy goes a long way in establishing effective security
governance. At least out data suggests that it will. But there has been no clear call in
information security research for establishing a control strategy or in practice.
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Issues with creating punitive structures: To enforce the controls effectively, it is indeed
important to establish two things upfront; what non conformity with controls could mean
and what are the consequences of non conformity? As observed by a respondent:
None of these control measures will work if key individuals and the
organizationlack the fortitude to enforce the rules and the remedial solutions
[internal audit director, federal agency].
In situations of strategic change, control systems are used by managers to formalize
beliefs, set boundaries on acceptable strategic behavior. Deterrence criteria shape the
perception of the workforce about ―what is expected‖ from it. Clearly establishing the
expectations of the organizational members reduces the pressure from the management in
explaining right from wrong. Establishing deterrence criteria should also include
defining and measuring critical performance variables and motivating discussion and
debate about strategic uncertainties that help organizations pass through changes (Simons,
1994). Research in security of information systems has acknowledged the importance of
establishing deterrence criteria for enhanced enterprise security. Dhillon and Torkzadeh
(2006) argue that deterrence is an important objective for maximizing security in
organization. Straub and Welke (1996) have used general deterrence theory for
establishing the need for deterrence activities in the organization. But there has been a lack
of effort in information systems security governance research to establish deterrence as an
important objective for governance. This research puts a stake in the ground and argues for
the establishment of deterrence criteria for effective security governance. This study
suggests that rewarding conformity and punishing non conformity with controls can
actually help the organizations in managing security. This is identified as a theoretical
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anomaly since most of the information security governance frameworks do not include this
objective.
Issues with establishing clarity in control development process:There should be
transparency in control development process. Clarity in control development process
increases the probability of all stakeholders having a clear understating of the intent and
scope of the controls. Simon (1994) argue that clear controls and procedures and
designated liaison roles along with a strong, comprehensive code of conduct and more
contingent pay for more employees are associated with fewer occurrences of crime. As
voiced by one of the respondents:
First and foremost information systems are, or contain, property that is a group
asset. It is important to establish how individuals charged with its security (often
everyone in an organization) value and take care of property that is not their
own. The designed controls convey the message, ―do your job properly and
protect your asset‖. Controls should be clear in this [Chief executive officer,
financial services industry]
To our knowledge, there has not been a single information security governance framework
that emphasizes clarity of controls development as an objective. Control development
process should be integrated with the business processes such that each and every control
developed answers a clearly established need in the business process and the cost of not
complying is obvious to the users. This is an important finding of this research and calls
for acknowledgment from researchers and sincere efforts to establish it in common
practice.
Issues with establishing formal control assessment functionality:Anthony (1965) defines
management controls as the process ―by which managers assure that resources are obtained
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and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization‘s objectives
(p. 17)‖. As suggested by our data, in order to realize this role of controls, formal control
assessment functionality should be established. As a separate department, controls
functionality would be in a better position to attract enterprise resources, develop better
oversight capabilities, assess the needs for controls, monitor investments, get the requisite
attention of top management and influence the corporate security culture. To our best
knowledge, no information security governance framework has suggested a separate
controls department. This study found that establishing formal controls functionality
would exponentially boost security governance efforts and a step of this proportion is long
over due. As one respondent opined by a respondent
What makes a car run? what makes it fast? Brakes! you are never growing to drive
a car fast if you do not have breaks. Lot of people use security controls just like
brakes. In fact, the security controls itself means that the business can run faster,
you do not have to worry. That‘s light ball for a lot of people, security controls
agency, Virginia].
Controls should be integrated with the business processes. Considering the impact that
controls have in managing business, a call for formalizing a separate entity for controls is
warranted.
Issues with enhancing group cohesiveness: Cohesive groups implementing and using
security controls can be more effective than groups which are dominated by rivalry,
politics and favoritism. Security initiatives call for cross functional collaboration and it is
important that the members on the group view the group favorably. As Anthony (1988, pp.
10) mentions, management control can be considered as 'the process by which managers
influence other members of the organization to implement the organization's strategies'
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(Anthony 1988: 10). Such influences are perceived positively in a cohesive group. This
aspect of security governance has not been highlighted in research literature and increasing
―group cohesiveness‖ as a governance objective has not been proposed so far. As
observed by a respondent:
Again sharing comes into play. We all must be able and capable of trusting
everyone in the organization that comes into contact with our shared assets.
The ability to maintain confidence is a good measure [Director of integrated
systems security in public safety industry].
Many of the security initiatives fail due to lack of coordination between various
functionalities (Wood, 2006; Fleming, 2007). Organizations tend to repeat mistakes and do
not learn from their experiences as there is a lack of alignment between various
occupational communities within itself (Schein, 1996). The operational and midlevel
managers have different shared assumptions and objectives which are not aligned with the
objectives preached and practiced by senior managers. Taylor (2006) argues that it is
management‘s misperception of risk causing behavior and its technology based approach
that ignores human factors that must be addressed for increasing security. Considering the
importance of group behavior in success of security initiatives, it seems fair to raise a voice
for group building efforts and incentives.
All the five objectives discussed here are important for security governance. Though some
of these objectives have been alluded to by the researchers but there has not been enough
emphasis to any of these objectives in information security governance research. These
objectives clearly, play crucial roles in holistic information systems security governance.
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More research is required to understand the incorporation of these objectives into
organizational security governance frameworks.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter synthesized the results of both the phases in this study and the implications
drawn from this research. The emergent principles of information security governance
from the proposed objectives were identified and its implications for research and practice
were discussed. A means-end framework was constructed based on the data from the study
and research literature available in this domain. This study presents some information
security governance objectives that have not been identified in the research literature.
These ―theoretical anomalies‖ are listed and implications are drawn.
The following chapter will summarize the findings and review the entire thesis. The
theoretical contributions, methodological contributions and practical contributions shall be
discussed. A discussion on possible criticisms of the research approach and design will be
raised and conducted. Potential future research directions stemming from this research
would also be discussed.
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusion
7.1 Overview of the research
This research argued that information security governance objectives in information
systems need to be grounded in the values of the organizational stakeholders. This
argument is based on the premise that if the values of the employees in the organization are
reflected in the security governance objectives; then there are better chances that the
objectives would produce the intended result i.e. better security. The motivation of the
research lies in the fact that there is hardly any work in information security governance
area that presents security governance objectives which are theoretically grounded and
empirically validated. This research is the first serious attempt to develop security
governance objectives that are theoretically established and empirically validated in an
organizational context.
On the practical side, this research is motivated by the lack of sound ISG objectives in
organizations, leading to catastrophic losses due to misuse of information. Security
breaches cost billions of dollars in direct losses, downtime, stolen identities and intellectual
property thefts. Fiascos such as demise of the Barings Bank, Kidder Peabody‘s inability to
institute adequate internal controls and Enron‘s failure to ensure integrity of business
processes points to the increasing importance of governance structures. At a high level,
governance structures created specifically for ensuring information security are called
information security governance (ISG) practices.
There are several models such as COBIT, COSO and ISO 2700 available in the industry to
guide organizations towards sound internal control structure. These models are popular and
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widely used. But the cases of security breaches due to inadequate controls being unable to
prevent these breaches are increasing. This situation calls for a serious revisit of these
models, with respect to organizational objectives for providing adequate information
security governance to protect assets. An assessment of the contemporary frameworks for
internal controls suggests two problems with the use of these models. First, all the existing
frameworks reviewed are atheoretical, based on experiences of the originators of the
models themselves and derived from best practices in the industry. Second, none of the
above frameworks provide guidelines specific to the creation of objectives of internal
controls for information systems security. Either the focus is too broad covering much
more than security or the guidance is not enough about using specific controls. Review of
the research literature in internal controls for organizations does not shed much light on the
process of creation of internal control objectives for information systems security. Internal
controls for information systems security literature lack the rigor of a theory to guide
research in this area. Research in information systems security area does not provide an
appropriate theoretical basis to design internal controls for security. In conclusion, a review
of internal control objectives, both in research and practioner worlds, suggests a need for a
theoretical basis for internal controls. This will help to develop sound ISG objectives for
dealing with security vulnerabilities. This research fills the gap by developing value based,
theoretically grounded and empirically validated ISG objectives.
This research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, a value focused assessment
was performed to develop information security governance objectives. Value Theory was
used as theoretical basis and value focused approach was used as the methodology to
269

develop 23 value based governance objectives. For this phase of the study, 52 semistructured interviews were conduced across 9 industries to elicit the values of people about
security governance. These objectives which were well grounded in theory, were first of
their kind to be developed in information systems security governance research. The
developed objectives were clustered in two groups as suggested by Keeney (1992), namely
fundamental and means. The objectives that directly help in achieving the main objective
for the decision context are fundamental whereas the objectives that help in achieving
other objectives leading to the fundamental objectives are called means objectives.
In the second phase of the research, an interpretive case study was conducted to validate
the proposed objectives in an organizational context. The single case study was conducted
at the department of IT for a major city in central east coast of the United States. The study
was completed over a six month period time from October 2007 to March 2008. The data
collection methods primarily used in this phase were semi structured interviews, forms,
reports, manuals in the department and through informal interaction and observations.
Each objective proposed in the phase one of the studies was used to describe the case
situations. Some apparent contradictions were observed between what the management
said should be done versus what was actually going on in the organization. These
contradictions are documented.
The findings indicated that all the objectives developed in phase one are important to the
organization. All the objectives were supported by the data and the organizational
measures to achieve these objectives were noted. Based on the data from the case study
and the conceptual understanding of the researchers, a means-end framework was
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developed. The data also suggested eight emergent information security governance
principles. These principles are more like directives for organizations and can be used to
design control related activities and tasks which will result in maximizing ISG.
The remainder of the chapter discuses the contributions of this research, the evaluation
criteria to establish the rigor of the study, the research design limitations and finally the
future research directions stemming from this work. Each of the above mentioned topics
are presented in a separate section.
7.2 Contributions
Any research endeavor should add to the body of knowledge in the subject area, to be
deemed as legitimate. This research adds to the research literature in theoretical,
methodological and practitioner streams. A discussion on each category of contribution is
presented below.
7.2.1 Theoretical
This research makes a unique contribution to the information security governance field. It
is a serious attempt aimed at formulating theoretically grounded and empirically developed
and tested information security governance objectives. In this research, the objectives
developed are grounded in the values of the organizational stakeholder and empirically
validated through a case study. Since most of the models used for security governance are
atheoretical and lack scientific support, the objectives developed in this research would be
a significant addition to the body of knowledge in this domain. Also, there has been almost
negligible research in the area of development of security governance objectives. The
developed here should fuel further inquiry in this area.
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Second, the means-end framework presented in this research postulates relationships
between the objectives and is a theory development exercise. The suggested theoretical
framework, based on data from the case study, is exploratory in nature and adds to the
theoretical knowledge in information security governance area.
Third, this research brings into light some subtle nuances of security governance that have
not been emphasized in the research literature currently. For instance objectives such as:
ensure clarity in controls development processes, ensure corporate control strategy, ensure
punitive structures, ensure formal control assessment functionality, and maximize group
cohesiveness. The above listed objectives have not been proposed as important ISG
dimensions in most of the ISG frameworks available, both in theory and in practice. There
have been passing references in literature about these objectives but most of the research in
this area has ignored the importance of these objectives for overall success of the security
program. We believe that these objectives are important in their own right and contribute
greatly towards maximizing information security governance in the organization. These
should be considered with other controls objectives for overall security governance
maximization.
Fourth, Value Theory provides an appropriate ontological and epistemological basis to
elicit, interpret and structure individual values for better information security governance
research. Using a theoretical lens such as Value Theory from the field of sociology to
investigate information security governance issues has provided a rigorous platform for
further research in this area. Bringing theories from other disciplines and applying them to
information systems domain is a theoretical contribution to the field (Weber, 2006).
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7.2.2 Practical
This research has contributions to offer organizations working on security governance
issues, mainly in four areas. First, it provides a sound list of security governance objectives
that are comprehensive and ready to use. Even though, there are other available security
governance frameworks such as COBIT that can be used by corporations, this framework
is exclusively targeted at security governance purposes.
Second, this approach allows the end users to participate in security governance programs.
This allows a better alignment on user and organizational values. For practitioners in the
real world, this framework provides guidelines about the importance of incorporating
employee‘s perspective into control design to ensure better results of security governance
initiatives.
Third, a security governance assessment tool can be generated using these objectives and
values. An artefact or a tool that can check the current level of security governance in
organization vis a vis where the level should be is based on the values of the employees in
the particular organization.
Fourth, the ISG principles proposed in this research are like directives which can be used
to achieve the objectives proposed in this study. Organizations can use the principles as a
high level plan for ISG and develop specific activities to meet the objectives.
7.2.3 Methodological
This study also provides methodological contribution. Value focused approach provides an
adequate methodology for empirical investigation of values. This approach is suitable for
qualitative as well as quantitative techniques of research. Using this methodology in the
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context of information security governance is a contribution to the body of knowledge in
information systems security research. Using this approach to develop decision objectives
allows better communication between stakeholders and facilitates a ―bottom-up‖ approach
to management.
7.3 Evaluation of the research
This research was evaluated using Klein and Myers‘ (1999) principles for evaluating
interpretive field studies. Klein and Myers‘ suggest providing a summary of the research
method, site, theory and key findings before actually assessing the work. This research was
conducted as an interpretive field study in the IT department of a state agency. The theory
behind the work is Value Theory, which is widely used in Sociology. The findings are 23
information security governance objectives and 8 principles of ISG. In this study, the
principle of the hermeneutic circle was implied but explicit recognition was not given to it.
As Klein and Myers (1999) found in the examination of the three sample articles that they
evaluated, this lack of explicit recognition is due to the implication of the principle in the
adherence to the other six principles.
The principle of contextualization was achieved through a clear and descriptive case study
write-up. The history and context of the study was established upfront. The lack of security
governance objectives was acknowledged and the organization‘s transition from current to
new policies and controls was shared. The third principle, interaction between the
researchers and the subjects, has been alluded to but not explicitly. One of the researchers
spent more than six months with the organization. The level of trust between the researcher
and the subjects increased during this period. The informal relationship with the
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respondents helped in getting insights that contradicted what was being said by the
participants. So the interaction of the researcher and subjects was such that good informal
communication sessions were frequent. This relationship influenced the data collection and
hence the findings of the study.
The principle of abstraction and generalization demands that idiographic details revealed
by the data interpretation through the application of the principles one and two to
theoretical concepts describe the nature of human understanding and social actions (Klein
and Myers‘, 1999). This study was based on or guided by Value Theory. The guiding
theory helped in understanding the importance of individual values in decision-making.
Based on this premise, individual values about information security governance were
elicited and converted into decision objectives.
The last three principles are about researcher‘s sensitivity in data analysis. The principle of
dialogical reasoning indicates the researchers‘ sensitivity towards vetting possible
contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions and the actual findings. In this study,
Value theory is the intellectual basis. Some of the objectives were claimed to be important
in interviews but were actually not being followed. These contradictions were noted and
apparent reasons for these were discussed. Hence dialogical reasoning was performed and
discussed. The principle of multiple interpretations demonstrates how the researcher shows
sensitivity to differences in interpretations among the participants to the same event. The
multiple perspectives of the top management, the middle management and the operational
management on the same objectives actually led to better synthesis of the results and the
ISG principles were created. Hence, this principle of multiple interpretations was used in
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this research. Lastly principle of suspicion, recommends that the researcher should be
sensitive to possible biases and distortions by the participants. In this research, the
operational level people inserted distortions about the role of other agencies into the
success of the security program. The top management believed that other agencies had
minimal role to play in the success whereas others believed that due to politics, every step
of the security policies and controls program would suffer delay.
7.4 Limitations
In this research or for interpretive field studies in general, there are two major areas of
criticism- namely generalizability and researcher bias. A discussion on the generalizibility
of the results is presented in chapter 3. In an interpretive field research, many of the
findings do not hold true in other organizations. It is not the intention of this research to do
so. The results are not generalizable in statistical sense but are generalizable to theory. The
contributions in theoretical sense are presented in the previous section. Yin (2003) calls
this analytic generalization which means theories used in other studies can be used as a
template to compare the results.
Another criticism could be that the researcher as the research instrument allows several
confounding variables to creep in, which bias the results. The objectivity of the case study
was maintained by the researchers by restricting themselves to the objectives developed
during phase 1. The researchers maintained distance from the data and remained focused
on interpreting the case situation in the light of developed objectives. By consciously
stating the historical and intellectual basis of this research and involving what the
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interviewees said in critical reflections, we refrained from falling prey to bias and showed
how the various interpretations emerged in this research (Klein and Myers 1999).
For data collection phase, we ensured that only individuals with substantial experience in
using information technology with more than 5 years of managerial experience in relevant
area were interviewed. Even though the interviewees appeared knowledgeable and
concerned about governance issues, it is possible that their understanding about security
governance is not a true representation of the actual state of affairs.
7.5 Future research directions
There are several streams of work that can arise from this research. Some of these are
discussed below.
The list of objectives developed in this research can be subjected to psychometric analysis
with separate large samples. Development of a model for measuring information security
governance could result from such an exercise. This research is more exploratory in nature
and uses qualitative data to test the validity of the objectives and establishing the relations
for means-end framework. But the next obvious step would be test the model using
quantitative data and perform confirmatory factor analysis. The models thus developed
could be tested using structure equation modeling techniques.
Second, further investigation to establish relationships between means and fundamental
objectives is required. Statistical tests could be performed for each of the paths suggested
in the means-end framework developed, rather than basing the relationships merely on
arguments.
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Third, more investigation is required to assess the correlations of the means objectives
within a fundamental objective and also correlations of the fundamental objectives
themselves. This stream of work requires quantitative data and multivariate analytical
techniques for analyzing the data.
Fourth, using multi objective decision analysis techniques, decision models can be created
for organizations. These models can help prioritize resources invested for the objectives
based on aggregate weights of the objectives and by ranking them in order.
Fifth, the objectives proposed in this research needs to be operationalized in order to be
achievable and useful in day-to-day activities. Further research is required to develop
activities and tasks for every objective so that the controls can be optimally designed.
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APPENDIX
Interview Template for the study
The interview will start with a discussion on informed consent. The researcher will read
the attached consent form and explain in length about the consent form before the
interview begins. The interviewee will sign the consent form before being interviewed.
List of guiding Questions
1. What are your values about internal controls for information systems security? By
values we mean things that you feel are important and should be reflected in the
controls.
2. Please elaborate what things are important to you for control design with
examples/stories/experience.
3. Why are these things important to you in context of internal control design? Do you
think these things make more secure information systems? How so? Elaborate.
4. In an ideal situation, when you have to design internal controls for information
systems security in an organization from scratch, what are the things you will like
to include and why?
5. Why do you think some of the controls work or do not work? Elaborate.
6. How important is it, in your opinion, to incorporate the feedback of employees
about such controls and why? Elaborate.
7. There are many regulatory compliance issues forcing organizations to make
changes in their control structure. Does compliance drive internal control design in
your organization? How much? Explain.
8. How important is it, in your opinion, to communicate the intent of such controls to
employees? Does it make any difference in your opinion? How so? Explain.

Interview Template for the second phase of the study
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The interview will start with a discussion on informed consent. The researcher will read
the attached consent form and explain in length about the consent form before the
interview begins. The interviewee will sign the consent form before being interviewed.
List of guiding Questions
1. What are your values about internal controls for information systems security? By
values we mean things that you feel are important and should be reflected in the
controls.
2. Please elaborate what things are important to you for control design with
examples/stories/experience.
3. Why are these things important to you in context of internal control design? Do you
think these things make more secure information systems? How so? Elaborate.
4. How important is regulatory compliance plan in your organization? Does is help
the internal control structure in organization? Explain
5. How can you improve the control implementation process? Elaborate.
6. How important is it, in your opinion, to incorporate the feedback of employees
about such controls and why? Elaborate.
7.

How important is it to establish deterrence criteria for the employees? Can you
share any experience where lack of deterrence proved to be harmful for the
organization?

8. How important is it, in your opinion, to communicate the intent of such controls to
employees? Does it make any difference in your opinion? How so? Explain.
9. What proactive controls initiatives are important to assure successful control
development and implementation? Explain with examples
10. In your opinion, is it helpful to have visible leadership for effective security
controls? Why or why not?
11. Does clear responsibility and accountability in structures help in implementing
security controls effectively? Explain
12. How does clarity in processes help in instituting controls? Explain
13. Do you think audit helps in developing better control structure? Explain with
examples
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14. Do you think clarity in controls can be achieved through effective communications
and training about the subject? Why or why not?
15. Is it important to have a control strategy? Does separate control assessment
functionality help in control implementation? Explain
16. Is the culture in your organization help in understanding the importance of security
controls? How so?
17. Is the management involved in the controls development process? Is it helpful to
get the management involved? Why or why not?
18. Does your organization attempts to standardize the controls? Does it help? Explain

Interview Log for Phase1 of the study
Respondent
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Industry

Role

Healthcare
Credit card services
Insurance
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Credit card services
Telecommunications
Insurance
Energy
Energy
Insurance
Credit card services
Credit card services
Insurance
Telecommunications
Credit card services
Healthcare
Internet service providers
Credit card services
State agency
State agency
Insurance
Insurance
Insurance

IT Director
Security Manager
Security Officer
IT Director
Helpdesk IT specialist
Manager-HR
IT Director
Manager-Accounts
Security Manager
Helpdesk IT specialist
IT Director
Helpdesk IT specialist
Security Officer
Manager-Accounts
Security Officer
Security Manager
Systems Auditor
System Administrator
Systems Auditor
Manager-Finance
IT Director
CIO
Systems Auditor
Manager-Administration
Manager-HR
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Duration
(minutes)
35
50
40
60
30 (P)
55
20
70
25
60
47
20
25
10
80
90
80
80
25
15
40
60
60
25
45 (P)

Respondent
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Industry

Role

Health services
Health services
Health services
Internet service providers
Internet service providers
Financial investment
Credit card services
Internet service providers
Credit card services
Internet service providers
Banks
Banks
Real estate development
Financial investment
Financial investment
Real estate development

IT Director
CEO
Systems Auditor
Manager-HR
Security Manager
Manager-Accounts
Systems Auditor
System Administrator
Systems Auditor
Helpdesk IT specialist
System Administrator
Manager-Administration
Security Manager
Security Officer
Security Officer
System Administrator

Duration
(minutes)
50
15
30
35
50
25
30
40
50
20
45
30
15
30
45
60

Interview log for phase 2: CCIT
Respondents
1.

Roles
Chief Information Officer

2.

Security Director

3.

Security Manager

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Security Officer
IT Development-Manager
IT infrastructure-Manager
Administration-Manager
Help desk IT staff 1
Help desk IT staff 2
Internal Audit Director
Internal Audit Officer

12.

Project Management-Manager

Duration (minutes)
60
60 (repeat)
45
30 (repeat)
45
40 (repeat)
40
50
50
60
30
30
60
50
40 (repeat)
45

Table: Raw Values-Common Form Values-041008
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Maximize Information Security Governance
No.
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Raw Values
Problems you come across are usually lack of
awareness about controls
With media hype and everything with respect to
governance failure .. security is becoming very
important for business.
Awareness and responsibility for your action
..know what you are doing
using some of your knowledge in daily
practices and in dealing with organizational
issues
pretty much be aware of what people should do
and should not do
training implemented in such a way that .. you
not only develop the principle of security or
privacy but also let them know what are the
common uses of it …here you should be using
them...
social engineering, you have to watch out
before you say any thing make sure they
identify them self correctly.
contract employee are asked to reset password
every month
making sure no single point if failure ,
unfortunately you have to remember more than
one password for this
we do have some feedback from various people
... not everything is convenient but people are
getting used to it.. There is no other option
controls are in the policy in order to impose the
policy (meaning - ensure compliance – as
interpreted by the researcher via probes)
We all tend to bring along.. some of the
experiences… it may not be… the way we put it
one the table
designed our audit program overtime we
changed .. so we are still undergoing additional
tuning..
Certainly we take input from auditees. It‘s the
part of the process
Usually there couple of points of contact …
who help coordinate our efforts and help in
audit.. and those POC provides us with other
point of contact
we sit down with these people we have this one
on one with them…
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Common Form Values
Lack of awareness is a source of
problems for controls.
Responsiveness to media hype

Clarity of responsibility in organizations
Accountability for actions
Leverage individual knowledge for
ensuring internal controls
Ensure awareness of organizational
actions and practices
Training should reflect principles of
internal controls rather than means of
ensuring security

Increase awareness of internal control
breaches through social engineering
Define policies for access to information
resources
Define multiple layers of controls

Define a system for incorporating
feedback to improve controls
Balance convenience with usability
Ensure compliance with internal
controls defined in the policy document
Individuals differences in managing
internal controls
Internal audit control practices need to
evolve with time and changing contexts
Take input from various individuals
dealing with controls on a day to day
basis
Auditing and compliance with controls
is also based on informal feedback from
trusted informants
Sit with people individually and take
their perspective on the process

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.

we might go back to the procedure and .. tell
them what Joe told me… so they may fail on
their own procedure…
people who are really knowledgeable and know
what they are doing ….-but hey haven‘t be able
to push what they have been doing … because
of the resources tie
Generally speaking auditors think of themselves
as…. I think they are somewhat of
consultants…
some times controls fall through the crack.. they
might be initially good controls but fail with
change
he has right access.. and the role changes and all
changes TASK
we do not create controls.. we only test them..
we consult about them … TASK
the appropriateness of access…and that‘s very
high level generic controls… the specific which
show appropriateness of access… the specific
tool you may use very different. TASK
the organization restructure… what controls do
you have to make sure you changes your
procedure accordingly.. or do the procedures
need to be changed
The application should not be a black box
(interpretation – clarity of processes). We
should understand the processes.
if you just even go to policies… and try to
implement the control so that you can answers
some of the question, you will be far ahead….
COBIT… gets some experts on COBIT.. It is
pretty big model very generic. It teaches you to
think about what you have to think about…
Look at COBIT and try to follow COBIT… you
may need lot of interpretation…it going to be a
long process…. Companies have separate
COBIT implementation project..
They have taken over all the localized controls
and centralized access controls…
You can‘t say it‘s not our fault because it‘s your
yard…. If you feel that you should have way of
knowing that..
regulatory compliance drives a lot what we do
Control consciousness came because of
regulatory compliance.
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Internal control audit involves cross
checking procedures with people
Individuals have ability to improve
internal controls.
Individuals constrained because of
resource allocations
Internal control auditors are indeed
consultants who ensure effectiveness of
controls
Internal control structures are not static.
Proper change management needed for
efficacy of controls
Controls should consider change of roles
Controls need to be tested appropriately
Controls are created by the management
and employees
High level controls are needed for
direction
Specific controls use different
approaches by organizations
Change management controls are
important

Clarity of business processes for internal
controls
Encourage discussion on internal
controls as identified in the policies
Be aware of industry frameworks and
models.
They guide proper internal control
formulation.
Generic frameworks need interpretation
Following industry frameworks requires
preparations
Balancing centralization vs
decentralization (move to 9)
Consequences of internal control
breaches should be communicated.
(move to under 3 above)
Encourage regulatory compliance to
internal controls
Establish a control consciousness culture
Establish a compliance culture

33.

Auditing became more important

34.

SOX is way too strong we might have to step
down

35.

We have everything SOX talks about already
build in just matter of depth. SOX helps get us
there quicker…
It helped a lot in a popularity of controls..
people are scared of SOX
Repeat compliance is a bigger pain.

36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

Resources should be classified…. Regarding its
sensitivity whether it is a proprietary
information
Access to those data resources…. should be
restricted
Authorization which should come from data
owner

41.

access controls needs to be self protected

42.
43.

Security controls needs to be driven from top of
the organization to the bottom
They set the tone for the entire organization…

44.

Executive should be aware in compliance era

45.

most important thing is the direction from
above.. management supports security
incentives
proper design of security.. ownership..
Authority.. privileges and roles… are clearly
defined…. as well as the data resources…. With
their sensitivity

46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

most important thing is communicating that…
to the individuals… an explanation to the
individual about why
Education is extremely important…
the biggest impact from the facts that executive
level… are being held accountable… for what
there organizations are doing… if the rules were
not followed
when you change executive level change
towards security .. you will absolutely change
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Auditing has gained importance as a
functionality
Regulations may be too strong to be
followed in entirety – define appropriate
internal controls in response to
regulations
Regulations help in following the
controls better
Failure to comply with internal control
regulations scares people
Repeat compliance with regulations is
difficult
Internal control structures should reflect
sensitivity of data
Access to data resources should be
restricted
Identify data owners for sensitive data
Authorizations should be linked to data
owners
Encourage individual responsibility for
ensuring proper access to data
resources.
Top management involvement in
defining internal controls for security
Top management should lead by
example when dealing with internal
controls
Awareness of compliance issues is
important
Direction should be provided from the
top management
Role and privileges need to be properly
defined and documented
Data resources should be clearly
classified according to sensitivity level
Communication about the nature and
scope of controls is important
Education of employees regarding
internal controls is needed
Executives should be accountable for the
actions
Rules should be followed
Change attitude of executives about
security controls

organization attitude for security….

51.

Security is one key internal control…

52.

Everybody got a security policy…and how well
you keep them update. Communicate them..
maintain them or central to your security effort.
Education as a control is probably…. is second
most important thing in security.
controls over what people think are good..
usually starts with people… it need not be
technology side.
security awareness training is good for
control…
call security architecture review.. for anything
goes into the production.

53.
54.

55.
56.

57.

58.
59.
60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

Part of our change management process is
security.. architecture review.. which
application developers.. …purchasing officials..
this meets security guidelines… and its another
example of controls
Other controls ,in term of change management
that we do.
The perspective is to ask questions about
controls.. ask questions
Security controls are built along the way… such
that the business can run smoothly..
Nothing can derail a security initiative and
change management quicker than agitating
employees ..
for taking control away from people.. trying to
impose…make people jump there hoops…

making sure people understand the priority
understand roles , responsibility .. if you can
demonstrate you can get the level of service

some of the technology that support us .. such
as audit tools.. should be run by separate
groups…. Not run by security administrators…
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Executives impact the organization’s
attitude towards security
Security requirements define internal
controls
Continuously update internal control
requirements in security policies
Education is an important control for
security
Controls need to be people oriented.
Need to understand feelings, attitudes
and belief of people.
Security awareness training is important
for good controls
Engage in an IT architecture review,
which helps in correctness of design
All program codes should be adequately
reviewed
Change management process is
important
All guidelines for governance need to be
defined by consensus
Change management should be
adequately emphasized
Relevance of all controls needs to be
adequately discussed
Controls in business processes are not an
after-thought, they are designed and
built as part of a change initiative
Do not agitate employees

Sudden changes in responsibility
structures are not good for security
governance
Do not impose new rules on employees
without careful consideration and
proper buy-in
Demonstrate clearly roles and
responsibilities
Organizational members need to
understand that certain tasks, controls
and actions have a priority
Auditing functions and actions need to
be separated

65.

having the control built in the low level are
important.. Identity management… set of
technology.. very important for controls for
security management program

66.

external audit is another good stuff …

67.

it becomes issue of internal policies…. it has to
be related to IT architecture… client side you
have to incorporate controls as part of system
design…

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.
73.

74.

75.

so for control point you need few people
dedicated to doing this thing….. program
management office .. project management….
Set of a separate office looking of security only
it is a huge undertaking that goes back to
identity management… we have so many
environment to maintain.. we need tools for
that.. .. the tools are very expensive
.controlling people from inside is more of
accountability and responsibility you have to
make very clear the consequences of the
action….
But what is the criminal action… people are
held responsible as the induction process begin
in the company… but it‘s not clear if this
happens.. what action would be taken …
security has to be a part of functional
requirements…
I believe we must make sure companies do the
right thing. One way to accomplish this is
through training.

Bridge the gap. MIS and Accounting have to
play in the same sandbox.

Provide more training to MIS people. They
need to understand the need for compliance.
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Controls need to be at all levels of the
organization – higher levels as well as
lower levels
Identity management is perhaps the
most important control in organizations
Controls need to be periodically
evaluated by external auditors
Controls should be related to the IT
architecture
Controls need to be instituted as part of
organizational design
There needs to be a management
function that ensures efficacy of controls
Separate office is required for
maintenance
The nature of controls determines that
kind of tools necessary for management
Resources need to be allocated for
maintaining controls
Accountability and responsibility is
required
Consequences of non compliance to
controls needs to be communicated to
the employees
Explain the meaning of criminal action
to the employees
Explain the consequences of action
Security governance has to be a
functional requirement
Ensure that companies do the right
thing
Training is required to help
organizations do the right thing
Bridge the gap between different
functionalities in the organization
MIS and accounting have to coordinate
for better controls
Provide training to technology oriented
people such that they are responsive for
compliance purposes

76.

Changes in the corporate culture have to be
managed in a better way.

77.
Suddenly
people are reviewing everything that
you do…such changes have to be
managed properly.
78.

79.

80.

Security governance should be a way to move
forward to, build the new program into existing
business processes.
It is a continuous process, not just a list of
things to complete in order to ensure security
governance.

We have to build around the existing processes.
Building up from nothing would be more
difficult, it is better to have something to begin
with.

Explain the importance and need for
compliance to technical people
Better change management practices in
the organization
Appreciation for cultural aspects needs
to be central in organizing security
governance controls
Review of controls should be in light of
the organizational objectives
Ensure that security governance is an
antecedent to complete security and
process integrity
Control assessment and implementation
should be undertaken in a continuous
iterative manner
Control implementation should not be
an after-thought
Once needs to understand the
organizational context for control
implementation.
Controls cannot be implemented using a
“clean slate approach”
Security governance controls need to be
simple and easy to use

81.

Cleanliness, orderliness

82.

Continuous improvement

Make sure to have continuous
improvement

83.

Standardization

Establish standardization in the control
process

84.

Systemization

85.

Trust

Create systemization in control
development process
Establish trust in the organization

86.

Timeliness

Controls should reflect timeliness

87.

Results-oriented

Have a result oriented attitude

88.

Power

89.

respecting the rights of others, including their
confidences and personal information

One needs to appreciate the impact of
organizational power structures while
establishing controls
Respect the rights of others
Respect other people’s confidence

90.

Respect other people’s personal
information
People should have accountability for
their action

Accountability for one‘s actions.
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positive reinforcement for doing the right thing
and doing things right;

Establish positive reinforcement for
doing the right thing

92.

negative consequences for failure to do so

93.

Living in a security conscious culture as
reflected in individuals watching out for each
other.

Establish positive reinforcement for
doing the things right
Establish clear negative consequences
for failure to do the right things
Establish a security conscious culture

91.

94.

95.

96.

Senior executives ―walk the talk,‖ holding
themselves visibly accountable to the same
policies and procedures that apply to everyone
else

Holding all outside parties (customers,
suppliers, vendors, partners, contractors, etc.) to
the same standard of care as required of
employees, and as appropriate to their roles
Using regulation as a catalyst for information
security governance

97.

When a culture of security is absent, it turns
compliance into a ―check the box‖ exercise
instead of substantive, sustained improvement.

98.

Security is considered a cost of doing business,
not a discretionary or negotiable budget-line
item that needs to be regularly defended.

99.

Security controls has achievable, measurable
objectives that directly align with enterprise
objectives.

Communication on controls topics is
encouraged.
100. Discussion on controls topics is encouraged.
100

101. Debate on controls topics is encouraged.
102. An organization should regularly compare and
benchmarks its security control state,
investments, and actions with others in its
market sector and community of practice.
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Establish a culture where individuals
watch out for each other
Top management should “walk the talk”
Top management should be visibly
accountable for actions
Visibility in ensuring the policies and
procedures are same for all
Hold all stakeholders to same standard
of care appropriate to their roles

Use regulations as a catalyst for better
security governance practices
Ensure that compliance is a substantive
and sustained improvement in business
processes
Lack of security governance culture
turns compliance into check the box
exercise
View security governance as cost of
doing business
Security governance is not a negotiable
budget-line item
Security controls should have achievable
objectives
Security controls should have
measurable objectives
Governance control objectives should
align with enterprise objectives
Encourage communication amongst
employees about control issues
Encourage discussion amongst
employees about control issues
Encourage debate amongst employees
about control issues
Compare regularly the security
governance state across the industry
Benchmark security governance
practices with industry standards

103. Security leaders/general auditors/treasurer are
well respected in the enterprise culture

104. Security leaders are perceived as valued
contributors whose opinions and expertise are
sought
105. General auditors navigate freely across the
organization
106. Security leaders regularly collaborate with peers

Benchmark security governance
investments against industry standards
Security leaders should be well
respected in the organizational culture

Perceive security leaders/auditors as
valued contributors

107. Rewards, for security-policy compliance are
consistently applied and reinforced.

Auditors should be able to navigate
freely across the organization
Peer collaboration in security
governance is important
Rewards for compliance with policies
should be ensured

108. Recognition for security-policy compliance are
consistently applied and reinforced.

Apply and reinforce recognition for
complying with policies

for
security-policy
109. Consequences
compliance are applied and reinforced.

Explain the consequences of non
compliance with policies

non

110. We grant access to people not positions.
111. Be aware of morality of your staff. Allow them
small things and don‘t wait for things like
notices.

Grant access to people not positions
Be aware of the morality of the staff

112. Keep the ownership of the information.
113. Internal satisfaction from what I am doing is
very important to me.
114. There has to be proper ways to maintain and
integrate the information.

Focus on ownership of the information
Ensure employee satisfaction

115. Need to create an environment and a leadership
style, culture, values where we encourage
internal competition to stay within groups.

Encourage internal competition to stay
within groups

116. Systematically structure and level information
needs.
117. Management should be available when people
need assistance.
118. Give examples to employees about how
something has to be done.
119. Give specific details of what you want and how
you want it.
120. Information can be improperly integrated. Audit
process helps in this.
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Do not delay small things for
bureaucratic reasons

Maintain and integrate the information
properly

Create an environment of leadership
style and culture to minimize intergroup
rivalry
Structure your information needs
Make management/leadership available
when the need arises
Training with examples
Provide specific examples of how work
should be done
Develop audit process to integrate the
information rules

121. personal integrity influences individual and
group behavior towards information security
controls

122. Honor: It is important to go beyond disciplinary
records to establish whether or not the truth was
told even when it would result in a negative
outcome for the individual.
123. We all must be able and capable of trusting
everyone in the organization that comes into
contact with our shared assets.
124. Politics, favoritism, and self-interest typically
trump these values and may undermine the
security of information systems

Personal integrity influences individual
behavior towards controls
Personal integrity influences group
behavior towards controls
Ensure honor of the employees
Ensure that truth is being told
Go beyond the norms to protect honor
of individuals
Enhance an environment of trust in the
organization
Politics undermines the security
governance
Avoid favoritism in groups

125. Only individuals with strong moral values are
allowed to access, audit, and sustain our
information systems.

126. Continuous monitoring is of no use if corrective
measures are not instituted and carried out.

127. None of these control measures will work if key
individuals and the organization lack the
fortitude to enforce the rules and the remedial
solutions.
128. whatever you do.. you should not impede
people or hinder people doing their job.
129. You should be flexible enough but strong
enough to protect companies assets…
130. so you have to put those kinds for things which
are acceptable.. and respected by people
131. You have to educate people …why are we
doing what we are doing
132. change management for any kinds of
changes….to any production systems ..should
go thru proper security channels to make those
changes
133. The ability to share: work, responsibility, and
credit, is a fundamental measure of integrity.
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Avoid self interest in group
Ensure individuals with strong moral
values to access data
Ensure individuals with strong values to
audit the systems
Ensure continuous monitoring of
controls
Institute corrective measures for
continuous monitoring
Ensure that key individuals enforce
rules and remedial solutions

Do not create barriers to people doing
their job
Be flexible and strong to protect
company assets
Do things that are acceptable and
respected by people
Educate people
Explain to people why they are doing
what they are doing
Manage changes in the organization
properly
Changes in production systems should
be managed
Encourage the ability to share the work
Ability to share responsibility is
important
Credit about a good work should be
shared properly

have
to
have
enough
134. You
firewalls….routers…software…so that you can
protect external threats…
135. internally people are as bad as they are
outside….disgruntled employee can share any
access with outside
136. trust goes so far….there have to be
controls…some procedures in place…
137. You have to do a risk assessment…for every
kind of information..
138. most of the information gets collected from the
garbage.. as a part of your security you have to
worry about physical security …

have
to
worry
from
both
139. You
perspective…what‘s the damage to the
organization and what‘s the damage to the
individual…
140. internal control within IT should be such that no
person has all the rights
141. If you intend to do something which is different
from our standard process you have to be
accountable….the manager has to know the
process…
SOX
has
come
things
have
142. since
changed…companies are spending lot of time
in this .

143. if I were the CIO..I follow through and make
sure that we are we have to prove that what we
say is what we do
144. people do not see any value in those
controls…..if you do not see in value some
thing …it will not move forward…..
145. all will go lose .. if there is no disciplinary
action… if there are no policy published in HR
handbook that if you do this thing …. The
consequences are such so why would I do that
146. at the beginning if the controls are too
complex...people will find a way around it…
they do not want to do it…
147. complexity definitely derives adherence ….if
they are flexible .. they are good.. people
understand ..and they will work… it‘s not tying
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Ability to share is a fundamental
measure of integrity
Have enough technical protections in the
organization
Have protection against disgruntled
employees
Trust is important in the organization
Create controls in work process to
ensure procedures are followed
Perform a risk assessment to develop
controls
Physical security is important part of
security
Create controls for accessing
information from garbage
Assess the damage to the organization
from lack of control
Assess damage to the individual from
lack of controls
No single person should have all the
rights or access
Know the business process properly
Own up the responsibility for any
deviation in the normal business process
Regulations have changed the way
companies look at controls
Organizations are spending resources on
compliance
Ensure what is being claimed is being
done
Ensure that people see value in controls

Explain clearly the disciplinary actions

Do not make complex controls

Explain the purpose of control to people.
The complexity derive adherence of
controls.

148.
149.

150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

my hands.. but helping me to do the work .. I
will follow it
Ease of use…
importance of controls… if I do not see it is
important … I will not do it…..why should I do
it……
whether it IT function or HR function it has to
be function that has to be properly
defined…positioned by organization .. funded
by the organization.. and respected by the
organization where you put ownership of
controls does not matter
Management has to be committed no matter
where you put it…
chances of success of security in being in IT are
higher because it is a discipline which brings
I think it was a shame not to follow regulations.
Regulations should be followed in their entirety.
Certain line of business should be more strict
with the following through of such regulations.

156. Prevention Mentality
157. open-mindedness
158. biggest influence to individual and group
behavior towards IS governance is peer
pressure.

159. If everyone else is following or not following
the policies and also ease of use.
160. ideally each employee job functions and needs
should be looked at and IS designed around that
IS needs.
161. biggest factor for whether a person observes the
security policy is if it is convenient or not.
162. How much people invest in it if the company
makes it their priority so will the people.
163. Some of these practices work only because they
are required through law.
164. These laws were created for the good of the
company and the investor.
165. Discipline
166. Whether one‘s personal values/norms are the
same with the company‘ or not. If it‘s not they
most like his behaviors would negatively affect
the security governance.
167. if one feels his effort/performance is being
reward satisfactory, he would voluntary follow
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Ensure that controls are easy to use
Communicate importance of controls

Ownership of control should reside in
functionality

Management should be committed to
controls.
The ownership of control should lies
with IT department.
Ensure that the regulations are followed.
Follow regulations in entirety
Differentiate between lines of business.

Create prevention mentality
Encourage open mindedness to provide
inputs.
Group behavior is governed by peer
pressure.
Peer pressure influences individual
behavior.
Ensure ease of use of controls.
Ensure job design around IS needs.

Create convenient policy
Management should make controls its
priority
Ensure regulations are followed
Regulations protect the organization and
the investors
Encourage discipline in the organization
Align personal and organizational values

Reward good performance

the controls.
168. If the company has a good environment, where
everyone willing to follow the security
governance, it will affect one‘s behaviors
towards it.
169. This risk has been instilled in all of our
employees. Each department has IT security
liaison that is responsible for the IT security
plan is implemented.
170. I feel the responsibility is very important.
171. There always needs to be balancing point where
the practices that are followed / not followed
can be sustained by the losses.
172. Practices or governance of one kind will depend
on the type of industry it is followed
173. there has to be strong leadership, reinforcement
a tie between what‘s being done why and its
value and risks and regular user education.

Encourage an environment of
conformity
Environment of conformity affects
individual behavior
Instill risk consciousness in the
employees
Each department should take care of its
controls plan
Encourage a sense of responsibility
Balance between gains and losses from
the controls
Differentiate between type of industry
Provide strong leadership
Explain the reasons behind
organizational actions
Explain the risks and values of controls
to users

174. It helps to have IT personnel in visible positions
with good commitment from top executives.
175. individuals should also be honest and
determined for security.

176. Personal integrity influences
security governance practices
177. Values of the organization

information

Educate users regularly
Encourage committed IT personnel to
be in visible positions
Encourage honesty
Encourage determination about
following controls
Encourage personal integrity
Instill good values in the organization

178. Culture in the organization
179. Attitude of supervisors
180. Actions (disciplinary) taken against unethical
behavior in general influence individual
behavior.

181. Relevance /level of confidentiality
information involved influences behavior.

of

182. Secrecy creates fear, which ultimately leads to
someone making a mistake by letting information

311

Create controls culture in the
organization
Encourage control conscious attitude of
supervisors
Take disciplinary action against
unethical behavior
Action against unethical actions
influences individual behavior
Behavior is influenced by level of
confidentiality of the information
Do not create an environment of fear

out
183. A value of mistrust by not developing close
relationships with business stakeholders has led
to this value of secrecy.
184. Data integrity is critical for many reasons.
185. Confidentiality:
186. How important is the info to the firm?

Discourage secrecy amongst employees
Discourage an environment of mistrust
Assess the criticality of data integrity
Ensure confidentiality
Assess the sensitivity of the information

187. Firm wide policies should be readily available
accessible.

Make the polices readily accessible

188. Some practices (For SOX, HIPPA) work
because the company is faced with strict
punishment if they don‘t do it.

Create a fear of punishment for
organizations

189. Respect for company‘s rule

Establish clear consequences for not
complying with laws
Respect company’s rules

190. Respect for society‘s laws

Encourage respect for laws of the society

191. Dedicated to the company

Encourage dedication to the company

192. My pride in myself doing my job to the best of
my ability drives me the most.
193. Relationship with my supervisor and /or those
that own the data I manage is important.
194. If a person does not come to follow the policies,
everyone is exposed.

Encourage self pride in the job

195. Does it hold to correct people responsible for
and failure of protecting this privacy
196. Does the policy make everyone responsible to
protecting the information?

Make the correct people accountable for
their actions
Make people responsible for protecting
the information

197. free expression

Encourage free expression

198. Desire to conform

Instill the desire to conform

199. Desire to meet expectations

203. Improper business process

Instill the desire into the employees to
meet the expectations about controls
Encourage flexibility in controls
Encourage efficient communication
policy within the organization
Develop corporate security control
strategy
Avoid improper business processes

204. Risk Management Strategy
205. This is where the proactive approach of putting

Establish a risk management strategy
Establish controls proactively

200. Have good changeability
201. Communication policy
202. Corporate security control strategy
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Nurture the relationship with employees
Ensure everyone follows the policies

in internal controls (just like burglar bars –
against burglars) to ensure that ―burglars‖ are
taken care of where there is a breach.
206. the psychology of the perpetrators should be
analyzed from this perspective and strategies
put in place for counter measures.

207. The best way to stop this internally is to instill
good principals into employees (control from
source)
208. a big stick for those who break the rules –
―whack‖ them hard so that it be lesson not only
for the rule breaker but for anyone who will try
to follow suite.
209. IT manages and facilities by installing suitable
environmental and physical controls which are
regularly reviewed for their proper functioning

210. Organizational responsibilities and formal
processes for ensuring compliance with
external requirements are clearly defined.

Ensure that action is taken against
people who break the law
Analyze the psychology of the
perpetrators
Create counter measures to deal with
destructive actions
Instill good principles into employees
Manage controls from the source of
problems i.e. employees
Establish clear punishments for rule
breakers
Set deterrence criteria to be followed
Establish suitable environmental and
physical controls
Regularly review the controls for proper
functioning
Create organizational responsibilities
for compliance
Formalize process of compliance in the
organization

Centralize controls functionality

Develop a central control functionality

Table: Common Form Values to Objectives
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Maximize Internal Controls for IS Security
No.

Common Form Values
Lack of awareness is a source of problems.
Responsiveness to media hype
Clarity of responsibility in organizations
Accountability for actions

Objectives
Increase awareness of security governance
Ensure responsiveness media hyped issues
Define responsibility and accountability of
controls for security governance

Leverage individual knowledge for
ensuring internal controls
Ensure awareness of organizational actions
and practices

Ensure learning about internal control
issues
Increase awareness of business activities
and processes

6.

Training should reflect principles of
internal controls rather than means of
ensuring security

Define training programs to reflect details
of internal controls

7.

Increase awareness of internal control
breaches through social engineering
Define policies for access to information
resources
Define multiple layers of controls

Increase awareness of breaches because of
social engineering
Define control policies for access to
information resources
Define multiple layers of controls

Define a system for incorporating feedback
to improve controls
Balance convenience with usability
Ensure compliance with internal controls
defined in the policy document
Individuals differences in managing
internal controls
Internal audit control practices need to
evolve with time and changing contexts

Institute feedback channels for security
governance
Balance convenience with usability
Ensure compliance with policy document

14.

Take input from various individuals
dealing with controls on a day to day basis

Incorporate feedbacks from people on
daily basis

15.

Auditing and compliance with controls is
also based on informal feedback from
trusted informants
Sit with people individually and take their
perspective on the process
Internal control audit involves cross
checking procedures with people
Individuals have ability to improve internal
controls.
Individuals constrained because of
resource allocations
Internal control auditors are indeed
consultants who ensure effectiveness of
controls

Encourage informal feedback from people
about controls

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

16.
17.
18.

19.
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Manage individual differences about
controls
Develop audit practices for changing
contexts of governance

Develop cross checking mechanisms for
audit function
Encourage individual to improve controls
Discourage individuals from feeling
restrained due to resources
Treat internal auditors as consultants to
ensure effectiveness of controls

20.

Internal control structures are not static.
Proper change management needed for
efficacy of controls

21.
22.

Controls should consider change of roles
Controls need to be tested appropriately

Develop dynamic internal control
structures
Develop effective change management
practices

Controls are created by the management
and employees
23.

High level controls are needed for direction
Specific controls use different approaches
by organizations

24.

Change management controls are
important

25.

Clarity of business processes for internal
controls
Encourage discussion on internal controls
as identified in the policies

Establish clarity in business processes

Be aware of industry frameworks and
models.
They guide proper internal control
formulation.
Generic frameworks need interpretation

Refer to industry models and frameworks
for control formulation

26.

27.

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

Following industry frameworks requires
preparations
Balancing centralization vs
decentralization (move to 9)
Consequences of internal control breaches
should be communicated. (move to under 3
above)
Encourage regulatory compliance to
internal controls
Establish a control consciousness culture
Establish a compliance culture
Auditing has gained importance as a
functionality
Regulations may be too strong to be
followed in entirety – define appropriate
internal controls in response to regulations
Regulations help in following the controls
better
Failure to comply with internal control
regulations scares people
Repeat compliance with regulations is
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Encourage discussion on internal controls
as identified in the policies

Balance centralization with
decentralizations
Communicate the consequences of internal
controls breaches
Encourage regulatory compliance to
internal controls
Establish a control consciousness culture
Establish a compliance culture

Define controls for compliance with
regulations

Explain the consequences of failure to
comply with regulations

38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

difficult
Internal control structures should reflect
sensitivity of data
Access to data resources should be
restricted
Identify data owners for sensitive data
Authorizations should be linked to data
owners
Encourage individual responsibility for
ensuring proper access to data resources.
Top management involvement in defining
internal controls for security
Top management should lead by example
when dealing with internal controls
Awareness of compliance issues is
important
Direction should be provided from the top
management
Role and privileges need to be properly
defined and documented
Data resources should be clearly classified
according to sensitivity level
Communication about the nature and scope
of controls is important
Education of employees regarding internal
controls is needed
Executives should be accountable for the
actions
Rules should be followed
Change attitude of executives about
security controls

Establish control structure to reflect
sensitivity in data

Identify data owners for sensitive data
Link data owners with authorizations
Encourage individual responsibility for
ensuring proper access to data resources.
Involve top management to defined
internal controls
Encourage top management to lead by
example

Define and document roles and privileges
properly

Communicate about nature and scope of
controls
Encourage education about internal
controls

Change attitude of executives about
security controls

Executives impact the organization‘s
attitude towards security
Security requirements define internal
controls
Continuously update internal control
requirements in security policies
Education is an important control for
security

Not sure

54.

Controls need to be people oriented. Need
to understand feelings, attitudes and belief
of people.

Develop people oriented controls
Understand people‘s attitudes and beliefs
about controls

55.

Security awareness training is important
for good controls
Engage in an IT architecture review, which

Ensure IT architecture review for

51.
52.
53.

56.

Ensure internal controls meet security
requirements
Reflect control requirements in security
policies
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57.

58.
59.

60.

61.
62.

helps in correctness of design

correctness of design

All program codes should be adequately
reviewed
Change management process is important

Ensure adequate review of programs

All guidelines for governance need to be
defined by consensus
Change management should be adequately
emphasized
Relevance of all controls needs to be
adequately discussed
Controls in business processes are not an
after-thought, they are designed and built
as part of a change initiative
Do not agitate employees
Sudden changes in responsibility structures
are not good for security governance
Do not impose new rules on employees
without careful consideration and proper
buy-in

63.

develop guidelines using consensus

Discuss adequately the relevance f controls

Develop controls as a part of change
initiative
Discourage employee agitation
Discourage sudden changes responsibility
structures

Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules

Demonstrate clearly roles and
responsibilities
Organizational members need to
understand that certain tasks, controls and
actions have a priority

Explain priotization of tasks and actions
for controls to members

64.

Auditing functions and actions need to be
separated

Establish difference between audit
functionality and actions

65.

Controls need to be at all levels of the
organization – higher levels as well as
lower levels

Develop controls for all the levels in the
organization

Identity management is perhaps the most
important control in organizations
Controls need to be periodically evaluated
by external auditors
Controls should be related to the IT
architecture

Develop identity management control

Controls need to be instituted as part of
organizational design
There needs to be a management function
that ensures efficacy of controls

Institute controls as part of organizational
design
Ensure efficacy of controls through the
management

66.
67.

68.
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Ensure periodic review of controls from
external auditors
Establish the relation between controls and
IT architecture

69.

70.

71.

Separate office is required for maintenance
The nature of controls determines that kind
of tools necessary for management

Develop flexibility in tools for controls

Resources need to be allocated for
maintaining controls
Accountability and responsibility is
required

Ensure adequate resources allocation for
maintenance of controls

Consequences of non compliance to
controls needs to be communicated to the
employees
Explain the meaning of criminal action to
the employees

Communicate the consequences of non
compliance of ontrols
Explain the meaning of criminal action to
the employees

Explain the consequences of action
72.
73.

74.

75.

76.

77.
78.

79.

Security governance has to be a functional
requirement
Ensure that companies do the right thing
Training is required to help organizations
do the right thing
Bridge the gap between different
functionalities in the organization

Develop security governance as a
functional requirement

Bridge the gap between different
functionalities in the organization

MIS and accounting have to coordinate for
better controls
Provide training to technology oriented
people such that they are responsive for
compliance purposes

Encourage co-ordination between MIS and
accounting for controls

Explain the importance and need for
compliance to technical people
Better change management practices in the
organization

Explain the importance and need for
compliance to technical people

Appreciation for cultural aspects needs to
be central in organizing security
governance controls
Review of controls should be in light of the
organizational objectives
Ensure that security governance is an
antecedent to complete security and
process integrity
Control assessment and implementation
should be undertaken in a continuous
iterative manner

Encourage appreciation for security
governance culture

Control implementation should not be an
after-thought

Discourage planning about control
implement ion as after thought
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Review controls with respect to
organizational objectives
Ensure that security governance is an
antecedent to complete security and
process integrity
Ensure continuously iterative control
assessment and implementation

80.

One needs to understand the organizational
context for control implementation.
Controls cannot be implemented using a
―clean slate approach‖

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

Security governance controls need to be
simple and easy to use
Make sure to have continuous
improvement
Establish standardization in the control
process
Create systemization in control
development process
Establish trust in the organization
Controls should reflect timeliness
Have a result oriented attitude
One needs to appreciate the impact of
organizational power structures while
establishing controls
Respect the rights of others

Understand the organizational context of
controls implementation

Use clean slate approach for controls
implementation
Develop simple and easy to use controls

Establish standardization in the control
process
Create systemization in control
development process
Establish trust in the organization
Ensure timeliness in controls
Develop a result oriented attitude
Understand organizational power
structures in developing controls
Respect the rights of others

Respect other people‘s confidence

Respect other people‘s confidence

Respect other people‘s personal
information
People should have accountability for their
action
Establish positive reinforcement for doing
the right thing

Respect other people‘s personal
information

Establish positive reinforcement for doing
the things right

93.

Establish positive reinforcement for doing
the things right
Establish clear negative consequences for
failure to do the right things
Establish a security conscious culture

94.

Establish a culture where individuals watch
out for each other
Top management should ―walk the talk‖

Establish a culture where individuals watch
out for each other
Encourage the management to ―walk the
talk‖

90.
91.

92.

Top management should be visibly
accountable for actions

Establish a security conscious culture

Encourage transparency about
accountability for actions

Visibility in ensuring the policies and
procedures are same for all
95.

Establish positive reinforcement for doing
the right thing

Hold all stakeholders to same standard of
care appropriate to their roles
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Enhance visibility about fairness of
policies and procedures
Ensure appropriate care to all stakeholders

96.
97.

98.

99.

Use regulations as a catalyst for better
security governance practices
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and
sustained improvement in business
processes

Use regulations as a catalyst for better
practices
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and
sustained improvement in business
processes

Lack of security governance culture turns
compliance into check the box exercise
View security governance as cost of doing
business

Avoid turning compliance into check the
box exercise
View security governance as cost of doing
business

Security governance is not a negotiable
budget-line item
Security controls should be achievable

Ensure that security governace is a nonnegotiable budget line item
Develop achievable objectives

Security controls should have measurable
objectives
Governance control objectives should align
with enterprise objectives
100
100.
101.
102.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Develop measurable security control
objectives

Encourage communication amongst
employees about control issues
Encourage discussion amongst employees
about control issues
Encourage debate amongst employees
about control issues
Compare regularly the security governance
state across the industry

Align security control objectives with
enterprise objectives
Encourage communication amongst
employees about control issues
Encourage discussion amongst employees
about control issues
Encourage debate amongst employees
about control issues
Compare the state of controls with
standards across industry

Benchmark security governance practices
with industry standards

Benchmark security governance practices
with industry standards

Benchmark security governance
investments against industry standards

Benchmark security governance
investments against industry standards

Security leaders should be well respected
in the organizational culture
Perceive security leaders/auditors as valued
contributors
Auditors should be able to navigate freely
across the organization
Peer collaboration in security governance
is important
Rewards for compliance with policies
should be ensured
Apply and reinforce recognition for
complying with policies
Explain the consequences of non
compliance with policies
Grant access to people not positions

Ensure respect for security leaders
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Ensure adequate access to auditors across
the organization
Encourage collaboration with peers
Ensure rewarding for conformity with
policies
Provide recognition for complying with
policies

111.

Be aware of the morality of the staff

Understand the morality of the staff
Avoid bureaucratic delays

112.
113.

Do not delay small things for bureaucratic
reasons
Focus on ownership of the information
it is helpful though to have a separate
controls department…that would get the
money required…

114.
115.

Ensure employee satisfaction
Maintain and integrate the information
properly

Ensure employee satisfaction
Maintain and integrate the information
properly

116.

Encourage internal competition to stay
within groups

Encourage internal competition to stay
within groups

Create an environment of leadership style
and culture to minimize intergroup rivalry
Structure your information needs
Make management/leadership available
when the need arises
Training with examples
Provide specific examples of how work
should be done
Develop audit process to integrate the
information rules
Personal integrity influences individual
behavior towards controls

Create an environment of leadership style
and culture to minimize intergroup rivalry
Ensure structuring the information needs
Ensure availability of the management

Personal integrity influences group
behavior towards controls
Ensure honor of the employees
Ensure that truth is being told

Respect personal integrity in a group

Go beyond the norms to protect honor of
individuals

Protect honor of the individuals

Enhance an environment of trust in the
organization
Politics undermines the security
governance

Enhance an environment of trust in the
organization
Discourage politics in the organization

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.

124.
125.

Ensure ownership of information
Develop a central controls department

Ensure training with examples
Illustrate with specific work related
examples
Develop audit process to integrate the
information rules
Encourage personal integrity

Ensure honor of the employees
Ensure that truth is being told

Discourage favoritism in groups
Avoid favoritism in groups
Discourage self interest in groups
126.

127.

Avoid self interest in group
Ensure individuals with strong moral
values to access data

Encourage access to individuals with
strong moral values

Ensure individuals with strong values to
audit the systems
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls
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Ensure strong moral values in auditors
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.

Institute corrective measures for
continuous monitoring
Ensure that key individuals enforce rules
and remedial solutions
Do not create barriers to people doing their
job
Be flexible and strong to protect company
assets
Do things that are acceptable and respected
by people
Educate people

Institute corrective measures for
continuous monitoring
Ensure that key individuals enforce rules
and remedial solutions
Discourage impeding people from their job

Explain to people why they are doing what
they are doing
Manage changes in the organization
properly

Explain the rationale behind controls

Protect company assets
Encourage acceptable and respectable
actions
Educate people

Manage changes efficiently
Manage changes in production systems

Changes in production systems should be
managed
134.

135.
136.
137.

138.
139.

140.

141.

Encourage the ability to share the work

Encourage the ability to share the work

Ability to share responsibility is important

Encourage responsibility charing

Credit about a good work should be shared
properly

Encourage sharing the credit for good work

Ability to share is a fundamental measure
of integrity
Have enough technical protections in the
organization
Have protection against disgruntled
employees
Trust is important in the organization
Create controls in work process to ensure
procedures are followed
Perform a risk assessment to develop
controls
Physical security is important part of
security

Ensure adequate technical controls
Ensure protection against disgruntled
employees
Encourage trust

Create controls to follow the procedures
Ensure risks assessment to develop
controls

Create controls for accessing information
from garbage
Assess the damage to the organization
from lack of control

Ensure damage assessment to the
organization from lack of controls

Assess damage to the individual from lack
of controls
No single person should have all the rights

Ensure damage assessment for individuals
from lack of controls
Discourage providing all rights to an
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142.

143.

or access
Own up the responsibility for any deviation
in the normal business process

individual
Understand the business processes
Understand the impact of regulations on
controls

Regulations have changed the way
companies look at controls
Organizations are spending resources on
compliance
Ensure what is being claimed is being done
Ensure that people see value in controls
Explain clearly the disciplinary actions
Do not make complex controls
Explain the purpose of control to people.
The complexity derive adherence of
controls.
Ensure that controls are easy to use
Communicate importance of controls
Ownership of control should reside in
functionality
Management should be committed to
controls.
The ownership of control should not lie
with IT department
Ensure that the regulations are followed.
Follow regulations in entirety
Differentiate between lines of business.
Create prevention mentality
Encourage open mindedness to provide
inputs.
Group behavior is governed by peer
pressure.

Provide resources for compliance

Understand the influence of peer pressure
on individual behavior
Ensure ease of use of controls.
Ensure job design around IS needs.
Create convenient policy
Ensure controls are a priority for the
management
Ensure regulations are followed
Ensure regulations protect stakeholders

166.
167.
168.

Peer pressure influences individual
behavior.
Ensure ease of use of controls.
Ensure job design around IS needs.
Create convenient policy
Management should make controls its
priority
Ensure regulations are followed
Regulations protect the organization and
the investors
Encourage discipline in the organization
Align personal and organizational values
Reward good performance

169.

Encourage an environment of conformity

Encourage an environment of conformity

Environment of conformity affects
individual behavior

Environment of conformity affects
individual behavior

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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Ensure what is being claimed is being done
Ensure that people see value in controls
Explain clearly the disciplinary actions
Discourage complex controls
Explain the purpose of controls

Ensure that controls are easy to use
Communicate importance of controls

Ensure management commitment to
controls
Ensure that IT department does not have
the ownership of controls
Ensure that the regulations are followed.
Follow regulations in entirety
Differentiate between lines of business.
Create prevention mentality
Encourage open mindedness to provide
inputs.
Understand the group behavior due to peer
pressure

Encourage discipline in the organization
Align personal and organizational values
Reward good performance

170.

Instill risk consciousness in the employees

Develop risk consciousness in the
employees

Each department should take care of its
controls plan
Encourage a sense of responsibility
Balance between gains and losses from the
controls
Differentiate between type of industry
Provide strong leadership

Ensure departments have control plan
Encourage a sense of responsibility
Balance between gains and losses from the
controls
Differentiate between type of industry
Provide strong leadership

Explain the reasons behind organizational
actions

Explain the reasons behind organizational
actions

Explain the risks and values of controls to
users

Explain the risks and values of controls to
users

176.

Educate users regularly
Encourage committed IT personnel to be in
visible positions
Encourage honesty

Educate users regularly
Encourage committed IT personnel to be in
visible positions
Encourage honesty

177.
178.

Encourage determination about following
controls
Encourage personal integrity
Instill good values in the organization

Encourage determination about following
controls
Encourage personal integrity
Ensure good values about security
governance
Create controls culture in the organization
Encourage control conscious attitude of
supervisors
Ensure disciplinary action against unethical
behavior

171.
172.
173.
174.

175.

179.
180.
181.

182.
183.
184.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Create controls culture in the organization
Encourage control conscious attitude of
supervisors
Take disciplinary action against unethical
behavior
Action against unethical actions influences
individual behavior

Ensure action against unethical behavior

Behavior is influenced by level of
confidentiality of the information
Do not create an environment of fear
Discourage secrecy amongst employees

Define responsibilities according to level
of confidentiality of information
Discourage an environment of fear
Discourage secrecy amongst employees

Discourage an environment of mistrust
Assess the criticality of data integrity
Ensure confidentiality
Assess the sensitivity of the information
Make the polices readily accessible
Create a fear of punishment for
organizations

Discourage an environment of mistrust
Assess the criticality of data integrity
Ensure confidentiality
Assess the sensitivity of the information
Ensure policies are readily available
Create a fear of punishment for
organizations

Establish clear consequences for not

Establish clear consequences for not
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complying with laws
Respect company‘s rules
Encourage respect for laws of the society
Encourage dedication to the company
Encourage self pride in the job
Nurture the relationship with employees
Ensure everyone follows the policies
Ensure accountability

203.
204.
205.
206.

complying with laws
Respect company‘s rules
Encourage respect for laws of the society
Encourage dedication to the company
Encourage self pride in the job
Nurture the relationship with employees
Ensure everyone follows the policies
Make the correct people accountable for
their actions
Make people responsible for protecting the
information
Encourage free expression
Instill the desire to conform
Instill the desire into the employees to
meet the expectations about controls
Encourage flexibility in controls
Encourage efficient communication policy
within the organization
Develop corporate security control strategy
Avoid improper business processes
Establish a risk management strategy
Establish controls proactively

207.

Ensure that action is taken against people
who break the law
Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators

Ensure that action is taken against people
who break the law
Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators

208.

Create counter measures to deal with
destructive actions
Instill good principles into employees

Create counter measures to deal with
destructive actions
Instill good principles into employees

Manage controls from the source of
problems i.e. employees
Establish clear punishments for rule
breakers

Manage controls from the source of
problems i.e. employees
Establish clear punishments for rule
breakers

Set deterrence criteria to be followed
Establish suitable environmental and
physical controls

Set deterrence criteria to be followed
Establish suitable environmental and
physical controls

Regularly review the controls for proper
functioning
Create organizational responsibilities for
compliance

Regularly review the controls for proper
functioning
Create organizational responsibilities for
compliance

Formalize process of compliance in the
organization

Formalize process of compliance in the
organization

Centralize your controls functionality. It is
important to have all the controls work
under the same umbrella.

Centralize controls functionality

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

209.

210.

211.
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Ensure responsibility for protecting
information
Encourage free expression
Instill the desire to conform
Instill the desire into the employees to
meet the expectations about controls
Encourage flexibility in controls
Encourage efficient communication policy
within the organization
Develop corporate security control strategy
Avoid improper business processes
Establish a risk management strategy
Establish controls proactively

Objectives for Maximizing Information Systems Security Governance

F1

1 Fundamental Objectives (condensed after completion of Phase 1)
Objective Name
Condensed objectives
Ensure corporate controls
Establish security controls as non-negotiable budgetary item
strategy
Encourage planning about power structures in developing
controls
Establish security governance as n antecedent to complete
security
Establish security as cost of doing business

F2

Encourage a controls conscious
culture

Ensure departments have control plan and tools
Encourage appreciation for prevention mentality
Encourage a culture where individuals watch out for each other

F3

Maximize Clarity in Policies and
Procedures

Ensure an obedient culture
Enhance visibility about fairness of policies and procedures
Ensure reflecting control requirements in policies
Improve the accessibility of the policies in the organization

F4

Maximize Regulatory
Compliance

Encourage discussion on internal controls as identified in the
policies
Encourage development of controls for regulatory compliance
Improve security governance practices using compliance as a
‗catalyst‘
Establish a compliance culture

F5

Ensure continuous iterative
control assessment

Follow compliance in its entirety
Improve controls implementation practices continuously
Encourage validation of controls with changing contexts
Establish organizational context for control implementation
Enable effective change management practices
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Means objectives (Condensed after completion of Phase 1 of the study)
M1

Objectives
Ensure Efficacy of
Audit Processes

Condensed Sub-Objectives
Encourage audit processes to integrate information rules
Ensure audit practices for changing contexts of governance task
Ensure adequate access to auditors across the organization

M2
M3

Maximize clarity in
business processes
Ensure
Communication
about Controls

Encourage internal auditors as consultants to ensure effectiveness of
controls
Enable clarity in business related activities
Ensure sound understanding of business processes
Encourage communicating scope and intent of the controls
Improve inter and intra group employee communications about controls
Encourage frequent debates about risks and values of controls
Explain the damages from lack of controls

M4

Ensure Alignment of
Individual and
Organizational
Values

Enable efficient communications policy
Encourage aligning personal and organizational values
Encourage respect for individuals’ privacy
Increase individual loyalty to the organization

M5

Ensure data criticality

Improve individual’s attitudes and beliefs about controls
Ensure data classification according to sensitivity
Enable data ownership
Ensure data is linked to authorizations

M6

Ensure punitive
structures

Ensure identity management
Ensure action against unacceptable behavior
Ensure clear consequences for non conformity
Encourage defining criminal behavior clearly

M7

Ensure clarity in
control development
process

Improve discipline in the organization
Encourage development of simple and easy to use controls
Ensure timely and flexible controls
Ensure multi layered nested controls
Ensure risks assessment to develop controls
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M8

Ensure formal
controls assessment
functionality

Ensure a centralized controls assessment functionality
Improve controls as part of organizational design
Encourage integration of controls into IT architecture
Encourage usability assessment of controls
Encourage stakeholder participation in controls
Minimize bureaucratic delays
Discourage planning about control implementation as “after thought”

M9

Maximize
monitoring and
feedback channels

Ensure balance between gains and losses from the controls
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls
Ensure periodic review of controls by external auditors
Encourage development of feedback channels for security goervancne

M10

Ensure Visible
Executive leadership

Encourage review of controls with respect to organizational objectives
Encourage the management to “walk the talk”
Encourage top management to lead by example
Encourage committed IT personnel to be in visible positions

M11

Maximize Group
Cohesiveness

M12

Maximize
management
commitment

Encourage control conscious attitude of supervisors
Encourage sharing the credit for good work
Minimize favoritism in groups
Ensure management commitment to controls efficiency
Encourage rewarding conformance with controls
Increase positive reinforcement for doing the right thing
Ensure open environment
Discourage impeding people from their job

M13

M14

Maximize resource
allocation for
controls
Encourage
Standardization of

Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules
Ensure resources for controls
Enable appropriate environmental and physical controls
Ensure cross functional group agreement on controls
Encourage benchmarking controls against industry standards
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M15

Controls

Encourage comparison of controls in same line of business

Maximize Training
and Education

Maximize regular training with work related examples
Improve knowledge about relevance of controls

M16

Ensure ethical and
moral values

Encourage awareness about control breaches
Encourage individual ethical and moral values
Encourage individual self pride in job

M17

Maximize trust
building mechanisms

Encourage morality of the staff
Increase trust in the organization
Reduce fear in the organization
Decrease politics in the organization
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